Pro-Kremlin party leader hails people’s republics in southeast Ukraine


Text of report by the website of Russian newspaper Izvestiya on 31 July

[Article by Sergey Mironov, leader of the A Just Russia faction in the Russian Federation State Duma: "Novorossiya – new Russia. Just Russia faction leader Sergey Mironov on what Russians want and how they are able to defend their interests"]

Novorossiya [southeast Ukraine] has been occupying the principal place in the picture of Ukrainian events recently. Politicians, political analysts, journalists, and experts are talking about bombardments and bombing raids, the deaths of children and old people, thousands of refugees, the destruction of the Malaysian Boeing, and the militias’ retreats and counteroffensives. But among all of this there is a subject to which nobody is paying attention, and I would like to do so. It seems to me that it is exceptionally important. More important than many other issues if you look at it in terms not of days and weeks but months and years.

Let us ask ourselves: What is happening in Novorossiya if we look at this process from an ideological and world-view angle? What kind of state do the defenders of the DNR [Donetsk people’s republic] and the LNR [Luhansk people’s republic] want to build?

A. proviso. I do not know whether the insurgents will succeed in defending their motherland against highly superior enemy forces, although I wish them success with all my heart. But in any event we have to acknowledge something that is obvious: The existence of the Donetsk and Luhansk republics is an established historical fact. This event has already divided the history of Ukraine into "before" and "after." You can burn cities to the ground and not leave a single person alive in the southeast, but you cannot erase these pages from history with Grad, Uragan, and Smerch missiles.

The inhabitants of Novorossiya are compelled to exist in a state of permanent stress; they feel that they are living on the brink of death. At the same time they feel their historic predestination, and this feeling is proving to be stronger and deeper than the fear of death – it outweighs it. So it is not just war that is determining the life of the state of Novorossiya. Activists and politicians in Donetsk and Luhansk are engaged in imposing order in civil matters.

What does all this mean? A process of forming a nation is underway. Collective creativity by Russian people who, through the culpability of former leaders, are compelled to live other than in Russia, is underway. It was difficult and agonizing for them to exist in an aggressive environment that denies their identity. This aggression began with the language issue and ended in bombing raids. But there is a paradox here: Against the backdrop of explosions, while war is waging, people are thinking about how they would like to live in conditions of peace. What should the republic be like? How should it be organized?

DNR and LNR constitutions have already been written. A vigorous lawmaking process is underway. Novorossiya has a name and policy documents, albeit they have not yet – in wartime conditions – been completely honed. The constitution of Novorossiya has been published. In accordance with this constitution Novorossiya is a rule-of-law democratic state. Secular, but with clear moral points of reference. At the present time it is a parliamentary republic although it might possibly become a presidential republic once it has withstood the Kiev authorities’ terror and consolidated itself. In Novorossiya there is a mixed economy and equality among all types of ownership, and in domestic policy there are social priorities.

The legislative initiatives that are emerging testify that these few million people want to see their republic as a social state based on traditional values. Social justice and tradition form the essence of the societal and state project that is currently being built in the DNR and the LNR.

In there is a flag and coat of arms incorporating symbols from prerevolutionary and Soviet traditions. This choice testifies to a desire to overcome the historical fractures in Russian history. And overcoming historical fractures and divisions is a guarantee of stability in present-day politics. In other words, healthy conservatism is inherent in Novorossiya’s citizens in peacetime. But today they are compelled to defend themselves and their historic choice.

Despite the mass killings of civilians that the Ukrainian army is perpetrating, these people are not retreating from the choice that they made in the course of the referendum. They are not turning their back on their ideals. They are fighting and dying for them. The current (essentially temporary) Kiev government hates their flag, hates their ideals, and is blatantly ignoring their social project. It is ignoring their historic rights and expression of their wishes, denying the indisputable fact that everyone has his own path within a common European tradition. This government talks about a "conflict of mentalities," repudiating the principle of pluralism and describing their opponents as "nonhuman" and "subhuman," and is terrorizing the civilian population.

But, I repeat, even if Ukrainian troops were to destroy all the defenders of Novorossiya and carry out mass purges, it will no longer be possible to erase the fact of the emergence of the state of Novorossiya from world history. We will have to live with this understanding. Consequently it is necessary to formulate a systemic attitude towards this historical phenomenon.

The Russian intellectual elite will have had to answer the question as to why a logical merging of social democratic and conservative ideals – that is to say, ideals of social justice and traditional values – has taken place in Novorossiya’s public consciousness. This set of ideals emerged on the soil of Donetsk and Luhansk not under pressure from external forces but as the free choice of the people.

Here it is impossible to get away from the simple and obvious fact that these ideals reflect the views and ideals of not only several million inhabitants of Novorossiya but also the enormous overwhelming majority of the population of Russia. The nationwide Russian support for Donetsk and Luhansk is largely determined by a community of ideas, especially a community of values and historical reference points. What are they?

First, in Novorossiya and Russia people identify themselves with the Russian Orthodox tradition – not in a strictly church sense but in a broader interpretation. As opinion polls demonstrate, around 80 per cent of our country’s citizens describe themselves as such. Second, these are the same 80 per cent who today support Vladimir Putin and expect him to strengthen the Russian state. Finally, these are the same people who are proud of our army, which crossed the Alps, halted Napoleon, saved Russia during the years of the Great Patriotic War [as World War II is known in Russia], and very recently protected the population of Crimea from the fate that subsequently overtook the inhabitants of Donetsk and Luhansk. The army that is ensuring the country’s sovereignty and integrity, to which a recent session of the Russian Federation Security Council was devoted….

The word Novorossiya today has not one but two meanings. On the one hand, it is the name of former Russian lands. On the other, it means "new Russia." A little Russia that is seeking to follow the same path along which the Russian Federation is also travelling.

Today those who lay claim to global control within the framework of a unipolar world are attempting to obstruct progress in this direction. To obstruct it to the detriment of their own and – even more so – European interests. But the historical journey of large and small nations cannot be halted. The example of Novorossiya has shown what Russians want and how they are able to defend their interests. And I would not advise anybody in the world to even try to do in Russia what they are trying to carry out in Ukraine. The outcome for such experimenters would be extremely inauspicious.

Source: Izvestiya website, Moscow, in Russian 31 Jul 14

Eurasianism Political Philosophy and the Novorossiya Project

Putin’s long game? Meet the Eurasian Union
It starts in 2015 and sounds like a scheme to rebuild the USSR, but its history is quite different — and troubling for the West
Leon Neyfakh, Globe Staff
The Boston Globe | March 09, 2014

What is Vladimir Putin up to? The crisis in Ukraine, brought to a boil when Russia’s president sent troops into the Crimean peninsula, has created almost a cottage industry of guessing at the autocratic leader’s intentions from one day to the next.

When it comes to Putin’s long-term strategy, however, there is at least one concrete plan that offers some insight, and one specific date that Russia observers are looking ahead to. That date, Jan. 1, 2015, is expected to mark the birth of an important new organization linking Russia with an as-yet-undetermined constellation of its neighboring countries—an alliance Putin has dubbed the Eurasian Union.

Currently, only two nations besides Russia, Belarus and Kazakstan, have signed on. A number of other post-Soviet states, including Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, have signaled interest in joining. It’s expected to build on an existing regional trade pact to establish common policies on labor migration, investment, trade, and energy.

But from the moment Putin announced his plan, experts have believed he sees it as the linchpin of something much larger: a new geopolitical force capable of standing up to Russia’s competitors on the world stage in a way it hasn’t been able to since the fall of the Soviet Union. “We suggest a powerful supranational association capable of becoming one of the poles in the modern world,” wrote Putin in the 2011 op-ed in which he first described his vision.

For all its ambition and the grandeur of its name, the Eurasian Union hasn’t been discussed much in the West outside of foreign-policy circles; when asked about it recently, the State Department declined to comment. This does not mean US officials aren’t worried about its implications. In December 2012, then-Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton made a remark that, to date, seems to represent the American government’s only public position on Putin’s idea: “There is a move to re-Sovietise the region,” she said. And while of course the new entity wouldn’t be called the USSR, she said, “Let’s make no mistake about it. We know what the goal is and we are trying to figure out effective ways to slow down or prevent it.”

It’s tempting to see it that way, not least because Putin famously once said the breakup of the Soviet Union was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,” and has also reportedly promised that the Eurasian Union would be based on the “best values of the Soviet Union.” But to say the project is simply an effort to reassemble the USSR is crude and incorrect, say Russia analysts. Instead, Putin’s efforts should be seen as a realization of an entirely different, and much less familiar idea called Eurasianism—a philosophy that has roots in the 1920s, and which grew out of Russia’s longstanding identity crisis about whether or not it should strive to be a part of Europe.

In recent years, the philosophy has been embraced by a swath of activists and political actors in the post-Soviet region, including some radical right-wing thinkers whose version of Eurasianism is built on a bluntly fascist ideology. While there are also some Russians promoting the Eurasian Union who believe a more moderate version of the philosophy is possible, Western critics say that Putin will need some kind of ideological glue to hold it together, and it’s most likely to take the form of a forceful antidemocratic, anti-Western worldview.

The extent to which Putin is truly driven by any kind of Eurasianist philosophy—as opposed to, say, a raw appetite for power and drive for a stronger Russia—is as opaque as any of his plans. But it’s worth noting, as the situation in Ukraine continues to unfold, that Russia experts have always considered that country the crown jewel—and even a necessary anchor—of any successful version of the Eurasian Union. “If you have Ukraine, the Eurasian Union moves a little further west, and puts it right on the border of the EU,” said Hannah Thoburn, a Eurasia analyst at the Foreign Policy Initiative, a Washington-based nonprofit. “Russia desperately wants to have Ukraine.”


Russia has spent much of its existence in a kind of tense suspension between Europe and Central Asia. Its landmass lies mostly in Asia, but its proud history of music, art, and literature are more closely associated with Europe.

That identity crisis has been part of Russian life for centuries, and it was in this context that a group of early 20th-century thinkers started making the argument that the people of Russia and Central Asia should not strive to contort themselves into Europeans, but rather assert themselves as a cultural and political force unto themselves.

What began as an emotional aversion to the prospect of Russia and its neighbors being “eternal disciples” to the West, wrote Russian political commentator Leonid Radzihovsky in an e-mail, became the basis for the theory of Eurasianism: “that the Slavic world must follow a separate path—that it should not be a second-rate Europe, but another type of civilization altogether.”

The Eurasian dream was eclipsed by the Bolshevik revolution and the formation of the Soviet Union, whose power stretched deep into Europe, and whose ideology vied for minds all around the globe. But after the USSR collapsed in 1991, the idea came back to life, said Jeffrey Mankoff, the deputy director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic & International Studies. Suddenly the relationship between the former Soviet states was again a totally open question.

In the geopolitical sense, Eurasianism isn’t much more than a policy orientation, a belief that Russia is better served by building its own coalition instead of aligning with the economies of the West. Where observers get worried is who, exactly, is carrying the flag for it now—in particular a thinker named Aleksandr Dugin, founder of Russia’s Eurasia Party and the figure most closely associated with what has come to be known as Neo-Eurasianism.

Though initially seen as a marginal figure in Russian politics, Dugin—who is said to be a professor in the sociology department at Moscow State University—has been a prolific author and tenacious public figure since the 1990s, giving speeches and appearing on television to press his cause. In a YouTube video promoting the Eurasian movement, Dugin is shown pointing a rocket launcher toward the sky, while a thundering soundtrack of Russian hymns mixed with threatening heavy metal plays in the background. His followers carry black flags with an aggressive logo of arrows bursting outward. He once wrote that the country needs an “authentic, real, radically revolutionary and consistent fascism.” More recently, he weighed in on the crisis in Ukraine with a column calling for “the liberation of Europe from the very Atlanticist occupiers who caused the catastrophe in Kiev.”

While the language and aesthetics may sound like the definition of fringe, Dugin has become increasingly influential over time. According to fascism scholar Anton Shekhovtsov, he “entered the mainstream” when he became an adviser to the head of the State Duma, Russia’s parliamentary body, in 1998. Today, Shekhovtsov, says, “his ideas are taken seriously by people who are close to Putin.”

Dugin and his followers may be the most worrisome face of Eurasianism, but they are not its only supporters; other Eurasianists disdain him as a fascist using the philosophy for his own ends. Among these is Yuri Kofner, the founder of the Eurasian Youth Movement, a clean-cut, blond 20something who makes friendly YouTube videos in English aimed at Westerners who might be curious about the Eurasian dream. “Dugin has used the Eurasian ideology and twisted it,” said Kofner in an interview. He added, “Other Eurasianists, like myself, believe he does a very harmful thing to the Eurasian idea by making it seem very imperialistic, which is something that people from other post-Soviet countries cannot agree with.”

But while Kofner and others may distance themselves from Dugin, they are not shy about their hopes for what the Eurasian Union will one day become. In this, they see Putin as an ally.

“The thing is, Putin and his people are very practical,” Kofner said. “The algorithm in their mind is: First, we’ll build an economic union, we’ll keep it calm, we’ll keep it cool, we won’t talk a lot about it in an ideological sense, and then step by step [we’ll work to create a sense of cultural unity] and then maybe we’ll add something political, like a common parliament.”


It is impossible to say whether a belief in any particular style of Eurasianism is what drove Putin to push for a Eurasian Union. “He’s always had an intellectual affiliation with Eurasianist thinkers,” said Thoburn, “but he didn’t really talk at all about this idea of the Eurasian Union [until relatively recently].”

For the most part Putin has spoken of the Eurasian Union in purely economic terms—the official name of the organization is the Eurasian Economic Union—and has rejected, more than once, as nonsense all suggestions that it’s meant to create a new Russian empire. But he has also made remarks that indicate he envisions something deeper than a mere economic alliance, echoing some basic aspects of Eurasianist thinking. At a televised conference last year, for example, he described the Eurasian Union as “a project to preserve the identity of the people who inhabit the historic Eurasian space,” and said, “Eurasian integration is a chance for the post-Soviet space to become an independent center for global development—not a peripherality to Europe or Asia.”

While many Russia observers are skeptical that in pursuing the Eurasian Union Putin has in mind some abstract idea about the Slavic world’s historic fate as a civilization, there are others—Yale historian Timothy Snyder in the New York Review of Books, Robert Zubrin in the National Review—who have warned against underestimating the influence of Neo-Eurasianist philosophy on Putin’s thinking.

Putin’s vision of the Eurasian Union, the argument goes, is going to require a shared ideology to succeed, and while that ideology won’t be communism, as it was in the USSR, the history and rhetoric of the Eurasian movement suggests that it will inevitably be some hodge-podge of anti-Western, antiliberal thought.

“What unites these countries is that they all have autocratic or semi-autocratic regimes,” said Robert Legvold, professor emeritus and Russia specialist at Columbia University, referring to post-Soviet states like Belarus and Kazakstan. “The one thing that unites them is that they’re against US efforts at democracy building around the world.”

One intriguing argument that’s been made by Russia observers in recent weeks is that the Kremlin’s very high-profile campaign against gays and the increasingly intimate relationship it has established with the Russian Orthodox church are part of a broader effort to “brand” Russia as the bedrock of traditional values working to fight back the tide of moral corruption emanating from the West. This, too, could strengthen its role as the center of a new Eurasian power structure. “Part of this idea of contrasting Eurasia from the West is that they live according to different values,” said Mankoff. “So Putin talks about how the West has become decadent…and its embrace of gay marriage as being an example of that.”


Last week, as Russian forces maintained their position in the Crimean peninsula, the leaders of Belarus and Kazakstan held a meeting with Putin—previously scheduled for later in the month, but pushed up in light of the situation in Ukraine—to discuss the Eurasian Union treaty. There is reason to think Belarus and Kazakstan were spooked by Putin’s decision to use military force in the situation with Ukraine, and are perhaps now reevaluating their decision to forge closer ties.

Given how much it appears to worry his allies, it might be surprising that Putin would have played such a strong hand in Ukraine last week. But that, say many observers, suggests just how much he has invested in this idea. Ukraine—with its steel mills, coal plants, bountiful agricultural resources, and massive population of 46 million people—has always, according to Russia experts, been key to Putin’s vision for the Eurasian Union.

“Ukraine is the big one,” said Alexander Cooley, a political science professor at Barnard College who studies post-Soviet countries. “The others are small and weak.” For this reason, he said, the success of the Eurasian Union “hinges on Ukraine’s participation and cooperation.”

Last fall, when it seemed like Ukraine was on a path toward closer ties with the West, and the government was taking steps toward signing an “association agreement” with the European Union, the Kremlin intervened and convinced the country’s now-deposed president to back out. The following month, Putin announced that Russia would buy $15 billion worth of Ukrainian government bonds—widely seen as compensation for sticking by Moscow. Viewed in isolation, the episode was nothing more than a very expensive game of tug-of-war. In light of Putin’s Eurasian dream, it was an investment in a legacy.

Putin himself, of course, hasn’t spoken about his actions in Crimea in these terms: He has framed it as a measure to protect the region’s Russian population in the wake of a coup. But as we watch his next moves, it’s worth remembering that, whether or not he got it from Eurasianist thinkers, at the core of his foreign policy agenda lies the belief that Russia’s destiny is to forge its own path.

