Eurasianism Political Philosophy and the Novorossiya Project

Putin’s long game? Meet the Eurasian Union
It starts in 2015 and sounds like a scheme to rebuild the USSR, but its history is quite different — and troubling for the West
Leon Neyfakh, Globe Staff
The Boston Globe | March 09, 2014

What is Vladimir Putin up to? The crisis in Ukraine, brought to a boil when Russia’s president sent troops into the Crimean peninsula, has created almost a cottage industry of guessing at the autocratic leader’s intentions from one day to the next.

When it comes to Putin’s long-term strategy, however, there is at least one concrete plan that offers some insight, and one specific date that Russia observers are looking ahead to. That date, Jan. 1, 2015, is expected to mark the birth of an important new organization linking Russia with an as-yet-undetermined constellation of its neighboring countries—an alliance Putin has dubbed the Eurasian Union.

Currently, only two nations besides Russia, Belarus and Kazakstan, have signed on. A number of other post-Soviet states, including Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, have signaled interest in joining. It’s expected to build on an existing regional trade pact to establish common policies on labor migration, investment, trade, and energy.

But from the moment Putin announced his plan, experts have believed he sees it as the linchpin of something much larger: a new geopolitical force capable of standing up to Russia’s competitors on the world stage in a way it hasn’t been able to since the fall of the Soviet Union. “We suggest a powerful supranational association capable of becoming one of the poles in the modern world,” wrote Putin in the 2011 op-ed in which he first described his vision.

For all its ambition and the grandeur of its name, the Eurasian Union hasn’t been discussed much in the West outside of foreign-policy circles; when asked about it recently, the State Department declined to comment. This does not mean US officials aren’t worried about its implications. In December 2012, then-Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton made a remark that, to date, seems to represent the American government’s only public position on Putin’s idea: “There is a move to re-Sovietise the region,” she said. And while of course the new entity wouldn’t be called the USSR, she said, “Let’s make no mistake about it. We know what the goal is and we are trying to figure out effective ways to slow down or prevent it.”

It’s tempting to see it that way, not least because Putin famously once said the breakup of the Soviet Union was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,” and has also reportedly promised that the Eurasian Union would be based on the “best values of the Soviet Union.” But to say the project is simply an effort to reassemble the USSR is crude and incorrect, say Russia analysts. Instead, Putin’s efforts should be seen as a realization of an entirely different, and much less familiar idea called Eurasianism—a philosophy that has roots in the 1920s, and which grew out of Russia’s longstanding identity crisis about whether or not it should strive to be a part of Europe.

In recent years, the philosophy has been embraced by a swath of activists and political actors in the post-Soviet region, including some radical right-wing thinkers whose version of Eurasianism is built on a bluntly fascist ideology. While there are also some Russians promoting the Eurasian Union who believe a more moderate version of the philosophy is possible, Western critics say that Putin will need some kind of ideological glue to hold it together, and it’s most likely to take the form of a forceful antidemocratic, anti-Western worldview.

The extent to which Putin is truly driven by any kind of Eurasianist philosophy—as opposed to, say, a raw appetite for power and drive for a stronger Russia—is as opaque as any of his plans. But it’s worth noting, as the situation in Ukraine continues to unfold, that Russia experts have always considered that country the crown jewel—and even a necessary anchor—of any successful version of the Eurasian Union. “If you have Ukraine, the Eurasian Union moves a little further west, and puts it right on the border of the EU,” said Hannah Thoburn, a Eurasia analyst at the Foreign Policy Initiative, a Washington-based nonprofit. “Russia desperately wants to have Ukraine.”


Russia has spent much of its existence in a kind of tense suspension between Europe and Central Asia. Its landmass lies mostly in Asia, but its proud history of music, art, and literature are more closely associated with Europe.

That identity crisis has been part of Russian life for centuries, and it was in this context that a group of early 20th-century thinkers started making the argument that the people of Russia and Central Asia should not strive to contort themselves into Europeans, but rather assert themselves as a cultural and political force unto themselves.

What began as an emotional aversion to the prospect of Russia and its neighbors being “eternal disciples” to the West, wrote Russian political commentator Leonid Radzihovsky in an e-mail, became the basis for the theory of Eurasianism: “that the Slavic world must follow a separate path—that it should not be a second-rate Europe, but another type of civilization altogether.”