Last December, Putin was asked a question at a conference about whether he planned to invest in infrastructure projects that would take advantage of the fact that Russia’s geography puts it squarely in between the East and the West. Without pausing, Putin responded by objecting to the premise of the question. “You said that Russia is located ‘between’ the West and the East. But in fact, it’s the West and the East that are to the left and right of Russia.”


Alternative identity, alternative religion? Neo-paganism and the Aryan myth in contemporary Russia
Nations & Nationalism. Apr2008, Vol. 14 Issue 2, p283-301. 19p

Abstract: As in all post-Soviet states, the Russian intelligentsia has been preoccupied with the construction of a new national identity since the beginning of the 1990s. Although the place of Orthodox religion in Russia is well documented, the subject of neo-paganism and its consequent assertion of an Aryan identity for Russians remains little known. Yet specialists observing the political and intellectual life of contemporary Russia have begun to notice that the development of references to ‘Slavic paganism’ and to Russia’s ‘Aryan’ origin can be found in the public speeches of some politicians and intellectual figures. This article will attempt, in its first section, to depict the historical depth of these movements by examining the existence of neo-pagan and/or Aryan referents in Soviet culture, and focusing on how these discourses developed in different spheres of post-Soviet Russian society, such as those of religion, historiography, and politics.


Behind the Ukranian Crisis: Alexander Dugin, Eurasianism, and the Nouvelle Droite
Showdown of Arms | April 15th, 2014

The controlled media at present is alight with features and exposes on the situation between Russia and Ukraine and this week’s newest “new Hitler” Vladimir Putin; besides being derivative and lacking intellectual vigor; this shibboleth should inform you of the motivating forces behind the media and political establishments of the West. Some are aware of the cultural-political, strategic and economic reasons for the reincorporation of Crimea into the Russian fold. Far fewer are aware of the ideological and philosophical underpinnings for the situation.

The question of the hour is; what is Russia doing and why? The Russian strategy is grounded in the geopolitical agenda of Eurasianism. As the name implies, Eurasianism is a projected political alliance between the nations of Europe and Asia (including Russia and the Islamic world) designed to counteract what is termed the “Atlanticism” of American-European Union objectives/agendas. Eurasianism has a long history stretching back to the 1920’s Russian émigré community, where many of its ideas were formed. However the man most closely associated with the doctrine today as well as responsible for its modern form is Alexander Dugin.

Dugin was born on January 7th, 1962 in Moscow. In his youth, he worked as a journalist and became involved in Pamyat, an Orthodox-Christian nationalist group and later the National Bolshevik Party and then eventually with Vladimir Putin’s political machine. In 2001, Dugin formed the Eurasia Party and the Eurasia Movement. Supported by both the government and Orthodox-Christian establishment in Russia, Alexander Dugin’s Eurasia Movement stands on the threshold of a seismic shift in world power. He is truly one of the handful of people whom are actively contributing to and affecting the historical process unfolding before our eyes. His 1997 book, “Foundations of Geopolitics” has been very influential in elite circles within the Russian government and lays out his geopolitical strategy. The Eurasian Party is the political entity pursuing the goals enumerated in Foundations.

The Eurasia Movement can be described as a branch of the Nouvelle Droit or New Right, which is a collective of philosophers and political parties across Europe and America whom oppose the forces of modernity, given form in the doctrines of Cultural Marxism and stand for the restoration of European traditionalism. The Nouvelle Droit advocates a complete break from the left-right political dichotomy entrenched in liberal Western democracies. Instead it incorporates useful facets of both as well as novel approaches of its own, constituting a political third or in some cases, fourth position; a kind of syncretism. Key individuals in this movement include Alain deBenoist, Tomislav Sunic, Guillaume Faye, Michael O’Meara and of course Alexander Dugin. Key political parties include the German National Democratic Party, the British National Party, the Golden Dawn of Greece, Jobbik of Hungary and the National Front of France.

In addition, the Eurasian Movement incorporates the ideas of Jean-François Thiriart, whom advocated self-determination for the peoples of the world and a pan-European outlook, a kind of Europe-wide nationalism for the European peoples.The agenda of the Eurasian Movement can be summarized as intended to form axes of power throughout the world by which American world hegemony can be undermined and ultimately displaced by a Finlandized Europe where larger and more powerful nations have a sphere of influence over smaller nations. In the words of Dugin, Europe would be united in common cause “from Lisbon to Vladivostok”. Specifically Dugin’s book, Foundations of Geopolitics and the English language condensed version; The Fourth Political Theory, outline several prescriptions of this type, among them:

In Europe:

Germany should be offered the de facto political dominance over most Protestant and Catholic states located within Central and Eastern Europe. Kaliningrad oblast could be given back to Germany. The book uses the term a "Moscow-Berlin axis".

France should be encouraged to form a "Franco-German bloc" with Germany as both countries have a "firm anti-Atlanticist tradition".

The United Kingdom should be cut off from Europe.

Finland should be absorbed into Russia. Southern Finland will be combined with the Republic of Karelia and northern Finland will be "donated to Murmansk Oblast".

Estonia should be given to Germany’s sphere of influence.

Latvia and Lithuania should be given a "special status" in the Eurasian-Russian sphere.

Poland should be granted a "special status" in the Eurasian sphere.

Romania, Macedonia, "Serbian Bosnia" and Greece – "orthodox collectivist East" – will unite with "Moscow the Third Rome" and reject the "rational-individualistic West".

Ukraine should be annexed by Russia because "Ukraine as an independent state with certain territorial ambitions represents an enormous danger for all of Eurasia and, without resolving the Ukrainian problem, it is in general senseless to speak about continental politics". Ukraine should not be allowed to remain independent, unless it is cordon sanitaire, which would be inadmissible.

In the Middle East and Central Asia:

The book stresses the "continental Russian-Islamic alliance" which lies "at the foundation of anti-Atlanticist strategy". The alliance is based on the "traditional character of Russian and Islamic civilization".

Iran is a key ally. The book uses the term "Moscow-Tehran axis".

Armenia has a special role and will serve as a "strategic base" and it is necessary to create "the [subsidiary] axis Moscow-Erevan-Teheran". Armenians "are an Aryan people … [like] the Iranians and the Kurds".

Azerbaijan could be "split up" or given to Iran.

Georgia should be dismembered. Abkhazia and "United Ossetia" (which includes Georgia’s South Ossetia) will be incorporated into Russia. Georgia’s independent policies are unacceptable.

Russia needs to create "geopolitical shocks" within Turkey. These can be achieved by employing Kurds, Armenians and other minorities.

The book regards the Caucasus as a Russian territory, including "the eastern and northern shores of the Caspian (the territories of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan)" and Central Asia (mentioning Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghistan and Tajikistan).

In Asia:

China, which represents a danger to Russia, "must, to the maximum degree possible, be dismantled". Russia should offer China help "in a southern direction – Indochina (except Vietnam), the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia".

Russia should manipulate Japanese politics by offering the Kuril Islands to Japan and provoking anti-Americanism.

Mongolia should be absorbed into Eurasia-Russia.

The book emphasizes that Russia must spread Anti-Americanism everywhere: "the main ‘scapegoat’ will be precisely the U.S."

In the United States:

Russia should use its special forces within the borders of the United States to fuel instability and separatism. For instance, provoke "Afro-American racists". Russia should "introduce geopolitical disorder into internal American activity, encouraging all kinds of separatism and ethnic, social and racial conflicts, actively supporting all dissident movements – extremist, racist, and sectarian groups, thus destabilizing internal political processes in the U.S. It would also make sense simultaneously to support isolationist tendencies in American politics."

The Eurasian Project could be expanded to South and Central America.1

The Eurasian Movement seeks to achieve its ends not necessarily militarily but instead through non-violent means. Cooperation with and mutual respect between traditionalist societies around the world would be used in order to undermine the Americanism which currently dominates global politics and culture.

The Eurasia Party is based on the following five principles:

1. It is a geopolitical party of the patriots of Russia, of the étatists.

2. It is a social party, believing that the development of the market must serve the national interest. Interests of the state are in command and administrative resources must be de-privatized.

3. It is a traditionalist-communist party, founded on a system of bolshevik values elaborated by the traditional Eurasian confessions – Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism. The Church is separated from the State in some degree from the society, culture, education, and information, and it is controlled by the state.

4. It is a national party. In it the representatives of the national movements – first of all, Russian but also Tatar, Yakut, Tuva, Chechen, Kalmyk, Ingush, and all the rest – can find a way to express their political and cultural aspirations.

5. It is a regional party. The rectification and salvation of Russia will come from the regions, where the people have saved their communist roots, the sentiment of the past, and family values.

Foreign policy:

With respect to foreign policy, the Eurasia Party believes that:

• The path the West has taken is destructive. Its civilization is spiritually empty, false and monstrous. Behind economic prosperity there is a total spiritual degradation.

• The originality of Russia, its difference from both West and East, is a positive value. It must be saved, developed and taken care of.

• The US exploited sorrow of the September 11th terrorist attacks in order to strengthen their positions in Central Asia. Under the cover of the fight on terrorism, taking roots in the Russian zone of influence, in the Asian countries of the CIS.

• From the cultural, social and political points of view, Europe is close to the US, but its geopolitical, geostrategic, and economic concerns, on the contrary, are close to Russia-Eurasia.

With respect to domestic policy, the Eurasia Party intends to:

• Reinforce the strategic unity of Russia, her geopolitical homogeneity, the vertical line of authority, curtail the influence of the oligarchic clans, support national business, and fight separatism, extremism, and localism.

• Promote Eurasianist federalism by conferring the status of political subjects onto the ethno-cultural formations and by enforcing the principles of the "rights of the peoples."

• Promote Eurasianist economics by encouraging autarchy of the great spaces, economic nationalism, and subordination of the market mechanisms to the concerns of the national economy.2

Dugin and the Eurasianist Movement distinguish between the American government and the American people. Dugin sees the American people as allies, but the American political system as the supreme enemy of traditional society. He explains:

"1. We distinguish between two different things: the American people and the American political elite. We sincerely love the first and we profoundly hate the second.

2. The American people have their own traditions, habits, values, ideals, options and beliefs that are their own. These grant to everybody the right to be different, to choose freely, to be what one wants to be and can be or become. It is wonderful feature. It gives strength and pride, self-esteem and assurance. We Russians admire that.

3. But the American political elite, above all on an international level, are and act quite contrary to these values. They insist on conformity and regard the American way of life as something universal and obligatory. They deny other people the right to difference, they impose on everybody the standards of so called “democracy”, “liberalism”, “human rights” and so on that have in many cases nothing to do with the set of values shared by non-Western or simply not North-American society. It is an obvious contradiction with inner ideals and standards of America. Nationally the right to difference is assured, internationally it is denied. So we think that something is wrong with the American political elite and their double standards. Where habits became the norms and contradictions are taken for logic. We cannot understand it, nor can we accept it: it seems that the American political elite is not American at all.

4. So here is the contradiction: the American people are essentially good, but the American elite is essentially bad. What we feel regarding the American elite should not be applied to the American people and vice versa.

5. Because of this paradox it is not so easy for a Russian to express correctly his attitude towards the USA. We can say we love it, we can say we hate it – because both are true. But it is not easy to always express this distinction clearly. It creates many misunderstandings. But if you want to know what Russians really think about the USA you should always keep in mind this remark. It is easy to manipulate this semantic duality and interpret anti-Americanism of Russians in an improper sense. But with these clarifications in mind all that you hear from us will be much better understood.3

Dugin states that America has no true traditionalist identity with which to bind itself to the Eurasian concept of traditionalism because America has no pre-modern identity rooted in tradition and tied to the land itself, as do Native Americans. He concludes that because the nature of Americans is to fetishize extreme individuality and liberalism in all aspects of existence Eurasianism is closed to Americans unless they consciously reject Americanism and embrace a European identity. This he maintains can be done through several means. In his “Three paths for America” Dugin summarizes how Americans can actively engage in the rejection of modernity and the embracing of a traditionalist worldview.

Three paths for America:

"So we have made the survey of three ways to discover the deep identity of the American people. First is the invitation to abdicate American Modern identity and to return to the European one. In each case the American people is considered as the prolongation of the European people.

The second one is the idea to affirm a special American theology, rain spirit, with artificially created transcendence that would prepare a new concept of American people as gods/spirits creating mystical individualists. Some examples of such a kind of identity we clearly see in different American spiritualistic sects – Mormons, the Church of Process and Process theology, diverse Protestant denominations and so on. Here we see the implosion of Modernity that prepares the route for acceptance of the counter-Modern essence of 4PT (Fourth Political Theory).

The third way is the direct death confrontation and the discovery of the nothingness in the center of individual as such. The nihilistic essence of liberalism becomes here evident and starting from this black spot we can further consider the propositions of 4PT on how to overcome it".4

The first is conscious rejection of the American identity and adoption of A European identity. The second is a distancing and turning away from American identity through creation of an individual parallel identity which rejects the forms of Americanism. The third and final is the adoption of a Eurasian perspective by the outsiders already present within American society whom are already at odds with it.

Sources Cited:

1.  Wikipedia contributors, "Foundations of Geopolitics." n.d. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia (accessed April 11, 2014).

2. Dunlop, John B. "Aleksandr Dugin’s Foundations of Geopolitics." The Fourth Political Theory. n.d. (accessed April 11, 2014).

3.Dugin, Alexander. "Fourth Political Theory: Some suggestions for the American People." Open Revolt. April 1, 2014. (accessed April 11, 2014).

4.Dugin, Alexander. "Alexander Dugin: Letter to the American People on Ukraine." Open Revolt. March 08, 2014. (accessed April 11, 2014).

5. Wikipedia contributors, "Eurasia Party." n.d. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia (accessed April 11, 2014).

Dugin’s Novorossiya Project and Romantic Eurasianism III

Alexander Dugin
The Fourth Political Theory

Under capitalism, the capitalists rule. Under socialism – representatives of the working class, the proletariat. Under Nazism and Fascism – racial or national elite, "the new aristocracy". Under Fourth Political Theory should rule the People (Narod in Russian, akin to the German Volk: not "Population").

Modern Russia – has capitalism. Hence, it is ruled by capitalists. Therefore not Narod. In order to build Russia, in which will rule the Narod, it is necessary to carry out an anti-capitalist (anti-oligarchic, at least) Revolution. Financial magnates should be excluded from political power. And that’s the main thing. Everyone should choose – power OR wealth. Choose wealth, forget about power. Choose power – forget about wealth.

The revolution must take place in three stages:

1. Ultimatum to all major oligarchs (one hundred persons of Forbes list and a hundred more in hiding, but we all know whom) swear their allegiance to the Russian assets (all foreign and strategic national assets will now be controlled by special bodies).

2. Nationalization of major private properties of strategic importance.

3. Translation of patriotic representatives of big capital in the category of officials with the voluntary transfer of the property to the State. Defeat in the civil rights (including the deprivation of the right to vote, participation in election campaigns, etc.) to those that prefer to preserve capital in non-strategic, but in a significant scale.

The state should become an instrument of the People. This system be called as such "laocracy", literally, "power of the people (laos – Greek for "people").

In a bloody battle for Ukraine, we see the true face of capital – Ukrainian big business (oligarchs – Poroshenko, Kolomojsky, Ahemetov etc.) lead the genocide against the People; Russian oligarchs betray the people by engaging a criminal agreement with Ukrainian class partners. And all this is in the interests of the global oligarchy – the world capitalist system, centered in the United States.

Now exposes all incompatibility of Russia and capitalism. Either capitalism, or Russia. This is most clearly understood by Novorossia leaders. They, happening at the forefront of the whole Russian People, in fact started this Russian People’s Revolution. That is why it’s them that so furiously attacked the devotees junta mercenaries from the ranks of Ukrainian swine-fascists, as as well liberal capitalist elements in the fifth and sixth columns from Russia. And most importantly they have become existential enemies of the U.S. and the World Government. Strelkov, Gubarev, Purgin, Pushilin, Mozgovoy – challenged global capital. And they did it on behalf of the People. In this case, on behalf of the Russian People. But if supporters of ukrainian People were consistent, they would have been allies of this Revolution, and not miserable hirelings of global capital – as they are now. Turning to the side of Novorossia, Ukrainians turn not as much to Russia, and not even on the Russian side, but on the side of the People, the People with a capital letter, which fights in a deadly battle with the world of Capital, to the side of LAOCRACY.

Therefore the coming campaign against Kiev will not just revenge and not only the liberation of the ancient Russian lands, it will be a campaign against Capital in favor of laocracy, the power of the People, for the People’s State. I do not think that the Russian oligarchy will support this, it can not misunderstand that it’s days are numbered. It’s why it so hysterically screams "do not send troops", since victory of Novorossia will inevitably mean a revival of Russia itself, the awakening of the People. That is the reason for desperate attempts to betray Novorossia. This agony of the Russian oligarchy and its public hirelings. Their task – to destroy the heroes of the Revolution of Novorossian Revolution – not only Popular, but also social, and destroy it in the bud.


Battle for the State. Russians Awaken
Alexander Dugin
Nina Kouprianova | July 11, 2014

An Awakened Russian Defending the Russian World is a True Delight


In the political sense, the situation in Russia is becoming quite critical. These are fundamental shifts rather that fluctuations at the surface. Let us attempt to create a conceptual schema of current events.

There is a People (Narod in Russian, akin to the German Volk: henceforth the term “Narod” will be used—editors), and there are people (population). These are different things (different concepts). And all of them are collectively known as “Russia.” This homonymy generates layers of meaning, and everything gets tangled. Let us orthogonalize the full picture by placing everything onto its own level.

Narod is a historical-cultural community. This is a subject of destiny and creator of history.  However, not all philosophies and ideologies recognize its existence in this sense. Narod does not exist for the Liberals—there is only an aggregate of individuals. Nor does it exist for the Communists—only classes do; for the Nazis—only race exists; and for the fascists—only the state does. And, even though it sounds paradoxical, Naroddoes not exist for the nationalists either—for them, there is a political nation based on individual membership (the classic bourgeois nation is a product of Europe during the period of Modernity). Narod does not exist for all these ideologies—this is the complete ideological nomenclature of Modernity. But it does exist—it is the only thing that truly exists. Heidegger used to say, “Dasein exists through a People” (Das Dasein existiert völkisch). That is to say, man’s presence in the world is given to us through Narod. It provides us with language, appearance, psychological attributes, a place in time (history) and space (geopolitics).

Today, Russia’s Narod awakens breaking through the depths of its dreams—difficult and simple, impoverished and enriched—but dreams nonetheless. It views Crimea and Novorossia as territories of its awakening. Thus, Narod heads to a place where the Russian Light pulls it in like a magnet, shining through the heroes of Novorossia. These are not emotions, chauvinism, or ultra-patriotism. This is not a “hurray” or a surface, but, rather, it is the voice of our ultimate Russian depths. We exist authentically only when faced with death. Only when faced with death does it become clear what it means to be Russian. People go to Novorossia, to Donetsk and Lugansk, obeying the Will of Russian History, drawn in by the Russian Death. It is this Red Death that makes Russians what they are. Death in the world. In the name of Narod. Death for Narod is life. Thus, people go to Novorossia to live in the Russian way.

Igor Strelkov is the symbol of the Russian Narod. Strelkov is the embodiment of our spirit, our will, our resistance. And even if we are not there with him, he makes us ashamed of ourselves and proud of him, but most important, he inspires Faith in ourNarod. Strelkov exists authentically. In him, our Narod finds its image. And all those who are with him—Gubarev, Motorola, Mozgovoi, Babai, Purgin, and all the heroes of the Donetsk and Lugansk Peoples’ Republics, living or dead—they are all our Narod, its faces. As it is. As it exists. One cannot rip it out, pollute it, or relativize it.

There is also a population, the people. If our Narod is united on both sides of the border, then the population is different. People are not exactly Narod, or more specifically, not quite Narod. They could become the latter if the depths awaken in them, if they face Death, if they wake up. But they could also fail. In that case, they are individuals concerned with survival, comfort, contentment, success, career, material well-being, etc. The individual is the antithesis of Narod, a product of its decay. Narod separates into individuals in order for them to unite in it once again—as in a Church, Cathedral, Motherland. But sometimes this return does not happen. Then we are faced with the pure individual. On his own. In Greek, this kind of a pure individual without any ties to the Whole or his Narod was known as idiotes, a private citizen, which is the source for the term “idiot.” Population comprises idiots in the etymological sense. Narod is something entirely different—it is that which man becomes only when he addresses his own depths, lives inside history, and hears the voice of the Motherland’s sacred space. It is the individual that all political theories of Modernity address: they unite the individuals in different ways: Marxism—into classes, nationalism—into political nations, Liberals—into a civil society, but none of these is a People— Narod. Thus, Modernity rejects Naroddealing only with disparate people. People of Russia consider those in southeastern Ukraine to be different. And they are correct: from the legal standpoint, this is formally the case if the voice from the depths remains silent. In this case, it is absurd to speak of the Russian World, Russian Civilization, and Great Russia. Instead, there are the respective populations of two administrative units, two groups of individuals that have their own interests and goals. Thus, the population of Russia, people of Russia could remain deaf to Novorossia’s pain. According to this kind of logic, different people live there. They are murdered, violated, slaughtered, shelled, and bombed, but this is none of our business. This is neither good, nor pleasant, but, perhaps, they had done something wrong—people think. Yes, people survive. But Narod lives. Herein lies the difference. In order to live, Narod sends its best sons and daughters to their Death. Death for the sake of Narod, for the sake of Life. Not survival—Life.

There also is a State. This is a mechanism, a superstructure. In it, a People—Narod sees its creation and, perhaps, the most successful of its creations. Narod creates the State as a product of its historical will, and is proud of it. But the State could tear away fromNarod, forgetting its foundations. And then it could turn into a self-sufficient and dead mechanism, a machine. States could be living, but they could also be dead. A living State does not sever its links with its Narod, which created it, drawing its power from it. It lives and exists. It is. But when the State degenerates, it becomes an apparatus, machine, bureaucratic mechanism rather than an organic living whole. In that case, the State begins to view its Narod as a population, disparate people, and a mechanical sum of atoms. Any unification of these atoms—into a class, nation, or a society—is always arbitrary. The contemporary European State in the era of Modernity emerged dead from the onset. This is a mechanism of agglomerating a population. This kind of a State kills its Narod and turns it into a population. This kind of a State parasitically lives off itsNarod, its pain and suffering. It kills its Narod. Finds benefit in this. Makes a Gesheft. This is the State of managers and mechanics; more specifically—a State of traders and businessmen.

Today, this question is particularly acute: what is the Russian State at the moment? Does it belong to its Narod? Or is it mechanical? This is the principal dilemma for Putin, personally, as the head if this State with a vague dual identity. The rise of patriotism in Russia, reunification with Crimea, and the confrontation with the West are all signs of a People’s—Narod’s presence. Cynical political technologists (political scientists), the all-powerful and constantly lying top-level managers, mad corruption, dominant Liberalism, anti-Narod oligarchy, Westernizing on the part of the intelligentsia and the elites all point to the State of death, the State of survival. Putin has been balancing on this narrow fence between the State of a People—Narod and that of the mechanical and alienated Liberal elite for the past 14 years. He kept taking steps in one direction, then another. Of course, without a certain kind of support for Novorossia, today’s picture—even if critically difficult—would not be possible. Were Putin solely on the side if a dead State, Russia Corp., he would have betrayed everything himself long ago. But this is not the case. He comprises the painful drama of the Russian Statehood and its nature, crucified between Narod and the elite (always dependent upon the mass of surviving idiots—idiots in the etymological sense of the word, that is private citizens, individuals). In other words, the picture is as follows: on the one side, Putin (=State) has Strelkov as an embodiment of Narod. This is Novorossia as a whole. These are Russians and all that is Russian. On the other side, there is the elite (Yurgens in all his expressions), bureaucracy (Government, Administration), and average citizens. This is a mechanical, contemporary, Liberal, and Western State—in any case, not Narod, and in a certain sense, anti-Narod. Putin stands in between. Not Putin personally, but rather the State, its meaning and nature. .

Novorossia and its dramatic fate—specifically expressed in the stories of Strelkov, Gubarev, Mozgovoi, and others—which our Narod, Russians watch with bated breath—is one of Putin’s (Russia’s) paths. The other takes us in the direction of compromisers, blatant traitors, provocateurs, intrigue-makers, Liberals, and Westernizers (hidden or obvious), which use Russia’s duality in their own way. It is they that are the sixth column, which, in essence, is no different from the fifth one. The population always obeys the top-level management. After all, being fired, hired, bonuses, and penalties—in other words, survival—depend on it. Narod wants a Tsar as an embodiment of its own greatest will throughout history, as a sacred figure, as that which unites the Earth and the Sky, that enlightens and spiritualizes Narod itself. It does not see top-level management. It sees a Ruler. For Narod, Russia is the State of Russia’s Narod and those that linked their fate with it.

Today, these two poles—Narod and anti-Narod—have entered into the harshest confrontation. No one could say how this would end. Every scenario is possible. And Putin is being torn apart. His balanced strategy is no longer useful. History places the either/or dilemma in front of him: either his Narod or the elite (plus a mechanical, atomized, divided population). Either Civilization Russia (which means morality, Novorossia, Strelkov, and Gubarev) or Corporation Russia (which means pragmatism, political realism, and, ultimately, Yurgens and his variants).

This is the most difficult moment. Our People—Narod has made its choice. It has awakened, even if not in its entirety and not fully, but…Take a look around—Russians appear everywhere out of the depths of the survival slumber.  And boldly head to Novorossia. To die, that is, to Live. To Live authentically, as that which Is. Strelkov marks the horizon of our self-identification, and it is completely irrelevant who he is as an individual. He is the one for whom we waited for so long. He is the hero of Russians. And this is sufficient. He himself clearly says that he us Putin’s ray of light, his solar incarnation. And he is right. If Putin did not have this particular side, then there would be no Crimea or the heroic defense of Slavyansk. The fact that Novorossia still is—is unthinkable without this part of Russia, that of Narod. But another thing is also evident: the second (lunar) side of the State has rebelled. Traitors and “technologists” have declared a war on Novorossia, its leaders and symbols. They declared a war on Strelkov. And again, we have lies instead of battles. Betrayals instead of help. Disunity instead of solidarity. Treachery instead of loyalty. Do you recognize this modus operandi?

This is anti-Narod as such. And it offered Narod a deadly challenge. In comparison, Ukrainian Nazis are simply pawns at the hands of the global anti-Narod fading into the background. If there were not a powerful group of traitors in Moscow at the very top, we would already be outside of Kiev. Of course, we will still be there. Narod will be there. Russians will be there. But there is the following question: what about the State? Which path will it choose? Is it with Narod or its antithesis? This battle is more frightening than any military initiative. By changing the ratio ever so slightly at the surface, at the periphery, we end up with colossal results. As soon as the traitors slightly change the reports as to what is really going in in Novorossia, they create disinformation, increase uncertainty, and leave determination behind. Everything works: false arguments, selective usage of facts, lies—here the anti-Narod bureaucracy is a master.

I did not anticipate that the war against the sixth column at the top would be so bloody and difficult, and that its counter-offensive would be so cruel. After all, losing thousands of citizens in Novorossia, murders of women and children—these are simply the consequences of the actions carried out by the sixth column in Russia, which has been attempting to push the State onto its side. Its thesis—pull Strelkov out, begin negotiations, compromise with the junta—else its stolen wealth in the billions, real estate abroad,  families taken there long ago, omnipotence in Russia—will suffer. After all, it is anti-Narod that the elite comprises almost fully. There is only one ambassador for Narod. But he is restrained by the State’s machine of death.

As in 1612 during the Times of Troubles, Narod must take its own initiative. It cannot solely depend on the State. The latter is partly paralyzed by the sixth column. Even Putin cannot bear all of the responsibility. Historic Being is our cause—the cause of the Russians. Russians today are Novorossia, on the map and in the heart, on the machine gun and on the social-networking avatar. What a difficult moment…I do not recall another one of this caliber in my life…But it is also joyous! An awakened Russian defending the Russian World—this is true delight. We are armed Russians, what a delight!

Translated by Nina Kouprianova


It’s Not About Dugin
Matt Parrott
Traditionalist Youth Network | May 20, 2014

Over at The Occidental Observer, Domitius Corbulo warns us that “Alexander Dugin’s 4th Political Theory is for the Russian Empire, not for European Ethno-Nationalists.” Narrowly, Corbulo’s thesis is true. Professor Dugin is a staunch Russian patriot with a proudly weaponized ideology. The framework he presents in 4PT is a political effort to draw myriad philosophies and factions at odds with NATO into a broad coalition. As a man who also struggles to walk that fine line between objective theorist and political activist, I’m intimately familiar with the tightrope gymnastics involved.

Dugin’s professorial global theoretician avatar cannot be trusted, a truism which has already been driven into the ground by numerous New Right thinkers. Dugin can only be trusted to fight for his patriotic Russian vision. I say that lovingly, as a man who dedicates his life to the advancement of his people is at least as noble as an objective scholar. Besides, the myth of global objectivity is itself a pernicious Western liberal machination of the Zionist neo-Nazi running dog lackeys!

Sorry. Sorry. I couldn’t resist.

Whatever you think of Dugin, he’s largely beside the point. What’s happening is far greater than Dugin, and it’s far too great for any one man, even a man as ambitious and capable as Dugin, to master. Much the same way that Thomas Edison deserves credit for inventing the light bulb after having laboriously tested hundreds of filaments on his way to the right material, Alexander Dugin deserves credit for inventing the phenomenon of Tradition as a global ideology in opposition to the Western elites. He clouds his works up with hundreds upon hundreds of other ideas, many of which are useless or irrelevant for ourselves, but this one idea of his is the defining idea which will define the geopolitics of the coming century.

Back in March, Obama assured America’s mainstream news outlets that Russia cannot prevail in the Ukraine or anywhere else precisely because “unlike the Soviet Union, Russia leads no bloc of nations, no global ideology.” Perhaps Obama is ignorant of the RadTrad framework which is being gradually adopted and adapted by the Kremlin. Perhaps he fails to realize its potential as a far more coherent and unifying force against Obama and his gaggle of oligarchs than Marxism could have ever hoped to be. Whatever the case, Russia is definitely incubating a global ideology, gathering a bloc of allied nations, and cultivating an effective challenge to the hegemonic Western liberal world order.

Alexander Dugin

Trusting Dugin isn’t necessary, because this isn’t about Dugin, or even Russia, or even Eurasia. It’s about Russia slipping inexorably into the Hegelian antithesis of American decadence. Even if Dugin or the Russian Deep State would like to steer this development in a different direction, they can’t. Time and time again, they’re learning through trial and error that promoting identitarian and traditionalist messages captivates global audiences and entices allies, while variances from that message (like accusing opponents of being “Nazis”, dabbling in neo-Marxist racial and gender theory, and trying to imagine that these universal abstract principles are specific to the Eurasian sphere) fall flat.

If, through an obstinate refusal to accept the gift laid squarely in their lap, the Russian state fails to take up this mantle, the idea and the opportunity is already out there. It would be an excellent vehicle for China, as the Middle Kingdom awakens from its geopolitical coma in the coming decades. Any global elite which wishes to effectively challenge the Western liberal elites with an opposing global ideology must necessarily promote the faith and folk worldview which is under assault from this secular and consumerist anti-cultural global ideology.

Obama insisted in his speech that “Russia stands alone”. He’s right. At this point, Russia stands alone as the only global elite effectively positioned to benefit geopolitically from the death of liberal Modernity in the hearts and minds of Eurasians, the Global South, and even us Americans right here in the global elites’ backyard. This is largely owing to Dugin’s genius, and he is definitely, and rightfully so, “the most prominent New Right thinker in the world.”

Dugin’s Novorossiya Project and Romantic Eurasianism II

Alexander Dugin
RADIX JOURNAL | June 9, 2014



None of the words we use in the course of social and political discussions and analyses is ideologically neutral. Outside of ideology entirely, such words lose their meaning. And it is not possible to determine one’s attitude toward them unambiguously, since the content of any expression is shaped by context and semantic structures, a kind of operational system. When we live in a society with an obvious ideology, openly maintained as the dominant one, things are clear enough.

The significance of words flows directly from the ideological matrix, which is instilled through upbringing, education, and instruction and is supported by the active ideological apparatus of the state. The state forms a language, defines the meaning of discourse, and sets—most often through repressive measures, broadly understood—the limits and moral tint of the basic collection of political and sociological concepts and terms.

If we lived in a society in which communist ideology dominates, concepts such as “bourgeoisie,” “fascism,” “capitalism,” “speculation,” etc. acquire not only strictly negative connotations but specific meanings, with which capitalists, fascists, and speculators would categorically disagree. The disagreement concerns not only signs, but the very significance of words. The way a communist sees a fascist, or a capitalist seems to the fascist, might seem to a different party to be little more than a caricature or a distortion. And this, of course, works the other way around: fascism seems natural to the fascist, and communism, utterly evil.

For a capitalist, communism and fascism are equally evil. The capitalist most often does not think of himself as bourgeois. Speculation is for him a form of the realization of natural economic rights, and the system he defends he usually regards as a “free” society, an “open” society. Neither the Marxist analysis of the appropriation of surplus value, nor the fascist critique of the web of interest obligations and payments, and the international financial oligarchy, which usurps power over peoples and nations, ever convince him of anything.

Ideologies are similar to religions; hence Carl Schmitt speaks of “political theology.” Each believes sacredly in his own values and ideals, and criticism of or apology for alternative values most often has no effect (except for a few cases of confessional change, which occurs in the history of religion and in the history of political teachings).