The Eurasian dream was eclipsed by the Bolshevik revolution and the formation of the Soviet Union, whose power stretched deep into Europe, and whose ideology vied for minds all around the globe. But after the USSR collapsed in 1991, the idea came back to life, said Jeffrey Mankoff, the deputy director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic & International Studies. Suddenly the relationship between the former Soviet states was again a totally open question.

In the geopolitical sense, Eurasianism isn’t much more than a policy orientation, a belief that Russia is better served by building its own coalition instead of aligning with the economies of the West. Where observers get worried is who, exactly, is carrying the flag for it now—in particular a thinker named Aleksandr Dugin, founder of Russia’s Eurasia Party and the figure most closely associated with what has come to be known as Neo-Eurasianism.

Though initially seen as a marginal figure in Russian politics, Dugin—who is said to be a professor in the sociology department at Moscow State University—has been a prolific author and tenacious public figure since the 1990s, giving speeches and appearing on television to press his cause. In a YouTube video promoting the Eurasian movement, Dugin is shown pointing a rocket launcher toward the sky, while a thundering soundtrack of Russian hymns mixed with threatening heavy metal plays in the background. His followers carry black flags with an aggressive logo of arrows bursting outward. He once wrote that the country needs an “authentic, real, radically revolutionary and consistent fascism.” More recently, he weighed in on the crisis in Ukraine with a column calling for “the liberation of Europe from the very Atlanticist occupiers who caused the catastrophe in Kiev.”

While the language and aesthetics may sound like the definition of fringe, Dugin has become increasingly influential over time. According to fascism scholar Anton Shekhovtsov, he “entered the mainstream” when he became an adviser to the head of the State Duma, Russia’s parliamentary body, in 1998. Today, Shekhovtsov, says, “his ideas are taken seriously by people who are close to Putin.”

Dugin and his followers may be the most worrisome face of Eurasianism, but they are not its only supporters; other Eurasianists disdain him as a fascist using the philosophy for his own ends. Among these is Yuri Kofner, the founder of the Eurasian Youth Movement, a clean-cut, blond 20something who makes friendly YouTube videos in English aimed at Westerners who might be curious about the Eurasian dream. “Dugin has used the Eurasian ideology and twisted it,” said Kofner in an interview. He added, “Other Eurasianists, like myself, believe he does a very harmful thing to the Eurasian idea by making it seem very imperialistic, which is something that people from other post-Soviet countries cannot agree with.”

But while Kofner and others may distance themselves from Dugin, they are not shy about their hopes for what the Eurasian Union will one day become. In this, they see Putin as an ally.

“The thing is, Putin and his people are very practical,” Kofner said. “The algorithm in their mind is: First, we’ll build an economic union, we’ll keep it calm, we’ll keep it cool, we won’t talk a lot about it in an ideological sense, and then step by step [we’ll work to create a sense of cultural unity] and then maybe we’ll add something political, like a common parliament.”


It is impossible to say whether a belief in any particular style of Eurasianism is what drove Putin to push for a Eurasian Union. “He’s always had an intellectual affiliation with Eurasianist thinkers,” said Thoburn, “but he didn’t really talk at all about this idea of the Eurasian Union [until relatively recently].”

For the most part Putin has spoken of the Eurasian Union in purely economic terms—the official name of the organization is the Eurasian Economic Union—and has rejected, more than once, as nonsense all suggestions that it’s meant to create a new Russian empire. But he has also made remarks that indicate he envisions something deeper than a mere economic alliance, echoing some basic aspects of Eurasianist thinking. At a televised conference last year, for example, he described the Eurasian Union as “a project to preserve the identity of the people who inhabit the historic Eurasian space,” and said, “Eurasian integration is a chance for the post-Soviet space to become an independent center for global development—not a peripherality to Europe or Asia.”

While many Russia observers are skeptical that in pursuing the Eurasian Union Putin has in mind some abstract idea about the Slavic world’s historic fate as a civilization, there are others—Yale historian Timothy Snyder in the New York Review of Books, Robert Zubrin in the National Review—who have warned against underestimating the influence of Neo-Eurasianist philosophy on Putin’s thinking.