Consequently, before speaking seriously about one or another term, it is necessary to determine in which ideological context we will be considering it. Someone will surely object: science must take a neutral position. That is impossible. In this case, science would pretend to the status of a meta-ideology, i.e. a kind of “true ideology,” of which all other ideologies are relative forms. But nobody will agree with this, even it should come into someone’s head to flaunt such ambitions.

In the religious sphere, syncretic teachings periodically arise, claiming that they are the expression of “absolute truth” and that all other historical religions are its relative manifestations. But as a rule, such tendencies do not enjoy great popularity, remaining the property of rather small circles and denied by major confessions as “heresies.” Science, likewise, cannot claim the status of a meta-ideology and remain relevant. But it differs from ordinary ideology by three features:

  1. It reflects distinctly upon the structures of the ideological paradigm it considers. (Ordinary people do not even suspect that what seems to them their “personal opinion” is a secondary or even tertiary product of ideological processing, the mechanisms of which are entirely hidden from them.)
  2. In the course of analysis of ideological discourse, it uses the techniques of classical logic (Aristotle’s laws and Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason).
  3. It is able to build a comparative matrix of the correspondences between diverse ideologies, juxtaposing structures in their foundations and establishing symmetries and oppositions between separate discourses and their elements.

Thus, in considering any concept or term, it is possible to proceed in two ways: either to interpret it from the position of one or another ideology, not digging into its foundations and not comparing it with other interpretations (this is the level of propaganda and low-quality applied analysis/journalism), or to attend to the scientific method, which does not free us from adherence to an ideology, but forces us to reason, observing the three above-mentioned rules of the scientific approach (paradigm, logic, comparison).

We propose to consider the concept of the “middle class” in precisely this scientific spirit.


The concept of the “middle class” is crucial for the liberal-capitalist ideology. Although it appeared later than the Marxist theory of class struggle and the famous communist doctrine of the two antagonistic classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the very meaning of the term “middle class” has a much longer history and has its roots in the period of bourgeois revolutions and the rise of the Third Estate, which claimed henceforth a monopoly in political and economic spheres.

Before considering the “middle class,” let’s turn to the concept of “class” as such. Class is a concept of the social organization of modernity. Ancient orders and social-political systems were built on the caste principle. “Caste” should be understood as the doctrine that the inner nature of different people differs qualitatively: there are divine souls and earthly (feral, demonic) souls. The caste reflects precisely this nature of the soul, which man is not able to change during his life. The caste is fatal. The normal society, according to this conception, must be built so that those of a divine nature (the elite) are above, and those of an earthly (feral, demonic) nature remain below (the masses). That is how the Indian Varna system is arranged, as were ancient Jewish, Babylonian, Egyptian, and other societies.

This caste theory was replaced by a more flexible estate theory. The estate also proposes a difference in people’s natures (the existence of higher and lower), but here the fact of birth in one or another estate is not considered a final and natural factor in the determination of belonging to a certain social status. Estate can be changed if the representative of a lower estate accomplishes a great feat, demonstrates unique spiritual qualities, becomes a member of the priesthood, etc.

Here, alongside the caste principle, is the principle of meritocracy, that is, rewards for services. The meritocratic principle extends also to the descendants of the one who accomplished the feat (ennobling). Estate society was predominant in Christian civilization right to the end of the Middle Ages. In estate society, the highest estates are the priesthood (clergy) and the military (aristocracy), and the lowest is the Third Estate of peasants and craftsmen. Precisely the same way, in a caste society, priests and warriors (Brahma and Kshatriya) were highest, and lowest were peasants, artisans, and traders (Vaishya).

Modernity became the era of the overthrow of estate society. Europe’s bourgeois revolutions demanded a replacement of the estate privileges of the higher estates (the clergy and the military aristocracy, the nobility) in favor of the Third Estate. But the bearers of this ideology were not the peasants, who were connected with traditional society by the specific character of seasonal labour, religious identity, etc., but the more mobile townspeople and burghers. “Bourgeois” is itself formed from the German word “Burg” meaning “town.” Hence, modernity gave first priority to precisely the townsfolk-citizen-bourgeois as a normative unit.

The bourgeois revolutions abolished the power of the Church (clergy) and aristocracy (nobility, dynasties) and advanced the model of building society on the basis of the domination of the Third Estate, represented by the townsfolk-citizen-bourgeois. This is, essentially, capitalism. Capitalism, in its victory, replaces estate distinctions, but preservesmaterial ones. Thus, the notion of class arises: class signifies an indicator of the measure of inequality. The bourgeoisie abolish estate inequality, but preserve material inequality. Consequently, precisely modernity’s bourgeois capitalistic society is a class society in the full sense of the word. Previously, in the Middle Ages, belonging to an estate was one’s primary social attribute. In modernity, the entire social stratification was reduced to the attribute of material riches. Class is thus a phenomenon of modernity.


The class character of bourgeois society, however, was perceived most distinctly not by the ideology of the bourgeoisie, but by Marx. He elaborated his revolutionary teaching on the basis of the concept of class. At its foundation was the idea that class society and the material inequality characteristic of it, elevated to the highest criterion, exposes the essence of the nature of society, man, and history. In Marx’s class picture, there are always rich and poor, and the rich always get richer, and the poor, poorer. Consequently, there are two classes, the bourgeoisie and proletariat, and their struggle is the motor and meaning of history.

All of Marxism is built on this idea: when we speak of classes, we speak of two antagonistic classes, the difference between which is not relative but absolute, since each embodies in itself two irreconcilable worlds: the world of Exploitation and the world of (honest) Labor. There are two classes: the class of Labor (the proletariat) and the class of Exploitation (the bourgeoisie). In the capitalist system, the class of Exploitation dominates. The class of Labor must become conscious of itself, arise, and overthrow the class of Exploiters. They must create, at first, the Government of Labor—socialism. Then, after the last remnants of bourgeois society have been destroyed, communist society will appear, now fully classless. According to Marx, a classlessness is possible only after the victory of the proletariat and the radical destruction of the bourgeoisie.

For Marx, a “middle class” simply cannot exist. This concept has no independent semantics in Marxist ideology, since everything that is between the bourgeoisie and proletariat (for instance, the petty bourgeoisie or prosperous peasantry) relates essentially either to the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. For Marxists, the “middle class” is a fiction. It doesn’t exist, and the concept itself is nothing but an instrument of the ideological propaganda of capitalists, trying to fool the proletariat, promising a future integration into the class of the bourgeoisie (which, according to Marx, cannot happen, since the appropriation of surplus value prevents the proletariat’s enrichment).

We can draw the following conclusion: the term “middle class” is a fiction for Marxists, an artificial figure of bourgeois ideology, called upon to conceal the real picture of society and the processes occurring in it. At the same time, Marxists admit the fact of a transition from estate society to class society and, consequently, agree with the bourgeoisie that a society of material inequalities (class society) is “more progressive” than a society of estate inequality; they disagree with the bourgeoisie in that, for communists, this is not the “end of history,” but only the beginning of a full-fledged revolutionary struggle. Liberals, on the other hand, insist that material inequality is entirely moral and justified and maintain that the communists’ striving for material equality is, by contrast, amoral and pathological. For liberals, “the end of history” begins when everyone becomes “middle class.” For communists, it begins when the proletariat finally destroy the bourgeoisie and build a communist society of total equality.

The Middle Class within Liberalism

The concept of a middle class is implicitly present in liberal ideology from the very beginning. That said, it only receives full implementation in the course of the establishment of sociology, which endeavors to combine many avant-garde theses of Marxism (in particular, the centrality of the concept of class) and bourgeois conditions. Sociology is thus a hybrid form: ideologically, it is between communism and liberalism; methodologically, it emphasizes a scientific, analytic approach. We can distinguish two poles in sociology, the social (the school of Durkheim, the theories of Sorokin, etc.) and the liberal (Weber, the Chicago and “Austrian” Schools in the United States, etc.)

In any case, the specific character of the liberal understanding of class is the conviction that, in the standard bourgeois society, there is only one class, and all differences between the depths and the heights are relative and conditional. If, for Marx, there are always two classes, and they exist in implacable enmity, for liberals (Adam Smith, for instance) there is always ultimately one class—the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie nominally embraces the entire capitalist society. The poorest layers of this society are, as it were, incompletely bourgeois. The richest, on the other hand, area super-bourgeois. But the social nature of all people is qualitatively identical: all are given equal starting opportunities, setting out from which the bourgeois can either reach a certain level of success, or fail to reach it and tumble down into the incompletely bourgeois.

Hence, Adam Smith takes as a standard situation the following classical liberal narrative:

The baker hires a worker, who has recently come to the city for work. After working as an assistant to the owner, the hired worker learns to bake bread and observes the organization of processes of interaction with suppliers and customers. After some time, the hired worker borrows credit and opens a bakery. After first working independently, he eventually hires a helper, who has come to the city for work, and the cycle repeats itself.

In this model, we see the following. Not only is society thought of as middle class, but there exists the already-middle-class and the not-yet-middle-class. In this picture, the hired worker does not form a peculiar type, but represents the potentially bourgeois, while the ready baker is actually bourgeois (though even he, coming to ruin, can theoretically be in the position again of the hired worker, the not-yet-bourgeois).

According to Marx, the quantity of riches in society is a fixed quantity, and the presence of two classes is based on precisely this: those who have riches will never share them with the poor, since life in capitalist society is a zero-sum game. For Smith, on the other hand, richesconstantly increase. As a result, the boundaries of the middle class continuously expand. Capitalism is based on the presumption of the constant growth of riches for all members of society; ideally, all humanity must become middle class.

At the same time, there are two approaches to the middle class in liberal ideology. The first corresponds to left liberals: they demand that the super-bourgeois (the big capitalists) consciously share a part of the profits with the middle class and petty bourgeoisie, since this will lead to the stability of the system and to an acceleration of the growth of the middle class globally.

The second approach is characteristic of right liberals: they object to the burden placed on the super-bourgeoisie by taxation and welfare projects; they believe these contradicts the spirit of “free enterprise” and slows the dynamics of the development of the capitalist system, since the super-bourgeoisie stimulates the growth of the middle-bourgeoisie, which, in turn, urges on the petty bourgeoisie and the not-yet-bourgeoisie.

Accordingly, the concept of the middle class becomes, for left liberals, a moral value and ideological slogan (as in, “We must build a stronger middle class!”). For right liberals, on the other hand, the growth of the middle class is a natural consequence of the development of the capitalist system and does not demand special attention or elevation to a value.


In sociology, this basic ideological attitude of liberalism concerning the primacy of the middle class manifests itself in the relativization of the model of stratification. Sociology divides society into three classes: upper, middle, and lower (to this is sometimes added the underclass of pure marginals and social deviants). These classes are not identical to Marxist, nor to strictly liberal class concepts (since liberalism knows only one class, the middle class, while the others are thought of as its variations). This division fixes the dimension of individuals along four indicators: material sufficiency, level of fame, position in administrative hierarchy, and level of education. On the basis of strictly qualitative criteria, any person can be related to one of three social strata.

Here, the concept of class does not have a direct ideological content, but, as a rule, it is applied to bourgeois society, where sociology as a science appeared. This sociological classes, identified with social strata, should be distinguished from Marxist classes and from standard liberal conceptions about the middle class as the universal and single class.

In this case, in a bourgeois framework, the struggle for the rights of the underclass or support of the lower class (in a sociological sense) can be thought of as a left continuation of the liberal approach: attention to the lower layer of bourgeois society stipulates striving to facilitate its integration into the middle class, i.e. to pull them up the level of the bourgeois. For right liberals, such an effort is “amoral,” since it contradicts the main principle of social freedom: initiative and honest competition (the strong win, the weak lose, but such are the rules of the game; all should endeavor to become strong). The extreme version of right or even far-right liberalism is the “objectivism” of Ayn Rand.


There is one other ideological system of modernity, which we have yet to consider—nationalism. Nationalism is a variation of bourgeois ideology, which insists that the standard horizon of bourgeois society should not be humanity (the “cosmopolitanism” and “globalism” of classical liberals) but society as defined by the borders of a nation-state. The nation or people is taken as the maximal unit of integration. The market is open within the boundaries of the nation. But in the inter-state system, economic activity transitions to the level of the state, not private actors. From here, there arises the legitimization of such instruments as tariffs, protectionism, etc.

Nationalism thinks of the middle class not abstractly but concretely, as the middle class of a given national formation of the state. Nationalism also, like liberalism, accepts as a standard figure of society the townsperson-citizen-bourgeois, but puts the accent precisely on citizen, and what’s more, the citizen of a given national state.

The “nation” as a political formation becomes a synonym of bourgeois society. For nationalists, beyond this society, there exists only a zone of national and social risk. The nation is thought of here as a community of the middle class. And the task consists in integrating the lower layers into the national whole, often with the help of welfare measures. That is why nationalism can possess numerous socialist features, though the ideological basis here is different: pulling the economically weak to the level of the middle class is a task ofnational integration, not a consequence of orientation towards justice and material equality. We see something similar with left liberals, who consider integrating the under-class into broader society as a condition for the stability of the development of the capitalist system.

Nationalism, as a rule, relates negatively to national minorities and especially to immigrants. This is connected with the fact that in the eyes of nationalists, these elements disturb the homogeneity of the national middle class. Moreover, some national minorities are blamed for concentrating in their hands too much material wealth, in other words, those who challenge the national middle class “from above.” Nationalist feelings of injustice are expressed in antagonism towards “oligarchs” and, often times, as “economic anti-semitism,” a sentiment that was not foreign to Marx himself. In turn, other non-nationals (usually immigrants) are blamed for increasing the numbers of the lower strata and underclass, the integration of which is complicated by national differences. A variant of anti-immigrant nationalism consists in the charge that the increase of cheap labor slows the process of enriching the “native” population and the “harmonious” (for nationalists) growth of the middle class.


After making these necessary methodological refinements, we can finally raise the question: what is the middle class for Russia? What are its prospects? Is it important for us or, on the contrary, are discussions about it optional and secondary?

It is impossible to answer this without turning to one of the three classical ideologies (including the versions contained in each through the polarities of left and right).

If we take the position of right liberalism, the answer is this: we should not pay attention to the middle class; the most important thing is to secure maximum economic freedom (that is, complete removal of government from business, taxes approximating zero, etc.), and everything will fall into place. Right liberals and consistent globalists are convinced that the growth of the middle class in Russia is not the goal; it is a consequence of the nation’s integration into the global economy, the opening of internal markets for external competition, and the prompt dismantling of an overbearing state.

If we take the position of left liberalism, then our attitude changes substantially. The broadening of the middle class is the number one task for our society, since the successful establishment of capitalism in Russia depends on precisely this, as does its integration into the international community. A small and weak middle class facilitates the degradation of society into “lumpens" and “oligarchs” and indirectly helps nationalistic and socialistic anti-liberal tendencies capture the minds of the population. Social injustice and inequality, the volume of the underclass, and the slow growth of the middle class demand special attention and the execution of goal-directed policies, since the fate of capitalism in Russia is at stake. Again, the struggle for the middle class is a slogan of left liberals. And they are the ones who would most likely focus this topic, since it is the core of their ideological positions.

If we are contemporary Marxists by inertia or conscious choice, then any mention of a middle class must evoke our rage, since this is the ideological platform of the sworn enemies of communism—bourgeois liberals. For communists, the following is correct: the narrower the middle class, the sharper the social contradictions and the more acute the imperative of the class struggle of proletariat against bourgeoisie. Thus, the communist perceives a large lower social strata and underclass against the background of prospering oligarchs as the ideal social picture. For communists, the middle class is a lie, an evil, and its absence or underdevelopment is a chance and window of opportunity for revolution. If some “communist” thinks otherwise, then he is not a communist, but a revisionist and compromiser with the bourgeoisie.

If we are nationalists, then the middle class acquires for us an additional dimension. It is thought of as the skeleton of national society in opposition to the “immigrant underclass” and “foreign-born oligarchy.” This is the peculiar notion of the middle class in the nationalist framework. And the cutting edges of this conception of the middle class are directed against oligarchs (the upper class) and immigrants (the lower class and underclass); the middle class itself is regarded as the national class, i.e. as the Russian class, which includes Russianentrepreneurs, Russian proprietors, the Russian bourgeoisie, etc.

It is impossible to speak of the middle class as such, without adhering (consciously or not) to an ideological position. But since in Russia, according to the constitution, there is no state ideology, theoretically we can interpret the middle class however we want. The fact that this concept has become the center of discussions attests to the fact that in contemporary Russia, by the inertia of the ‘90s and early 2000s, a liberal paradigm prevails. In the absence of a state ideology, liberals nevertheless strive to impose on us their paradigm as dominant.

Let’s conduct a thought experiment: a discussion about the middle class is taking place in a socially significant platform, for instance on one of Russia’s major television stations. Representatives of all possible ideologies of modernity are participating: Russian liberals, Russian communists, and Russian nationalists.

The first, a Russian liberals, would say:

The growth of the middle class and elevation of the level of wealth for the citizens of Russia is the main task of our society and government.

The second, a Russian communist:

Illegal privatization in the ‘90s put national property in the hands of oligarchs; look how our people live in the provinces in poverty and squalor!

The third, a Russian nationalists:

Illegal immigrants are taking jobs from Russians, and they’re all led by Jewish and Caucasian oligarchs. That is a catastrophe for the Russian middle class!

Despite the fact that the viewers might like all three positions, the jury and “respected experts” will, undoubtedly, grant victory to the liberals. For ultimately, we still find ourselves in the condition of the ideological dictatorship of liberalism. This would happen despite the fact that society, recognizing the right of liberal discourse, fully and persistently denies its supremacy and absolute right. (In contrast, for the political elite, liberal dogmas remain sacred and unshakeable.)

From this, we can draw a conclusion: the middle class and discussion about it reflect the ideological order of liberals among Russia’s political and economic elite. If we do not share liberal axioms, then we might not consider this topic at all, or else offer an interpretation (Marxist, nationalistic, etc.) that liberals will vigorously reject.


In conclusion, we can conduct an analysis of the middle class in the context of the Fourth Political Theory. This theory is built on the imperative of overcoming modernity and all three political ideologies in order (the order has tremendous significance): (1) liberalism, (2) communism, (3) nationalism (fascism). The subject of this theory, in its simple version, is the concept “narod,”roughly, “Volk” or “people,” in the sense of “peoplehood” and “peoples,” not “masses.”

In its complex version, the subject of this theory is Heidegger’s category of Dasein. We can say, as an approximation, that narod must be thought of existentially, as the living, organic, historical presence of Russians in a qualitative spatial landscape, in the expanses of Great Russia. But if the subject is the narod and not the individual (as in liberalism), not two antagonistic classes (as in Marxism), and not the political nation (as in nationalism), then all the obligatory elements of the modern picture of the world change. There is no longer materialism, economism, recognition of the fatefulness and universality of the bourgeois revolutions, linear time, Western civilization as a universal standard, secularism, human rights, civil society, democracy, the market, or any other axioms and buzzwords of modernity. The Fourth Political Theory proposes solutions and horizons knowingly excluded by liberalism, communism, and nationalism. (More on this is found in my book The Fourth Political Theory and my new book The Fourth Way.)

On the whole, The Fourth Political Theory, when applied to the problem of the “middle class” says the following:

The transition from caste to estate and from estate to class is not a universal law. This process can occur as it did in modern Western Europe, or it can fail to occur or occur partially, as is happening today in non-Western societies. Hence, the very concept of class as applied to society has a limited applicability. Class and classes can be identified in modern Western European societies, but whether they can replace the caste inequality of the soul and human nature is not at all obvious. Western societies themselves are confident that classes do so. But an existential approach to this problematic can call this into question.

The most important thing is how the human relates to death. There are those who can look it in the face, and those who always have their backs turned to it. But the origins of the social hierarchy, the fundamental distinction between people and the superiority of some to others consists in precisely this. Material conditions are not decisive here. Hegel’s interpretation of Master and Slave is based on this criterion. Hegel thinks that the Master is the one who challenges death, who steps out to encounter it. Acting in this way, he does not acquire immortality, but he acquires a Slave, one who runs from death, lacking the courage to look it in the eye. The Master rules in societies where death stands at the center of attention. The Slave acquires political rights only where death is bracketed and removed to the periphery. So long as death remains in society’s field of vision, we are dealing with rule by the wise and heroic, philosophers and warriors. This is caste society or estate society. But not classsociety. Where class begins, life ends, and the alienated strategies of reification, objectivation, and mediation prevail.

Hence, the Fourth Political Theory thinks that the construction of society on the basis of the criterion of property is a pathology. The fate of man and narod is history and geography—but in no way economics, the market, or competition.

The Fourth Political Theory rejects class as a concept and denies its relevance for the creation of a political system based on the existential understanding of the narod. Even more so does it reject the concept of the “middle class,” which reflects the very essence of the class approach. The middle class, like the middle (that is, average) person, is a social figure situated at the point of maximal social illusion, at the epicenter of slumber. The representative of the middle class corresponds to Heidegger’s figure of das Man, the generalized bearer of “common sense,” which is subject to no verification or examination. (Das Man is often translated into English as “The They,” in the sense of “They say so-and-so will win the election this year…) Das Man is the greatest of illusions.

The middle, average person is not at all the same as the normal person. “Norm” is a synonym for “ideal,” that to which one should strive, that which one should become. The middle person is a person in the least degree, the most ex-individual of individuals, the most null and barren quality. The middle person isn’t a person at all; he is a parody of a person. He is Nietzsche’s “Last Man.” And he is deeply abnormal, since for a normal person, it is natural to experience horror, to think about death, to acutely experience the finitude of being, to call into question—sometimes tragically insoluble—the external world, society, and relations to another.

The middle class doesn’t think; it consumes. It doesn’t live; it seeks security and comfort. It doesn’t die, it blows out like a car tire (it emits its spirit, as Baudrillard wrote in Symbolic Exchange and Death). The middle class is the most stupid, submissive, predictable, cowardly, and pathetic of all classes. It is equally far from the blazing elements of poverty and the perverted poison of incalculable wealth, which is even closer to hell than extreme poverty. The middle class has no ontological foundation for existing at all, and if it does, then only somewhere far below, beneath the rule of the philosopher-kings and warrior-heroes. It is the Third Estate, imagining about itself that it is the one and only. This is an unwarranted pretension. Modernity and capitalism (in the sense of the universality of the middle class) is nothing more than a temporary aberration. The time of this historical misunderstanding is coming to an end.

Thus, today, when the agony of this worst of possible social arrangements still continues, you must look beyond capitalism. At the same time, we must value and take interest in both what preceded it, the Middle Ages, and in that which will come after it and that which we must create—a New Middle Ages.

Translated by Michael Millerman


Alexander Dugin
The Fourth Political Theory

In our Holy Great-Continental State there will be three types (with variations and subtypes, bien sûr):

  • philosopher-priests (clergy) 
  • royal heroes warriors (aristocracy, nobles) 
  • workers-villagers (people). 

If you do not recognize yourself among these three types, you will not be included in this State. 
This is the classical structure of Indo-European society, which stood originally and always (forever) was the very essence of social and political ideas of European and Indo-European cultures of Eurasia. It emerges in ancient times, in antiquity, in the Mediterranean civilization in the Middle Ages, and even through the pathology of modern times (in garbled form). Why deal with parodies – we need a Holy Empire.

At the head – sacral Basileus, the Great Monarch.

Look, today everyone puts forward completely utopian projects and do not hesitate to do it. Either universal gay-parade with post-human beings possessed by virtual currency and physical immortality (liberals). Then the global caliphate (wahhabis).

That messianic world center in Israel that feed rod of iron ger-toshav (Zionists). The "realists" and supporters of the status quo (say, nothing will happen and everything will be so as it is now as usual, as if everything had been so as of now, nonsense – everything was always different and it depends on what we are as free human beings want deeply in our hearts) grumble full absurdity – there is nothing more utopian than the desire to preserve all, that exists at the moment. In anyway, we are led by big projects.
Why should we, as traditionalists and fundamental conservatives hide behind the façade of our plans and projects of dry rational calculations (no one believes us anyway). Therefore, it’s possible to speak openly: our goal is Indo-European Empire – from Vladivostok to Dublin. Under the banner of Christ and the Great Monarch. The People’s Empire, ruled by the wise and courageous. Merchants and polit-technologists, oligarchs and usurers won’t exist there.

Everyone who does not like it can go out or sink in the other, disgusting, in my opinion, utopias.
Large Ukraine – is nonsense, unrealizable, spiteful, petty, envious, based on resentment as a national idea. But Great Russia is not nonsense. It was and it will be. Our lands narrow, and then – as a spring – expand.

As always. So beats the Russian heart. In 1991 we were again tightened. With Ossetia, Abkhazia and especially the Crimea and the Novorussia countdown – time of the Empire. Many of us want to restrain us, but will not succeed. We are building a different society in general, other State than the one we have now. From this transition state will not be left one stone upon another, as no stone was left from the Russian Empire and then of the Soviet Union. And we do not go back, but forward.

Eternity is not in the past, it is also always present, and most importantly – the future. All of eternity is ahead. This is the real avant-garde.

Indo-European Sacred Empire of the End – that’s our true future. A current misunderstanding will dissipate like smoke. 
Russian return to history and will build a New Russia. Imperial and absolute. Novorussia.

transl. Vladimer Ilin

Comments of translator:

I can outline some things on our path:

1. Spiritual. Protestant and American sects are the primal obstacle. Political always depends upon the spiritual, and we cannot ignore their destructive influence on our orthodox society. We need a conservative reform everywhere.
2. Political. All traitors, cowards and marodeurs are the primal obstacle, those who in Novorussia restrain the process of nationalization of oligarch’s industries and disobey the Commander Igor Strelkov. Dealing with them happens under martial law. 
3. Cultural. Image of a people (Laos) is today replaced with Mass-Media. Culture (society of the spectacle) is formed by popular concepts of infernal manipulators and not through the upper caste, as it should really be.
Our political life will live when we purify it with Fire (Idea, eidos), separating the valuable from the invaluable.


Dugin’s America
Matt Parrott
Counter-Currents Publishing | October 11, 2012

Alexander Dugin is a popular, well-connected, and academically respected professor at Moscow State University. Unlike his North American and Western European counterparts, his ideas are not censored by Russia’s mainstream media, and he more or less enjoys the favor of Putin’s Russian government. While he’s indubitably the most prominent New Right thinker in Russia, his domestic influence and his ambitious efforts to build international partnerships and relationships have made him arguably the most prominent New Right thinker in the world. 

His recently written and translated book, The Fourth Political Theory is a critical milestone in the global development of a New Right school of thought. In it, he strives to speak to a truly global audience, though his parochial biases and perspectives are a regular distraction from that goal. He strives to speak above and beyond modern liberal paradigms and values, but there’s a fair share of self-censorship, cleverness, and . . . Realpolitik . . . to wade through.

Fortunately, those who are intelligent and thoughtful enough to gain anything from this book will be intelligent and thoughtful enough to look past those distractions and at his invaluable insights, strategies, and perspectives. After all, the whole point of Benoist’s pluriversalism (universal pluralism) which he endorses is that the different regions and communities can retain and preserve their own unique narratives and perspectives. In the Russian psyche, “America” is something quite alien to what we Americans experience . . . just as our imaginary “Russia” is surely alien to actual Russians.

Foreigners, especially Russians, almost exclusively see our bad side. In many ways, Russians think more about America’s military and foreign policy than we do. Their exposure to “our” culture is almost exclusively from a handful of Jewish and cosmopolitan hubs which are nearly as alien and hostile to ordinary Americans as they are to Russians. When they visit, they’re more likely to visit those hubs. Just as 20th-century Americans perceived Russia as a villainous caricature of Jewish Bolshevism and belligerent Marxism, contemporary Russians perceive America as a villainous caricature of Jewish liberalism and cannibal capitalism.

In one especially irritating example among many, he explains how American liberal Ayn Rand’s capitalist ideology of Objectivism is the Protestant work ethic taken to its logical extreme. For the record, Ayn Rand was born and raised in Russia, only traveling to America after completing her studies in the very post-secondary university system Dugin works for. The conflation of Rand’s Hegelian inversion of Marxist ideology with Protestant perspectives on predestination could only occur in the fevered imagination of a Russian anti-American polemicist.

Of course, we on the North American New Right  are so gauche as to note that she’s actually neither Russian nor American, but a Jewess (actual surname: Rosenbaum), with a secular Jewish identity, attitude, and spirit. If we were to define a clear distinction between a host nation and Jewish culture, we would find that our actual differences are but a filioque relative to the chasm between either of our nations and the Jewish nation.

Dugin’s political theory “rejects all forms and varieties of racism” as one of its “essential features.” This may be a translation issue, but he seems to define “racism” as supremacism, carrying on about the evils of class racism, progressive racism, economic racism, technological racism (Mac vs. PC?), and cultural racism. Fortunately, he declares that his political theory has a “positive attitude toward the ethnos,” which is perhaps a loophole through which biological definitions of ethnic identities could be smuggled.

It’s very easy to denounce racial “supremacism” when both you and your society have had the privilege of being removed from racial strife. Historical examples of “supremacism” were not instances of simple villainy, but emergent reactions to powerful historical forces. Continental Europeans and Russians have plenty of advice to offer and judgment to pass on White South Africans, Australians, and American Southerners who didn’t have the luxury of developing racial attitudes at the comfortable distance afforded to a tenured professor deep in the heart of a largely White country.

Even within America, you’ve had (and continue to have) the aloof Yankees lecturing the South on the immorality of their structured relationship with the Black American people. The Great Migration of Black Americans into the North over the past century has afforded Yankees an opportunity to put their egalitarian theories into practice. Instead of a structured relationship, America’s Northerners opted for no relationship at all. While Southerners merely insisted on “separate but equal” schools, Northerners have avoided, evaded, and neglected their way to a definitively “separate but equal” country.

As the saying goes:

Southerners don’t mind Blacks living nearby . . . as long as they don’t get uppity.

Northerners don’t mind Blacks getting uppity . . . as long as they don’t live nearby.

If Russians are as alarmed by our supposed mistreatment of Black Americans, Amerindians, and other minority groups as they purport to be, perhaps they would consider offering them asylum? Perhaps the disproportionate share of Blacks we’ve imprisoned are political prisoners, political prisoners who will thrive in a less “supremacist” society? I kid. I kid. The Russians aren’t suicidal enough to invite that problem into their country and wouldn’t handle the problem any better than we have. Finally, Black Americans would not accept such an offer. Statistically speaking, Blacks may not be as intelligent as Whites . . . but they’re not stupid. They’re not about to pass up the rather comfortable and privileged position they enjoy in America’s “supremacist” society.

But there’s little point in seriously engaging the racial perspectives of Dugin and other New Right intellectuals abroad, because it’s a subject they clearly don’t take seriously yet. The European and Russian New Right will likely avoid taking racial issues as seriously as the North American New Right does until the sweeping demographic changes present them with serious racial issues. While we in America have a tremendous amount to learn from our brothers abroad, our current status as the primary host of Jewish Power and our intimate historical and direct familiarity with the racial question requires that we approach those problems clearly and directly, without word games, obfuscations, and evasions.

I agree with Dugin and the rest of the New Right that the structured “supremacist” framework of the American South and elsewhere should be retired in favor of ethnic identity and autonomy. I agree with Dugin that the hour has come for a sweeping alternative to the political theories of yesteryear. I agree with Dugin about the basic contours of that political theory: a pluriversalist and multipolar world order constructed upon the time-honored political unit of tribal identity.  I agree with Dugin that Western capitalism is at the heart of the problem . . . though I’m not willing to ignore the critical role Jews have historically played and continue to play in advancing and directing that destructive force.

I’ve been and will continue to be very critical of not only America’s subverted and psychotic regime, but of the degenerate aspects of our culture which cannot be blamed on Jews and multinational corporations. A good share of the problem is surely our fault. As we move forward, this problem of anti-Americanism is one we’ll need to parse thoughtfully and carefully. Much of the antipathy coming at us from our European and Russian counterparts is valid, understandable, or easy to brush off. There is, however, a good share of it which amounts to mere abuse, distorted demagoguery which plays well to domestic audiences at the expense of developing the very partnerships and relationships of which Dugin obviously grasps the importance.


The Third Political Theory
Michael O’Meara
Counter-Currents Publishing | April 26, 2013

“We will march to fight for Holy Russia/
And spill as one our blood for her.”
—White Army song

The “Third Political Theory” (3PT) is what Alexander Dugin, in The Fourth Political Theoryclip_image001 (2012), calls Fascism and National Socialism.[1]

According to Dugin, National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy were not just militarily, but ideologically defeated in the Second European Civil War (193945)—victims of “‘homicide’, or perhaps ‘suicide’.” Thereafter, these two national anti-liberal ideologies allegedly “overcome by history” ceased to address the great challenges facing European man. Then, with Communism’s fall in 1989/91, the second major anti-liberal “theory” opposing the Judeo-financial forces of Anglo-American liberalism collapsed. Today’s anti-liberal struggle, Dugin concludes, requires an ideology that has not “been destroyed and disappeared off the face of the earth.”

There is nothing in The Fourth Political Theory likely to please the Correctorate—which is, perhaps, reason for reading it. Nevertheless, Dugin’s effort to develop a compelling new “theory” appropriate to the global anti-system resistance must be judged (I’ll not be the first to say) a “failure”—an interesting failure, admittedly, but one also constituting a possible snare for the anti-system opposition, especially in its misleading treatment of 3PT and its implications for the anti-system resistance.


In early 1992, not long after the Soviet collapse, Alain de Benoist, the Paris-based leader of the French “New Right” (who was then just discovering le facteur Russie), was invited by Alexander Dugin to meet in Moscow. Though elements within the Correctorate immediately raised the specter of a “red-brown alliance”[2] (which apparently caused Benoist to keep his distance) and though petty differences continued to divide them, Dugin was eventually accepted as a kindred, anti-liberal spirit, sharing, as he does, the New Right’s Traditionalism (Evola), political theology (Schmitt), Heideggerian ontology, anti-Americanism, and tellurocratic geopolitics (Haushofer). In recent years, their differences seem to have succumbed to all that link their closely related projects.