Putin’s vision of the Eurasian Union, the argument goes, is going to require a shared ideology to succeed, and while that ideology won’t be communism, as it was in the USSR, the history and rhetoric of the Eurasian movement suggests that it will inevitably be some hodge-podge of anti-Western, antiliberal thought.

“What unites these countries is that they all have autocratic or semi-autocratic regimes,” said Robert Legvold, professor emeritus and Russia specialist at Columbia University, referring to post-Soviet states like Belarus and Kazakstan. “The one thing that unites them is that they’re against US efforts at democracy building around the world.”

One intriguing argument that’s been made by Russia observers in recent weeks is that the Kremlin’s very high-profile campaign against gays and the increasingly intimate relationship it has established with the Russian Orthodox church are part of a broader effort to “brand” Russia as the bedrock of traditional values working to fight back the tide of moral corruption emanating from the West. This, too, could strengthen its role as the center of a new Eurasian power structure. “Part of this idea of contrasting Eurasia from the West is that they live according to different values,” said Mankoff. “So Putin talks about how the West has become decadent…and its embrace of gay marriage as being an example of that.”


Last week, as Russian forces maintained their position in the Crimean peninsula, the leaders of Belarus and Kazakstan held a meeting with Putin—previously scheduled for later in the month, but pushed up in light of the situation in Ukraine—to discuss the Eurasian Union treaty. There is reason to think Belarus and Kazakstan were spooked by Putin’s decision to use military force in the situation with Ukraine, and are perhaps now reevaluating their decision to forge closer ties.

Given how much it appears to worry his allies, it might be surprising that Putin would have played such a strong hand in Ukraine last week. But that, say many observers, suggests just how much he has invested in this idea. Ukraine—with its steel mills, coal plants, bountiful agricultural resources, and massive population of 46 million people—has always, according to Russia experts, been key to Putin’s vision for the Eurasian Union.

“Ukraine is the big one,” said Alexander Cooley, a political science professor at Barnard College who studies post-Soviet countries. “The others are small and weak.” For this reason, he said, the success of the Eurasian Union “hinges on Ukraine’s participation and cooperation.”

Last fall, when it seemed like Ukraine was on a path toward closer ties with the West, and the government was taking steps toward signing an “association agreement” with the European Union, the Kremlin intervened and convinced the country’s now-deposed president to back out. The following month, Putin announced that Russia would buy $15 billion worth of Ukrainian government bonds—widely seen as compensation for sticking by Moscow. Viewed in isolation, the episode was nothing more than a very expensive game of tug-of-war. In light of Putin’s Eurasian dream, it was an investment in a legacy.

Putin himself, of course, hasn’t spoken about his actions in Crimea in these terms: He has framed it as a measure to protect the region’s Russian population in the wake of a coup. But as we watch his next moves, it’s worth remembering that, whether or not he got it from Eurasianist thinkers, at the core of his foreign policy agenda lies the belief that Russia’s destiny is to forge its own path.

Last December, Putin was asked a question at a conference about whether he planned to invest in infrastructure projects that would take advantage of the fact that Russia’s geography puts it squarely in between the East and the West. Without pausing, Putin responded by objecting to the premise of the question. “You said that Russia is located ‘between’ the West and the East. But in fact, it’s the West and the East that are to the left and right of Russia.”


Alternative identity, alternative religion? Neo-paganism and the Aryan myth in contemporary Russia
Nations & Nationalism. Apr2008, Vol. 14 Issue 2, p283-301. 19p

Abstract: As in all post-Soviet states, the Russian intelligentsia has been preoccupied with the construction of a new national identity since the beginning of the 1990s. Although the place of Orthodox religion in Russia is well documented, the subject of neo-paganism and its consequent assertion of an Aryan identity for Russians remains little known. Yet specialists observing the political and intellectual life of contemporary Russia have begun to notice that the development of references to ‘Slavic paganism’ and to Russia’s ‘Aryan’ origin can be found in the public speeches of some politicians and intellectual figures. This article will attempt, in its first section, to depict the historical depth of these movements by examining the existence of neo-pagan and/or Aryan referents in Soviet culture, and focusing on how these discourses developed in different spheres of post-Soviet Russian society, such as those of religion, historiography, and politics.