Dugin has since become a prominent fixture in the NR constellation, sharing the heavens with Benoist. This prominence is entirely deserved, for the gifted Dugin (something of a one-man think tank) is conversant in all the major European languages, erudite in the anti-liberal and esoteric heritage the NR rescued from the postwar Memory Hole, and, above all, an uncompromising, metapolitically-prolific opponent of the United States, “the citadel of world liberalism” and thus the principal source of evil in our time.

The exact nature of Dugin’s project (embracing various elements shared by Europe’s anti-system opposition) has, though, never been entirely clear when viewed from afar. This seems due less to the many bad English translations of his early articles or the numerous conflicting interpretations that can be found of his work—than to a remarkable political itinerary (possible only in the last sovereign white nation on earth) that took him from the political fringes to the heights of power: an itinerary that began with his membership in the ultra-nationalist and anti-Semitic Pamyet Party in the late 1980s, followed by the post-Soviet Communist Party of Gennady Zyuganov, next the National Bolshevik Party and certain other Eurasianist formations, then the Orthodox-monarchist Rodina bloc, and, for the last decade, after achieving national prominence as a “public intellectual,” an occasional adviser to Vladimir Putin and the Russian Duma.

These formations and capacities, each respectable, together raise certain obvious questions about the nature of a political project that spans such a wide spectrum of belief and blends such an eclectic mix of seemingly incompatible ideas (Evolean Traditionalism, NR thought [already a pot-pourri des idées divergentes], Eurasianism, inter alia) into a worldview suitable to the post-Soviet Russian state.

Arktos’ nicely translated and edited publication is such a publishing event precisely because it gives the Anglophone world its first book-length exposure to Dugin’s thought and thus a clearer view of his NR project.


Though still difficult to pigeonhole, I’ve become increasingly critical of Dugin over the years, mainly on account of his Eurasianism—which is not a National Bolshevism in the German sense (of allying Russia and Europe and hence overcoming the narcissistic differences dividing the Greco-Slavic East from the Romano-Germanic West), but rather something of a prospective state ideology inclusive of the Jews, Muslims, and Turks occupying Russian lands—more concerned thus with geopolitical than ethno-civilizational (state power rather than Russian) hegemony—and hence something potentially anti-cultural. This threat is underscored by Dugin’s formal allegiance to the ethnopluralist, multiculturalist, and communitarian principles (spin-offs of the Western universalism he formally opposes) that are key components of Benoist’s culturally-relativist “pluriversum.”[3]

Though unintended, these principles shared by Dugin and Benoist cannot but endanger Europeans, for they legitimize Islam’s colonization of their historic lands, just as they risk turning European Russians into a Turkic-Slavic or Asian people, and thus away from the destiny they share with other Europeans (the “Boreans”: the white or Indo-European peoples of the North).

In his talk at Identitär Idé IV, Dugin the ethnopluralist even toyed with the Left-wing fiction that “race” (as a scientific or zoological concept) is a “social construct” (in spite of his Evolean Tradionalism, which acknowledges the significance of “race” in both its physical and spiritual sense).[4] His position here, though it wavers at times, is like Benoist’s in slighting the racial fundament of what Saint-Loup called the patrie charnelle—the genetic and territorial heritage without which Europeans cease to be who they are.[5]

Dugin, of course, is correct in dismissing “race” as a key social determinant. The white man’s impending demise is spiritual, not biological, in origin. (This, incidentally, is why an American White Nationalism that appeals mainly to race is already a failed project.) Spirit is always primary and the materialist or biological basis of human existence is simply a vehicle of the spirit.

But however “insignificant” as a determinant, race is nevertheless indispensable—in the sense that man’s world is impossible without it. For man is a living, blood-infused being: change his blood (race) and you change his spirit. As it is with being and Being, there is no spirit without blood—the blood distinct to man’s “being-t/here” (Dasein). This doesn’t mean that blood explains or determines anything (at least directly), only that the genetic heritage cannot be dispensed with, without dispensing with the very condition (the “thrownness and facticity”) of human being. Not to see that race, stock, and kinship is an inextricable facet of being is not to see the necessarily embodied nature of Dasein. In fact, Dugin’s is not Heidegger’s Dasein, but an “idealism” (like his Traditionalism).

Dugin’s concessions via Benoist to the miscegenating principles of globalist cosmopolitanism, along with his Turko- and Islamophilia, are evident not just in a Eurasianism that mixes white and yellow, Christian and Islamic peoples in a single polity (instead of promoting the cultural homogeneity characteristic of the West European lands of the High Culture), but also in his stance on the former Faye-Benoist debate on ethnonationalism and communitarianism.

Guillaume Faye is no Vestal Virgin[6], admittedly, but on the decisive issues—race, culture, immigration, Islam—he has stood against the system’s ethnocidal forces for the sake of European Europe, while Dugin, again like Benoist (who in 2000 publicly denounced Faye as a “racist,” just as the French state had launched a judicial assault on him for inciting “racial hatred”), has repeatedly sought an accommodation with the anti-white forces (which probably accounts for a certain Third-World/Islamic interest in 4PT).

In The Fourth Political Theory, Dugin depicts Benoist as a fellow toiler in 4PT and explicitly identifies him with his project. This follows Benoist’s similar public affiliation with 4PT in Moscow in 2009.[7] In spite of their lingering differences, this collaboration between the Paris and Moscow New Rights in recent years seems aimed at giving their related brands of NR discourse (rechristened 4PT) a larger, more consequential audience. (But here I speculate, given that I no longer read their publications.)

Cui bono? For the “political soldier” (who, Dugin believes, is obsolete), for the white ethnonationalist, and, I suspect, for the Russian nationalist, Dugin’s affinity with Benoist, along with his anti-racist opposition to Faye, must set off alarms, signaling, as it does, Dugin’s allegiance to the most communitarian and ethnopluralist—i.e., the most politically correct and demographically compromising—of the NR tendencies.


The Fourth Political Theory is full of insightful discussions of 1PT (liberalism) and 2PT (Communism), which is another reason for reading it, but, strangely, there is almost no discussion, except in passim, of 3PT (Fascism/National Socialism)—perhaps because this “theory” was itself a negation of theory—and thus a negation, among other things, of the “modernism” Dugin rather simplistically attributes to it.

Just as questionably, he treats National Socialism and Fascism, though obviously different, as closely related tendencies, while at the same time ignoring their common roots in an earlier history of anti-liberal resistance. He similarly neglects the post-1945 extensions of this supposedly moribund “theory,” refusing to accept that 3PT did not die after the war and, more important, that the historical forces which once made it a power in the world (the destruction of meaning and the social-economic dislocations that come with excessive liberalization: think today’s “globalization”) are presently creating conditions conducive to another mass, “fascist”-style, anti-liberal insurgence.[8]

For Dugin, 3PT—let’s call it “fascism” (lower case)—is understood in a way not unlike that of the Communist International following its Popular Front turn (1934). In endeavoring then to rally the democratic plutocracies to a collective-security alliance with the Soviet Union against insurgent Germany, the Comintern used “fascism” as a generic term to describe a multitude of movements, allegedly in cahoots with the most reactionary and militaristic factions of Big Capital, but having little else in common other than their anti-liberal or anti-Communist defense of the nation or the nation’s tradition.

Not just Italian Fascists and German National Socialists, but the KKK and Republicans in the US, Franquistas and Falangists in Spain, the “leagues” and others in France, Catholic Rexists in Belgium, Orthodox Iron Guardists in Romania, and virtually every tendency of the interwar period opposing the nihilistic devastations of “democratic capitalism,” Soviet Communism, or Jewish chicanery ended up tagged as “fascist.” Conceptually, this “fascism” was so vacuously defined that “cognitive control over entry criteria into the class was all-but-lost,” as the term evolved into a form of liberal or Left-wing exclusion—like the term “racism.”

After 1945, both the Left and the Academy continued to follow the Comintern line, using the term “fascism” to describe everything or everyone who might oppose 1PT or 2PT in the name of some tradition or rooted identity (what Dugin calls “Dasein”). There’s nothing “scientific” (i.e., rigorous) here, for the term is expressly used to demonize whomever or whatever opposes the forces of capitalist or Communist subversion—usually because the arguments and claims justifying their practices cannot withstand rational scrutiny, even in their own courts. That Dugin uses the term in the same way suggests something about his own assessment of European anti-liberalism.


The second major problem with Dugin’s treatment of 3PT (specifically Fascism and National Socialism) is that he fails to acknowledge that these “ideologies” originated not ex nihilo in the 1920s and ’30s, but from a half-century long movement that had emerged in opposition to similar modernizing forces propelled by Jewish and speculative interests profiting from liberalism’s ongoing economization of European life. Not seeing or stressing the social-historical crucible out of which 3PT emerged causes him to miss the larger counter-modernist intent of its “Third Way.”

3PT struggles against liberal modernity, already beyond Left and Right, first stepped onto the historical stage in the late 19th century, as elements from the revolutionary anti-liberal wing of the labor movement joined elements from the revolutionary anti-liberal wing of the nationalist movement to resist liberalism’s Hebraic (i.e., usurious) model of state and society—a model which turns the nation into a market, caters to cosmopolitans, and denies it a history and destiny.[10]

In this sense, German National Socialism and Italian Fascism represented continuations of these earlier socialist and nationalist expressions of anti-liberalism, being sui generis mainly in embodying the specific spirit and tenure of their age.

Like our court historians, Dugin cannot define “fascism,” except vacuously. Indeed, it can only be defined vacuously given that “fascism” was an ideological deception, for there was only one Fascism and numerous distinct and particularistic forms of 3PT: anti-liberalism, anti-capitalism, anti-Communism, anti-modernization, anti-Semitism, ultranationalism, etc.—sometimes overlapping with one another, sometimes not—but, in most cases, defending their collective Dasein in terms of a specific land and people.

In a similar stroke, Dugin ignores the historical circumstances that brought Italian Fascism and German National Socialism to power: the profound material and psychological dislocations of the 1914–18 war and the devastating economic crisis that followed in the ’30s. If more attention were paid to this aspect of his subject, he might have noticed that since the crisis of 2008, economic stagnation, predatory confiscations by the Robber Barons, and the hollowing out of European institutions, preeminently the state, have created conditions in which another mass form of 3PT may arise to challenge the ethnocidal forces in command of state and society.

If this should occur, the Third Political Theory (the “anti-liberal” and hence anti-system “ideology”), which arose in rebellion against liberal modernity and corporate capitalism in the 1890s, and was called “fascism” in the 1920s and ’30s, is likely to assume what earlier were the unforeseeable forms of identitarianism, goldendawnism, casapoundism, and whatever other revolutionary nationalist tendency that presently fights the liberal devastation of European life in the name not necessarily of “race,” “state,” or theory (as Dugin has it), but in that of the traditions defining Europeans as a people (i.e., as Dasein and Mitsein—concepts, via Martin Heidgegger, native to 3PT).[10]

Not coincidentally, the tendencies that today represent 3PT are as distinct and different as the “fascisms” of the interwar period, though each belongs to the same epochal rebellion against liberal modernization that was defeated in 1945 and is only now, and still hesitantly, beginning to reassert something of its former oppositional significance.

Anti-liberals are nevertheless indebted to Dugin for giving them the term “3PT”—because they can now refrain (when being forthright) from describing or thinking of themselves as “fascists” (who, to repeat, were part of something born of an earlier European struggle against the rising forces of Jewish modernity)[11] and therefore ought, more accurately, to be seen as expressions of this larger historical movement (3PT), which has had many different manifestations, most of which converged in resisting the ethnocidal forces associated with capitalism, Communism, or the Jews. Beyond that, there was little ideological similarity (“theory”).

However 3PT is characterized—as “fascist” or as a larger anti-liberal movement—it continues to speak to the present world situation, for unlike the timid imputations of 4PT and the apoliteia lingering in its antecedents, it has an indisputable record of fighting the dark legions of the Antichrist—not for the sake of a theory, but for certain primordial identities rooted in blood and spirit, kin and countrymen. Indeed, if Europeans are to survive the 21st century, it seems likely that they will have to fight for something of greater “mythic” significance than the self-effacing, bloodless, theoretical tenets of 4PT.

As it was with Fascism and National Socialism in their time, 3PT in our time is also likely to reject the established political arenas and manifest itself “extra-institutionally”—against the Troika (IMF-ECB-EC) and its Masonic Parliaments, Money Changers, and Judeo-Americanists—as it resists liberalism’s nation-destroying effects and, more generally, the usurious system the US imposed on defeated Europe in 1945.

In the new political arenas it will create (analogous to 2PT’s Soviets), 3PT’s appeal will not be to a party, a theory, or a metaphysical abstraction (Dasein), but to the “sovereign people” (diminished as his term may be in the “society of the spectacle”)—as it (3PT) rallies the opposition against an unreformable system threatening Europeans with extinction.

And like its earlier manifestations, today’s 3PT struggle will create a counter-hegemony anticipating a future in which Europeans are again free to pursue the destiny born of their Gothic “kings and emperors.” It will not promote an “affirmative action” program for international relations or seek to ensure the communitarian integrity of the alien populations occupying their lands.


The third and most significant problem in Dugin’s treatment of 3PT lies in ignoring its postwar extensions and thus in failing to recognize those aspects of postwar “fascist” thought relevant to the current situation, especially now that it has shed its earlier petty-state nationalism, bourgeois (“vertical”) racism, and anti-Slavism.

Dugin and Benoist are both extraordinarily creative forces, from whom much can be learned, but ideologically the project of these “free-floating intellectuals” are closer in spirit to Britain’s “Traditionalist” Prince Charles than to such postwar 3PT figures as the American Vabanquespieler, Francis Parker Yockey, whose so-called “postwar fascism” took the theory and practice of 3PT to a point not yet attained by 4PT or NR thought.

Yockey would know nothing of Dugin’s postmodernity, but by the early 1950s, based on European aesthetic (i.e., Spenglerian) rather than scientific objective criteria and thus with a sort of postmodernism avant la lettre, he had worked out a prescient understanding of what lay ahead, offering both an analysis and a means of fighting whatever postmodern form Satan’s Synagogue might assume.[12] It’s hardly coincidentally that the postwar anti-liberal resistance starts—and culminates—with him.

A revolutionary imperial struggle against the Atlanticist Leviathan (aka the NWO)—the struggle to which Yockey gave his life—revolves around the formation of a Euro-Russian federation to fight the thalassocratic powers: les Anglos-Saxons incarnating the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism—England and America—whose hedonist dictatorship of “creative destruction” was not the invention of maniacal Jews, but entirely homegrown, given that it was born at Runnymede; came of age with Henry VIII’s sacrileges, which turned Christianity into a religion of capitalism (Protestantism); and triumphed with the Whig Oligarchy that has dominated the Western world since 1789, when its Continental ideologues overthrew the French monarchy, representing a “Catholic” and regalian modernity.[13]

By 1952, Yockey understood that both the liberation and destiny of Europe were henceforth linked to Russia—the sole world power capable of resisting the satanic counter-civilization geopolitically aligned along the Washington-London-Tel Aviv axis.[14]

Resisting the Leviathan, the movement stretching from Yockey, Saint-Loup, René Binet, and others in the 1940s and 50s, to Jean Mabire, François Duprat, and Jean Thiriart in the ’60s and early ’70s, and to the current generation of revolutionary nationalist, identitarian, and other “Third Way” or anti-system tendencies awakened by the golden dawn[15]—attests (I would think) to the continuing vitality of this allegedly moribund “theory,” especially compared to the deedless metapolitics of NR or 4PT discourse.

In contrast to 4PT, there beats at the heart of 3PT the spirit not of theory but of practice. The great 3PT tribunes all followed Pisacane in their conviction that “ideas spring from deeds and not the other way around.” What always is (and has been) most lacking is not ideas, but men to realize them. There are, as such, no metapolitics without politics.

Privileging Evola’s royal way to Guénon’s sacerdotal, the 3PT resistance distinguishes itself today by fighting for socialism against the Left, for nationalism against the Right, and for Europe’s “difference” against the multi-racialist ideologues of 4PT.


After 1945, 3PT’s POWs were exiled to the margins of European society. It is from there, accordingly, that the final assault on the liberal center is being prepared. For the propagandists of the deed—intent on ridding Europe of her usurers and alien interlopers, and thus of resuming her destiny—Dugin’s theory is a detour from the Euro-Russian Imperium offering the one possibility of creating not the utopia of 4PT multipolarity or replicating the vileness of US unipolarity, but of establishing a peaceful world order based on Borean principles.


1. Alexander Dugin, The Fourth Political Theory, trans. M. Sleboda and M. Millerman (London: Arktos, 2012).

2. Thierry Wolton, Rouge-Brun: Le mal du siècle (Paris: Lattès, 1999).

3. Michael O’Meara, “Benoist’s Pluriversum: An Ethnonationalist Critique,” The Occidental Quarterly 5: 3 (Fall 2005); [3]. Also Michael O’Meara,”Community of Destiny or Community of Tribes?,” Ab Aeterno n. 2 (March 2010); [4].