Behind the Ukranian Crisis: Alexander Dugin, Eurasianism, and the Nouvelle Droite
Showdown of Arms | April 15th, 2014

The controlled media at present is alight with features and exposes on the situation between Russia and Ukraine and this week’s newest “new Hitler” Vladimir Putin; besides being derivative and lacking intellectual vigor; this shibboleth should inform you of the motivating forces behind the media and political establishments of the West. Some are aware of the cultural-political, strategic and economic reasons for the reincorporation of Crimea into the Russian fold. Far fewer are aware of the ideological and philosophical underpinnings for the situation.

The question of the hour is; what is Russia doing and why? The Russian strategy is grounded in the geopolitical agenda of Eurasianism. As the name implies, Eurasianism is a projected political alliance between the nations of Europe and Asia (including Russia and the Islamic world) designed to counteract what is termed the “Atlanticism” of American-European Union objectives/agendas. Eurasianism has a long history stretching back to the 1920’s Russian émigré community, where many of its ideas were formed. However the man most closely associated with the doctrine today as well as responsible for its modern form is Alexander Dugin.

Dugin was born on January 7th, 1962 in Moscow. In his youth, he worked as a journalist and became involved in Pamyat, an Orthodox-Christian nationalist group and later the National Bolshevik Party and then eventually with Vladimir Putin’s political machine. In 2001, Dugin formed the Eurasia Party and the Eurasia Movement. Supported by both the government and Orthodox-Christian establishment in Russia, Alexander Dugin’s Eurasia Movement stands on the threshold of a seismic shift in world power. He is truly one of the handful of people whom are actively contributing to and affecting the historical process unfolding before our eyes. His 1997 book, “Foundations of Geopolitics” has been very influential in elite circles within the Russian government and lays out his geopolitical strategy. The Eurasian Party is the political entity pursuing the goals enumerated in Foundations.

The Eurasia Movement can be described as a branch of the Nouvelle Droit or New Right, which is a collective of philosophers and political parties across Europe and America whom oppose the forces of modernity, given form in the doctrines of Cultural Marxism and stand for the restoration of European traditionalism. The Nouvelle Droit advocates a complete break from the left-right political dichotomy entrenched in liberal Western democracies. Instead it incorporates useful facets of both as well as novel approaches of its own, constituting a political third or in some cases, fourth position; a kind of syncretism. Key individuals in this movement include Alain deBenoist, Tomislav Sunic, Guillaume Faye, Michael O’Meara and of course Alexander Dugin. Key political parties include the German National Democratic Party, the British National Party, the Golden Dawn of Greece, Jobbik of Hungary and the National Front of France.

In addition, the Eurasian Movement incorporates the ideas of Jean-François Thiriart, whom advocated self-determination for the peoples of the world and a pan-European outlook, a kind of Europe-wide nationalism for the European peoples.The agenda of the Eurasian Movement can be summarized as intended to form axes of power throughout the world by which American world hegemony can be undermined and ultimately displaced by a Finlandized Europe where larger and more powerful nations have a sphere of influence over smaller nations. In the words of Dugin, Europe would be united in common cause “from Lisbon to Vladivostok”. Specifically Dugin’s book, Foundations of Geopolitics and the English language condensed version; The Fourth Political Theory, outline several prescriptions of this type, among them:

In Europe:

Germany should be offered the de facto political dominance over most Protestant and Catholic states located within Central and Eastern Europe. Kaliningrad oblast could be given back to Germany. The book uses the term a "Moscow-Berlin axis".

France should be encouraged to form a "Franco-German bloc" with Germany as both countries have a "firm anti-Atlanticist tradition".

The United Kingdom should be cut off from Europe.

Finland should be absorbed into Russia. Southern Finland will be combined with the Republic of Karelia and northern Finland will be "donated to Murmansk Oblast".

Estonia should be given to Germany’s sphere of influence.

Latvia and Lithuania should be given a "special status" in the Eurasian-Russian sphere.

Poland should be granted a "special status" in the Eurasian sphere.

Romania, Macedonia, "Serbian Bosnia" and Greece – "orthodox collectivist East" – will unite with "Moscow the Third Rome" and reject the "rational-individualistic West".

Ukraine should be annexed by Russia because "Ukraine as an independent state with certain territorial ambitions represents an enormous danger for all of Eurasia and, without resolving the Ukrainian problem, it is in general senseless to speak about continental politics". Ukraine should not be allowed to remain independent, unless it is cordon sanitaire, which would be inadmissible.