4. Dugin’s Identitär Idé IV talk is at [5]. On race and Traditionalism, see Julius Evola, Éléments pour une éducation raciale, trans. G. Boulanger (Puiseaux: Pardès, 1984 [1941]); also Frithjof Schuon, Castes and Races, trans. M. Pallis and M. Matheson (Bedfont, UK: 1982 [1959]).

5. Saint-Loup, “Une Europe des patries charnelles,” Défense de l’Occident, n. 136 (March 1976).

6. Michael O’Meara, Guillaume Faye and the Battle of Europe (London: Arktos, 2013).

7. [6].

8. George Friedman, “Europe, Unemployment and Instability” (March 5, 2013), [7].

9. Karlheinz Weissmann, Der Nationale Sozialismus: Ideologie und Bewegung 1890–1933 (Munich: Herbig, 1998); Zeev Sternhell, La Droite révolutionnaire 1885–1914: Les origines françaises de fascisme (Paris: Seuil, 1978); Arnaud Imatz, Par-delà droite et gauche: Histoire de la grande peur récurrente des bien-pensants (Paris: Godefroy de Bouillon, 2002).

10. Pace Dugin, Martin Heidegger remained a proponent of 3PT, evident in his National Socialist critique of Hitler’s regime; see his “second magnum opus,” Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), trans. P. Emad and K. Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999 [1936-38/1989]).

11. On the essentially “Jewish” character of “modernity,” see Yuri Slezkine, The Jewish Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

12. Francis Parker Yockey, The Proclamation of London (Shamley Green, UK: The Palingenesis Project, 2012 [1949]); Francis Parker Yockey, “The Prague Treason Trial: What Is Behind the Hanging of Eleven Jews in Prague” (1952), [8].

13. E. Michael Jones, The Jewish Revolutionary Spirit and Its Impact on World History (South Bend, Ind.: Fidelity Press, 2008); Steve Pincus, 1688: The First Modern Revolution (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2009).

14. Desmond Fennell, Uncertain Dawn: Hiroshima and the Beginning of Post-Western Civilisation (Dublin: Sanas, 1996).

15. Nicolas Lebourg, Le Monde vu de la plus extrême droite: Du fascisme au nationalisme-révolutionnaire (Perpignan: Presses Universitaires de Perpignan, 2010).


Alexander Dugin on “White Nationalism” & Other Potential Allies in the Global Revolution
Counter-Currents Publishing | June 3, 2013

Editor’s Note:

The following text was compiled by John Morgan from various informal statements that Alexander Dugin posted to his Facebook page over the last year which deal with common themes. The compiler has combined and restructured them in an attempt to reshape them into a single, coherent text, and also brushed up the language somewhat. 

There are different tendencies in the new generation of revolutionary, non-conformist movements in Europe (on the Right as well as the Left), and some of them have been successful in attaining high political positions in their respective countries. The crisis of the West will grow broader and deeper every day, so we should expect an increase in the power and influence of our own Eurasianist resistance movement against the present global order, which is a dictatorship by the worst elements of the Western societies.

Those from either the Right or the Left who refuse American hegemony, ultra-liberalism, strategic Atlanticism, the domination of oligarchic and cosmopolitan financial elites, individualistic anthropology and the ideology of human rights, as well as typically Western racism in all spheres – economic, cultural, ethical, moral, biological and so on – and who are ready to cooperate with Eurasian forces in defending multipolarity, socio-economic pluralism, and a dialogue among civilizations, we consider to be allies and friends.

Those on the Right who support the United States, White racism against the Third World, who are anti-socialist and pro-liberal, and who are willing to collaborate with the Atlanticists; as well as those on the Left who attack Tradition, the organic values of religion and the family, and who promote other types of social deviations – both of these are in the camp of foe.

In order to win against our common enemy, we need to overcome the ancient hatreds between our peoples, as well as those between the obsolete political ideologies that still divide us. We can resolve such problems amongst ourselves after our victory.

At the present time, we are ALL being challenged, and ALL of us are being dominated by the forces of the prevailing global order.

Before we concern ourselves with these other issues, we first need to liberate ourselves.

I am very happy that Gábor Vona, whom I have met, and who is the leader of the Jobbik party in Hungary, understands this perfectly. We need to be united in creating a common Eurasian Front.

In Greece, our partners could eventually be Leftists from SYRIZA, which refuses Atlanticism, liberalism and the domination of the forces of global finance. As far as I know, SYRIZA is anti-capitalist and it is critical of the global oligarchy that has victimized Greece and Cyprus. The case of SYRIZA is interesting because of its far-Left attitude toward the liberal global system. It is a good sign that such non-conformist forces have appeared on the scene. Dimitris Konstakopulous writes excellent articles and his strategic analysis I find very correct and profound in many cases.

There are also many other groups and movements with whom we can work. The case of the Golden Dawn (Chrysi Avgi) is interesting because it is part of the growing (and very exciting indeed) reappearance of radical Right parties in the European political landscape. We need to collaborate with all forces, Right or Left, who share our principles.

The most important factor should not be whether these groups are pro-Russian or not. What they oppose is of much greater importance here. The enemy of my enemy is my friend. It is simple and easy to understand. If we adopt such an attitude in order to appeal to all possible allies (who either approve of us or who do not), more and more people will follow suit – if only due to pragmatism. In doing so, we will create a real, functioning network – a kind of Global Revolutionary Alliance. It is important that we pursue a strategy of uniting the Left and the Right everywhere, including in the United States. We need to save America from its own dictatorship, which is as bad for the American people as it is for all other peoples.

The issue of limited or unlimited government is, as far as I can see, of lesser importance in comparison with geopolitics – it all depends on the historical tradition of the nation in question. Gun ownership is a good thing when the guns are in our hands. Therefore, these two points when taken as a political platform I consider to be absolutely neutral in themselves. Such an American Right can be good or bad, depending on other factors beyond these two points. We need to have a dialogue with those who look deeper into the nature of things, into history and who try to understand the present world order.

I consider the “White nationalists” allies when they refuse modernity, the global oligarchy and liberal-capitalism, in other words everything that is killing all ethnic cultures and traditions. The modern political order is essentially globalist and based entirely on the primacy of individual identity in opposition to community. It is the worst order that has ever existed and it should be totally destroyed. When “White nationalists” reaffirm Tradition and the ancient culture of the European peoples, they are right. But when they attack immigrants, Muslims or the nationalists of other countries based on historical conflicts; or when they defend the United States, Atlanticism, liberalism or modernity; or when they consider the White race (the one which produced modernity in its essential features) as being the highest and other races as inferior, I disagree with them completely.

More than this, I can’t defend Whites when they are in opposition to non-Whites because, being White and Indo-European myself, I recognize the differences of other ethnic groups as being a natural thing, and do not believe in any hierarchy among peoples, because there is not and cannot be any common, universal measure by which to measure and compare the various forms of ethnic societies or their value systems. I am proud to be Russian exactly as Americans, Africans, Arabs or Chinese are proud to be what they are. It is our right and our dignity to affirm our identity, not in opposition to each other but such as it is: without resentment against others or feelings of self-pity.

I can’t defend the concept of the nation, because the idea of the “nation” is a bourgeois concept concocted as a part of modernity in order to destroy traditional societies (empires) and religions, and to replace them with artificial pseudo-communities based on the notion of individualism. All of that is wrong. The concept of the nation is now being destroyed by the same forces that created it, back during the first stage of modernity. The nations have already fulfilled their mission of destroying any organic and spiritual identity, and now the capitalists are liquidating the instrument they used to achieve this in favor of direct globalization. We need to attack capitalism as the absolute enemy which was responsible for the creation of the nation as a simulacrum of traditional society, and which was also responsible for its destruction. The reasons behind the present catastrophe lie deep in the ideological and philosophical basis of the modern world. In the beginning, modernity was White and national; in the end, it has become global. So White nationalists need to choose which camp they want to be in: that of Tradition, which includes their own Indo-European tradition, or that of modernity. Atlanticism, liberalism, and individualism are all forms of absolute evil for the Indo-European identity, since they are incompatible with it.

In his review of my book The Fourth Political Theory, Michael O’Meara criticized it [3] on the grounds of advocating a return to the unrealized possibilities of the Third Political Theory. It is good that people from different camps present their responses to the Fourth Political Theory, but it uses typically old Right/Third Way racist/anti-Semitic arguments. It is not too profound, nor too hollow. I doubt that we can get anywhere by repeating the same agenda of Yockey and so on. This draws the line between the Third Way and the Fourth Way. At the same time, I consider Heidegger to be a precursor of the Fourth Political Theory, and he was acting and thinking in the context of the Third Political Theory.

Concerning the “identitarians,” I have never uttered the name of Faye in all of my writing – he is not bad, but also not good. I consider Alain de Benoist to be brilliant – simply the best. Those “identitarians” who view the positive attitude toward Islam or Turks as a negative aspect of the Fourth Political Theory do so, I believe, partly due to the manipulation of globalist forces who seek to divide those revolutionary forces which are capable of challenging the liberal-capitalist Atlanticist hegemony.

Muslims form a part of the Russian population, and are an important minority. Therefore, Islamophobia implicitly calls for the break-up of Russia. The difference between Europe and Russia in our attitude toward Islam is that, for us, Muslims are an organic part of the whole, while for Europe they are a post-colonial wave of re-invaders from a different geopolitical and cultural space. But since we have a common enemy in the globalist elite, which is pro-Pussy Riot/Femen, pro-gay marriage, anti-Putin, anti-Iran, anti-Chávez, anti-social justice and so on, we all need to develop a common strategy with the Muslims. Our traditions are quite different, but the anti-traditional world that is attacking us is united, and so must we become.

If “identitarians” really love their identity, they should ally themselves with the Eurasianists, alongside the traditionalists and the enemies of capitalism belonging to any people, religion, culture or political camp. Being anti-Communist, anti-Muslim, anti-Eastern, pro-American or Atlanticist today means to belong to the other side. It means to be on the side of the current global order and its financial oligarchy. But that is illogical, because the globalists are in the process of destroying any identity except for that of the individual, and to forge an alliance with them therefore means to betray the essence of one’s cultural identity.

The problem with the Left is different. It is good when it opposes the capitalist order, but it lacks a spiritual dimension. The Left usually represents itself as an alternative path to modernization, and in doing so it also opposes organic values, traditions and religion, just as liberalism does.

I would be happy to see Left-wing identitarians who defend social justice while attacking capitalism on one hand, and who embrace spiritual Tradition and attack modernity on the other. There is only one enemy: the global, liberal capitalist order supported by North American hegemony (which is also directed against the genuine American identity).

In terms of traditionalism, usually traditionalism is defensive or is considered to be such. What we need is to break this assumption and promote offensive traditionalism. We should attack (hyper)modernity and make the status quo explode, in the name of the Return. I mean “offensive” in all ways. We need to insist.

Politics is the instrument of modernity. I think neo-Gramscism is an important tool. We have to form a historic bloc of traditionalists alongside organic intellectuals of a new type. We have Orthodox Christians (and perhaps other types of Christians as well), Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus who all reject the idea of the “Lockean heartland” (as per Kees van der Pijl) becoming global. We need to attack it together, not by ourselves. And we need to attack in any possible way – everyone as he or she is able – physically, politically, and intellectually . . .

It is time to be offensive.

Soon the world will descend into chaos. The financial system is going to collapse. Disorder, ethnic and social conflicts will be breaking out everywhere. Europe is doomed. Asia is in tumult. The oceans of immigrants everywhere will overthrow the existing order. The present system will be broken and disbanded.

After this transitional period, direct global dictatorship will be implemented. We should be prepared and start to organize the global resistance right now – the planetary network of traditionalists, Conservative Revolutionaries, Heideggerians, the partisans of the Fourth Political Theory and multipolarity, and non-conformists of all sorts – a kind of Sacred Front beyond Right and Left, and consisting of different, older political and ideological taxonomies. All three of the political theories have been phased out of modernity, and also out of conventional and assumed history. We, and also our enemies, are entering absolutely new ground.

Every traditionalist should ask himself (or herself) the following questions:

1. Why have I arrived to be on the side of Tradition in opposition to modernity?

2. What is the reality that makes me what I am, in essence? Where have I got it from?

3. Is my vocation as a traditionalist the result of my socio-cultural heritage (society, family, and culture) or is it the result of some other factor?

4. How it is possible, in the midst of modernity and postmodernity, to be differentiated from them?

5. In which way can I cause the modern world around me real damage? (In other words, how can I effectively fight against the Devil?)

The Fourth Political Theory struggles for the cause of all peoples, but it is not made for the people. It is a call to the intellectual elite of every human society, and rejects hegemony in all senses (philosophical, social, and political). This time, the people cannot help us. This time, we must help the people.

Opposing us is nothing more than an intellectual elite, but it is a hegemonic one. All its material power is nothing but an illusion and a phantasm: its texts, discourse and words are what really counts. Its force lays in its thought. And it is on the level of thought that we have to fight and, finally, win. Everything material that opposes us is actually nothing but pure privation. Only thought really exists.

It is easy to manipulate the masses, much easier than to persuade the few. Quantity is the enemy of quality – the more so, the worse. The capitalist elite thinks differently. That error will be fatal. For them. And we are going to prove it.

We need an open, undogmatic Front that is beyond Right and Left.

We have prepared for the coming moment of opportunity for too long. But now, finally, it is not so far in the future.

We will change the course of history. At present, it is on a very wrong course.

We can only win if we combine our efforts.

Dugin’s Novorossiya Project and Romantic Eurasianism I

The Fourth Political Theory
Alexander Dugin
Arktos Media Ltd (July 20, 2012)

All the political systems of the modern age have been the products of three distinct ideologies: the first, and oldest, is liberal democracy; the second is Marxism; and the third is fascism. The latter two have long since failed and passed out of the pages of history, and the first no longer operates as an ideology, but rather as something taken for granted. The world today finds itself on the brink of a post-political reality – one in which the values of liberalism are so deeply embedded that the average person is not aware that there is an ideology at work around him. As a result, liberalism is threatening to monopolise political discourse and drown the world in a universal sameness, destroying everything that makes the various cultures and peoples unique. According to Alexander Dugin, what is needed to break through this morass is a fourth ideology – one that will sift through the debris of the first three to look for elements that might be useful, but that remains innovative and unique in itself. Dugin does not offer a point-by-point program for this new theory, but rather outlines the parameters within which it might develop and the issues which it must address. Dugin foresees that the Fourth Political Theory will use the tools and concepts of modernity against itself, to bring about a return of cultural diversity against commercialisation, as well as the traditional worldview of all the peoples of the world – albeit within an entirely new context. Written by a scholar who is actively influencing the direction of Russian geopolitical strategy today, The Fourth Political Theory is an introduction to an idea that may well shape the course of the world’s political future. Alexander Dugin (b. 1962) is one of the best-known writers and political commentators in post-Soviet Russia. In addition to the many books he has authored on political, philosophical and spiritual topics, he currently serves on the staff of Moscow State University, and is the intellectual leader of the Eurasia Movement. For more than a decade, he has also been an advisor to Vladimir Putin and others in the Kremlin on geopolitical matters, being a vocal advocate of a return of Russian power to the global stage, to act as a counterweight to American domination.

Download in epub format at:


Alexander Dugin’s “The Fourth Political Theory”
Andrew Lowden
The Occidental Observer | July 22, 2013

The Fourth Political Theory
Alexander Dugin
Arktos Media, 2012. 211pp.

Alexander Dugin’s book is a very timely work; by which I mean it is almost exclusively a response to the twentieth century—“the century of ideology” (p. 15) — from the twenty-first. It is a right-wing critique of modernity that has learned its lessons from left-wing post-modernity. It joins a flurry of works in a similar genre of post-war “alternative politics,” spanning from Julius Evola’s Fascism Viewed from the Right of 1964 to Guillaume Faye’s Archeofuturism of 2010. Authors can be Christian, neo-pagan, or atheist; they can be reformed fascists, “paleo”-conservatives, or Traditionalists. They all, however, seem to send the same message and understand the same thing about the present state of the Western world: everything that is wrong with the way we act is rooted in something desperately wrong with the way we think. It is, in many ways, set apart from the radical right-wing not only in conclusions but the quality of the authors. While some are certainly pamphleteers in spirit, there is a distinctly intellectual strain running through it all—exemplified by the Nouvelle Droit phenomenon in France. It should come as no surprise, then, that Dugin is Professor of Sociology at Moscow State University (as well as Chair of that department’s Centre for Conservative Studies).

As might be expected from an academic, he has produced a dense work that may appear esoteric to the unlettered reader—indeed, even the learned man who has no experience with Heideggerian metaphysics may struggle through certain parts of the book. Nevertheless, it is also an exceptionally practical work, and though there are doubtlessly many critiques that any given conservative can level against it, it remains a monumental book merely because of its project. The Fourth Political Theory is not, as the title suggests, a coherent, well-defined theory: the book is not a manifesto, despite all appearances. Rather, the work is ambiguous; the closest one can get to a definition is that “the Fourth Political Theory is an unmodern theory” (p. 68).  The rest of what is said is either vague, dense, or apophatic (i.e., defined by what it is not).