In the Middle East and Central Asia:

The book stresses the "continental Russian-Islamic alliance" which lies "at the foundation of anti-Atlanticist strategy". The alliance is based on the "traditional character of Russian and Islamic civilization".

Iran is a key ally. The book uses the term "Moscow-Tehran axis".

Armenia has a special role and will serve as a "strategic base" and it is necessary to create "the [subsidiary] axis Moscow-Erevan-Teheran". Armenians "are an Aryan people … [like] the Iranians and the Kurds".

Azerbaijan could be "split up" or given to Iran.

Georgia should be dismembered. Abkhazia and "United Ossetia" (which includes Georgia’s South Ossetia) will be incorporated into Russia. Georgia’s independent policies are unacceptable.

Russia needs to create "geopolitical shocks" within Turkey. These can be achieved by employing Kurds, Armenians and other minorities.

The book regards the Caucasus as a Russian territory, including "the eastern and northern shores of the Caspian (the territories of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan)" and Central Asia (mentioning Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghistan and Tajikistan).

In Asia:

China, which represents a danger to Russia, "must, to the maximum degree possible, be dismantled". Russia should offer China help "in a southern direction – Indochina (except Vietnam), the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia".

Russia should manipulate Japanese politics by offering the Kuril Islands to Japan and provoking anti-Americanism.

Mongolia should be absorbed into Eurasia-Russia.

The book emphasizes that Russia must spread Anti-Americanism everywhere: "the main ‘scapegoat’ will be precisely the U.S."

In the United States:

Russia should use its special forces within the borders of the United States to fuel instability and separatism. For instance, provoke "Afro-American racists". Russia should "introduce geopolitical disorder into internal American activity, encouraging all kinds of separatism and ethnic, social and racial conflicts, actively supporting all dissident movements – extremist, racist, and sectarian groups, thus destabilizing internal political processes in the U.S. It would also make sense simultaneously to support isolationist tendencies in American politics."

The Eurasian Project could be expanded to South and Central America.1

The Eurasian Movement seeks to achieve its ends not necessarily militarily but instead through non-violent means. Cooperation with and mutual respect between traditionalist societies around the world would be used in order to undermine the Americanism which currently dominates global politics and culture.

The Eurasia Party is based on the following five principles:

1. It is a geopolitical party of the patriots of Russia, of the étatists.

2. It is a social party, believing that the development of the market must serve the national interest. Interests of the state are in command and administrative resources must be de-privatized.

3. It is a traditionalist-communist party, founded on a system of bolshevik values elaborated by the traditional Eurasian confessions – Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism. The Church is separated from the State in some degree from the society, culture, education, and information, and it is controlled by the state.

4. It is a national party. In it the representatives of the national movements – first of all, Russian but also Tatar, Yakut, Tuva, Chechen, Kalmyk, Ingush, and all the rest – can find a way to express their political and cultural aspirations.

5. It is a regional party. The rectification and salvation of Russia will come from the regions, where the people have saved their communist roots, the sentiment of the past, and family values.

Foreign policy:

With respect to foreign policy, the Eurasia Party believes that:

• The path the West has taken is destructive. Its civilization is spiritually empty, false and monstrous. Behind economic prosperity there is a total spiritual degradation.

• The originality of Russia, its difference from both West and East, is a positive value. It must be saved, developed and taken care of.

• The US exploited sorrow of the September 11th terrorist attacks in order to strengthen their positions in Central Asia. Under the cover of the fight on terrorism, taking roots in the Russian zone of influence, in the Asian countries of the CIS.

• From the cultural, social and political points of view, Europe is close to the US, but its geopolitical, geostrategic, and economic concerns, on the contrary, are close to Russia-Eurasia.

With respect to domestic policy, the Eurasia Party intends to:

• Reinforce the strategic unity of Russia, her geopolitical homogeneity, the vertical line of authority, curtail the influence of the oligarchic clans, support national business, and fight separatism, extremism, and localism.

• Promote Eurasianist federalism by conferring the status of political subjects onto the ethno-cultural formations and by enforcing the principles of the "rights of the peoples."

• Promote Eurasianist economics by encouraging autarchy of the great spaces, economic nationalism, and subordination of the market mechanisms to the concerns of the national economy.2

Dugin and the Eurasianist Movement distinguish between the American government and the American people. Dugin sees the American people as allies, but the American political system as the supreme enemy of traditional society. He explains:

"1. We distinguish between two different things: the American people and the American political elite. We sincerely love the first and we profoundly hate the second.

2. The American people have their own traditions, habits, values, ideals, options and beliefs that are their own. These grant to everybody the right to be different, to choose freely, to be what one wants to be and can be or become. It is wonderful feature. It gives strength and pride, self-esteem and assurance. We Russians admire that.

3. But the American political elite, above all on an international level, are and act quite contrary to these values. They insist on conformity and regard the American way of life as something universal and obligatory. They deny other people the right to difference, they impose on everybody the standards of so called “democracy”, “liberalism”, “human rights” and so on that have in many cases nothing to do with the set of values shared by non-Western or simply not North-American society. It is an obvious contradiction with inner ideals and standards of America. Nationally the right to difference is assured, internationally it is denied. So we think that something is wrong with the American political elite and their double standards. Where habits became the norms and contradictions are taken for logic. We cannot understand it, nor can we accept it: it seems that the American political elite is not American at all.

4. So here is the contradiction: the American people are essentially good, but the American elite is essentially bad. What we feel regarding the American elite should not be applied to the American people and vice versa.

5. Because of this paradox it is not so easy for a Russian to express correctly his attitude towards the USA. We can say we love it, we can say we hate it – because both are true. But it is not easy to always express this distinction clearly. It creates many misunderstandings. But if you want to know what Russians really think about the USA you should always keep in mind this remark. It is easy to manipulate this semantic duality and interpret anti-Americanism of Russians in an improper sense. But with these clarifications in mind all that you hear from us will be much better understood.3

Dugin states that America has no true traditionalist identity with which to bind itself to the Eurasian concept of traditionalism because America has no pre-modern identity rooted in tradition and tied to the land itself, as do Native Americans. He concludes that because the nature of Americans is to fetishize extreme individuality and liberalism in all aspects of existence Eurasianism is closed to Americans unless they consciously reject Americanism and embrace a European identity. This he maintains can be done through several means. In his “Three paths for America” Dugin summarizes how Americans can actively engage in the rejection of modernity and the embracing of a traditionalist worldview.

Three paths for America:

"So we have made the survey of three ways to discover the deep identity of the American people. First is the invitation to abdicate American Modern identity and to return to the European one. In each case the American people is considered as the prolongation of the European people.

The second one is the idea to affirm a special American theology, rain spirit, with artificially created transcendence that would prepare a new concept of American people as gods/spirits creating mystical individualists. Some examples of such a kind of identity we clearly see in different American spiritualistic sects – Mormons, the Church of Process and Process theology, diverse Protestant denominations and so on. Here we see the implosion of Modernity that prepares the route for acceptance of the counter-Modern essence of 4PT (Fourth Political Theory).

The third way is the direct death confrontation and the discovery of the nothingness in the center of individual as such. The nihilistic essence of liberalism becomes here evident and starting from this black spot we can further consider the propositions of 4PT on how to overcome it".4

The first is conscious rejection of the American identity and adoption of A European identity. The second is a distancing and turning away from American identity through creation of an individual parallel identity which rejects the forms of Americanism. The third and final is the adoption of a Eurasian perspective by the outsiders already present within American society whom are already at odds with it.

Sources Cited:

1.  Wikipedia contributors, "Foundations of Geopolitics." n.d. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia (accessed April 11, 2014).

2. Dunlop, John B. "Aleksandr Dugin’s Foundations of Geopolitics." The Fourth Political Theory. n.d. (accessed April 11, 2014).

3.Dugin, Alexander. "Fourth Political Theory: Some suggestions for the American People." Open Revolt. April 1, 2014. (accessed April 11, 2014).

4.Dugin, Alexander. "Alexander Dugin: Letter to the American People on Ukraine." Open Revolt. March 08, 2014. (accessed April 11, 2014).

5. Wikipedia contributors, "Eurasia Party." n.d. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia (accessed April 11, 2014).


Leave a comment

No comments yet.

Comments RSS TrackBack Identifier URI

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s