A summary of the book can be read on the publisher’s website. Dugin proposes that the twentieth century was a battleground of three political theories, the first (Liberalism), the second (Communism), and the third (Fascism). Two have failed outright, but the first of the three is still insufficient despite its victory. The “fourth political theory” is what can be assembled to answer the failures of the first three, by drawing from the first three and building a new edifice. Flavours of Faye are already apparent. What is truly interesting about the book, though, requires perhaps several readings. On the first, it is a standard work of the New Right—which, while a good alternative to the present paradigm, has become somewhat tired by now. On the second and third readings, however, qualities reveal themselves that offer for a much fuller appreciation of the monumental potential of the work.

Dugin’s direct definitions can be esoteric, such as his declaration that “at the heart of the Fourth Political Theory, is its magnetic centre, lies the trajector of the approaching Ereignis (the ‘Event’), which will embody the triumphant return of Being, at the exact moment when mankind forgets about it, once and for all, to the point that the last traces of it disappear” (p. 29). While Dugin gives some explanation of the Heideggerian Ereignis, he does not sufficiently explain how this is different than any other apocalyptic theory of the Right—and, more importantly, he is never explicit about what exactly is meant by Being and why it has significance in the political sphere. Even to the philosopher, therefore, this will seem like a misappropriation of metaphysical ideas to serve vulgar political ends (a charge levelled against Heidegger himself after he joined the National Socialist Party). This is perhaps unfair to Dugin and Heidegger alike, but without a doubt the concept of Ereignis is unnecessary for Dugin’s real preoccupation, which is the collapse of the present world order and the emergence of a new geopolitical and socio-cultural reality: the multi-polar world.

Throughout his work (even without the helpful footnotes from the editors), the influence of other thinkers is distinctly apparent. Spengler, especially, has left a deep mark on Dugin’s geopolitical thought, and, with others, is likely the reason Dugin chooses to interpret geopolitical change as a metaphysical event—since with the death of Western Civilisation, there comes a fundamental change not only in Weltanschauung but in the very metaphysical sense of the people within that Civilisation. Spengler speaks of this as the “soul” of the Civilisation—the way in which human beings as components of these massive organisms imagine themselves. The Hermeneutical Circle is an obvious step from this: a civilisation is an organism in itself by Spengler’s theory, meaning that no matter what it does, it can never be understood at its core, as it is fundamentally by anyone outside of itself; yet, in order to analyse a civilisation and come to understand it rather than merely know it, it is necessary to mentally step outside of the civilisation—to become foreign to it. Having accomplished this, though, one has lost access to the fundamental qualities of that civilisation. Thus, one can either be within the civilisation, and know it “by heart”, so to speak, in such a way that is unreflective, or one can step outside the civilisation and reflect on it, but lose the innate knowledge—what Spengler calls “race”—of the civilisation. What Dugin is proposing with this Ereignis is a truly apocalyptic, that is “revelatory” event, wherein self-knowledge and being, Spenglerian Race, shifts fundamentally, and people no longer live, act, and think within a Western, Liberal paradigm but come into a new paradigm. This new paradigm is the multi-polar world.

The identification in the book of “Western” with “Liberal” cannot be overstated for Western readers. Dugin speaks of transcending paradigms that are all, ultimately, Western in origin. Any efforts to preserve the West in a cultural or racial sense would be to fall short of Dugin’s goal of transcendence. It is for this reason that the section of his book dealing with racism deserves some note. At first glance, the two-page long attack on Nazi racism sounds like it could have come from any Antifa publication—it could make anyone with a racial consciousness cringe. It is jarring because it must be, however. Dugin’s comments on ethnocentrism reveal a much more complex attitude. “Liberalism as an ideology, calling for the liberation from all forms of collective identity,” he writes, “is entirely incompatible with the ethnos or with ethnocentrism, and is an expression of a systemic theoretical and technological ethnocide.” (p. 47) In the same breath as he speaks of the importance of the ethnos to the multipolar world, however, he also declares that “European and American societies are fundamentally afflicted with these types of racism [cultural, civilisational, technological, social, economic, and evolutionary], unable to eradicate them from itself despite intensive efforts.” (p. 44) Racial thinking, for Dugin, is too fundamentally joined to the sense of progress and Darwinian thinking that is inherent to the first three political theories, all rooted in Enlightenment ideology. It poisons against the organic ethnos, which must become the focal point of the Fourth Political Theory. His practical solution, then, is an anti-racial, or tribal understanding with a fluid conception of “race” similar to the Spenglerian understanding. All this returns to the sort of radical traditionalism that clearly influences his metaphysical thinking.

The basic assumption, then, (never made explicit in the book but obvious if one is familiar with Dugin’s other work) is that the present world paradigm is defined by the monopolarity of Euro-American Liberal world power. In a way, it’s a very Russian way of thinking—the Atlanticist world, dominated by America and defined by Liberal ideology, is insufficient for human society, and a more tribal co-existence of multiple powers is necessary to correct the present flaws of the globalist steamroller. The change Dugin is calling for, however, is not from within—the sort of rebellion against the dominant ideology. Rather, he denies that there is a dominant ideology:

Some may argue that… liberals… remain believers in their ideology and simply deny all others the right to exist”, [but] “this is not exactly true. When liberalism transforms from being an ideological arrangement to the only content of our extant social and technological existence, then it is no longer an ‘ideology’, but an existential facet, an objective order of things. It also causes any attempt to challenge its supremacy as being not only difficult, but also foolish.” (p. 20)

Liberalism has become the force of Western Civilisation, and cannot be changed: much like Spengler before him, Dugin is proposing that the goal of most conservative movements — to “restore” tradition — is impossible, and only the fall of the West will produce any real results similar to what conservatives are looking for. It is for this reason that while he constantly refers to conservative and traditionalist goals, and constantly speaks of the Right, the Fourth Political Theory is “not an invitation to a return to traditional society; i.e., it is not conservatism in the conventional sense” (p. 70). Rather, much in line with the other writers of the “alternative right”, the Fourth Political Theory “embodies our determination to go beyond the usual ideological and political paradigms and to make an effort to overcome the inertia of the clichés within political thinking… [it is] an invitation for a free spirit and a critical mind” (p. 35). He’s talking about something genuinely creative, but not progressive—the progressive is trapped in a linear motion. Dugin is proposing something that at once can break from the past and yet also be called “traditional”. One is reminded of Arthur Moeller van den Bruck’s assertion that “to be conservative means to create something worth conserving.”

There is irony in that “free spirit” and “critical mind” are themselves clichés of the Western cult of education—meaning that even as Dugin attempts to free himself, he is still somewhat trapped by the paradigm in which he works. To his great credit, however, he seems distinctly aware of this, and it influences his decision not to propose a manifesto or a new ideology, but to propose new questions. Therefore, his language is carefully chosen to reflect invitation and inspiration rather than goals and codes; the new theory “must draw its ‘dark inspiration’ from post-modernity, from the liquidation of the program of the Enlightenment, and the arrival of the society of the simulacra, interpreting this as an incentive for battle rather than as a destiny” (p. 23). The Fourth Political Theory is not post-modern, but draws on post-modernity; it is not anti-modern, but unmodern, rejecting the society of spectacle and appearances by de-constructing it.

For example, consider the simulacra of Che Guevara. The iconic “Che” photograph may seem to be support for radical communism, but the reality is that his image is printed on t-shirts manufactured in sweat-shops and then sold at profit to middle-class teenagers with too little education or understanding to embrace Guevara’s own ethics or ideology. Che becomes, therefore, a simulacra—appearing to be a communistic resistance but in reality representing capitalistic triumph. This is but one example – and it is a simple one at that. Far more complex simulacra dominate what Guy Debord called “the society of the spectacle”.

Debord, like Antonio Gramsci, is another common strain that Dugin has with the French authors of the “alternative right” persuasion. There is an immediate comparison that can be drawn to Faye’s Archeofuturism—itself an echo of an old Fascist project of combining futurism and traditionalism. Faye, though, is proposing something closer to Dugin’s idea—a co-existence of archaic forms with futuristic forms, in mutually exclusive spheres. Dugin is less anarchic in his vision—his multi-polar world has neater categories, the Civilizations—but nevertheless the two are pursuing a very similar goal: drawing from the old and out-moded ideas of modernity and pre-modernity to form a forward-looking world-view. The atheist Faye has the appearance of being more daring—his wanton abandonment of Christian sexual morality is an amusing example of the old French stereotype—but truly his work is less exciting and original than Dugin’s. Dugin is challenging his reader to cling to the ancient mores of his Christian faith, but do so in such a way that faces the challenges of a Brave New World. This creates tremendous doctrinal problems, especially in regards to the metaphysics of chaos that Dugin espouses, but it is a far more interesting proposal than Faye’s re-hashed Fascist progressivism.

Dugin is not progressive because he sees no need to be: “the era of persecuting Tradition is over”, he writes, because Liberalism has no more need to persecute it or attack it—the critiques of Tradition have become “common sense” and Liberalism no longer engages in ideological battles (p. 26). The “old way” is just that: generally (even universally) accepted as a relic. This creates a world that is actually both safer for radical conservative thought and also more dangerous: “following the logic of postliberalism, this will likely lead to the creation of a new global pseudo-religion, based on the scraps of disparate syncretic cults, rampant chaotic ecumenism, and ‘tolerance’”.

Dugin is perhaps being too conservative here: using his own ideas, it is easy to argue that this has already happened, and the EU and USA represent the great canonical bodies of the new religion. Tradition is no longer under attack, to be sure, but those who still come to its defence, drawing attention to themselves as though they still have a legitimate voice in the West, will come to be seen (and dealt with) as heretics. In this way, it is more dangerous to be a conservative. In another, however, it may not be: the post-liberal, post-modern world allows for the deconstruction of anything, including itself. Liberalism, therefore, gives the Right the tools to deconstruct it, such that destroying it is not necessary. It remains for the Right only to prepare for the post-Western world.

This is the basis for Dugin’s historical examination and evaluation of the various forms of “conservatism”, which is perhaps the best example of his practical politics. It is also here that one finds attitudes which seem to fall the most within the Western paradigm. The favour, for example, shown to “Conservative Revolution” and the critique of “liberal conservatism” echoes the same sort of things one hears from the majority of the alternative right throughout Europe. Dugin’s influence from Traditionalist and radical conservative thinkers like Evola, Spengler, E.J. Jung, Moeller van den Bruck, and the pan-Slavic Danilevsky and neo-Eurasianist Gumilev are all apparent in his analysis here. It is this section which is also the least original of the book—and the one which opens it up to many of the reigning critiques, including accusations that Dugin has not really outgrown his National Bolshevism or that the work is essentially just a rambling pamphlet for the Eurasianist movement in Russia. While certainly the practical political aspects of the work here are somewhat lacking in originality, when they are brought together with the more creative and daring sections of the book, they are cast in a new light. This was, no doubt, the intention of the editors in their assembly of the book.

This is the last thing that ought to be said about the book: it is a translation not of one, but of several Russian originals which have been brought together and attached to the core of the original text. Some of them are more daring than others—the Heideggerian and speculative work especially. This gives the work something of a turbulent feel at times; metaphysics in this chapter, practical politics in the next, something resembling a religious fervour in yet another. The first reading will not, as said above, reveal the depth of the work or the intention of the author and editors—not because of the way the editors chose to arrange the book, but rather because of the nature of the writings. Dugin has written, and Arktos has assembled, a book with a title suggesting new answers, while the clear intent of the book is to beg new questions, to challenge and change the language of the Right. This necessarily makes it a difficult work at times. It is, however, despite its shortcomings, perhaps the best primer for Dugin and his thinking available, and succeeds in challenging its reader. In a time when conventional ways of thinking about identity are accomplishing very little, this Russian author offers a new paradigm for identity and physical survival of those loyal to their Western identity.


Siryako Akda
The Fourth Political Theory

For the second part of my review of Alexander Dugin’s "The Fourth Political Theory," I will focus on the more esoteric and abstract aspects, and attempt to relate it to real political concerns and issues. Although such ideas may seem irrelevant to a lot of people, they do have significance in the sense that they allow us to trace the trajectory of Dugin’s ideas, as well as their implications on the political sphere. In other words, they can tell us where Dugin is “coming from.”

Having said that, there’s always the possibility that I have misinterpreted certain parts of Dugin’s thesis, but this is an inevitable risk when studying such an abstract work. But we should remember that Dugin’s book is an invitation to a struggle, rather than a full dogmatic declaration of finished truth. Any predictions that Dugin might make in his work are attempts to articulate how the epistemological landscape might change, and not necessarily how such changes might affect human affairs. This is why the book can be a little hard to decipher at times, particularly when we consider its apparent lack of a central and cohesive overarching theme.

It is best to approach the "The Fourth Political Theory" as the marking out of a philosophical arena wherein new and more concrete ideas can develop in the future. Having said all this, it’s important to begin deciphering the book by first looking at its own proposed ontological subject: Dasein.

Why Dasein?

Perhaps, the greatest feature of 4PT is that it is a form of universal particularlism, centered around the idea of civilizational multipolarity, ethnos and Dasein. The invocation of Dasein is a call for this particularism, but one problem is that Dasein is too complex and abstract a way to formulate this idea for most people.

So we come to ask a simple question, “Why Dasein?” Why does Dugin choose Dasein as the subject of the Fourth Political Theory? To address this question, we must consider where Dugin is coming from.

For Dugin, the modern world, and Liberalism in general, are attempts at moving away from tradition and organic communities, and into the high speed development which characterized the previous centuries, as well as the notion of linear, “monotonic” progress. As society becomes more abstract, characterized by technical concerns and applications, so too do people, thinking of themselves and others in increasingly abstract ways. The modern world created this experience, and it is this experience which has lead to the concealment of Dasein in human affairs.

However, as we move from the Modern World to the Post-Modern one, this reduction of human experience to the level of abstraction, which is also the level of "human rights" and globalization, is challenged by the arrival of a different paradigm, Postmodernity.

As we transition into the new era, the issue is no longer about tradition vs. liberalism, but a contest between authenticity and virtuality. Where the Modern World tried to overcome the past, Postmodernity is an attempt at overcoming Authentic Being in favor of a sort of hyper-virtual existence where the world becomes a sort of eternal rave party, where there is no individual self, but only the rhythm which animates the entire structure.

In other words, Dugin conceives the coming struggle as between the inauthenticity of the coming Post-Modern world and the authenticity of Dasein. For Dugin, Dasein is authenticity, tradition and rootedness, and therefore the best solution against the encroaching virtual world of Post-Modernity. 

The Postmodern world, despite its gifts of new and ever changing stimuli, is a cage that traps humanity in its own senses, severing it from the authenticity of Dasein. Let me put it this way: Do you want to believe that you’re a hermaphroditic African-Asian dragon trapped inside a heterosexual white male’s body? In Postmodernity you can become whatever you want, and later on, if you change your mind, we can always turn you into a little elf girl princess. You can become whatever you want to be, whenever and wherever you want to be. We have the technology, and no cisprivileged bigot will stand in your way of becoming a real pony princess. After all, anything’s possible in virtual reality, which is Postmodernity.

The freedom to be My Little Pony

This form of unlimited freedom is the logical conclusion to the liberal project, the freeing of man from man. It is deeply Faustian in its implications. The subject of Postmodernity is pure will to power in the context of the "Blue Pill" of The Matrix, where freedom is illusion and reality is slavery. In Postmodernity freedom is slavery and slavery freedom. Perhaps, George Orwell knew more than he thought when he uttered such paradoxes.

According to Dugin, however, this freeing of man from himself, and his sublimation into a sort of pure will to power is a symptom of a more important trend, namely the reassertion of the Radical Subject. This is a concept which is connected with Heidegger’s notion of Ereignis (the ‘Event’) and is connected with Dugin’s use of Dasein. The Radical Subject is an attempt at recreating the transcendent prehuman ontology, and the facilitation of the creation of "Chaos Logos."

Both Ereignis and the Radical Subject have semi-mystical meanings, and I would even go so far as call Dugin’s Radical Subject a form of Neo-Gnosticism, especially as it relates to Ereignis. For those who are familiar with Gnosticism, the concept of linear time, along with the material world, are manifestations of the False World of the Demiurge, Yaldabaoth and Saklas. Linear time is a prison wherein the soul is imprisoned in false dialectics, in Maya. Therefore, to overcome linear time is also to liberate the Radical Subject from the confines of time, from the confines of history and of Maya.

Therefore, Postmodernity may not just be the death of Liberalism, it also has a more important significance, which is the rebirth of the Radical Subject and the age of the Kairos (the Supreme moment). It is the rebirth of God from the corpse of pure materialism.

In this sense, there is definitely a religious subtext to Dugin’s philosophy. Modernity and Postmodernity are both considered historical necessities, as essential elements which open up the possibility of religious experience by overcoming the linear inertia of human consciousness by bringing about collective psychic stress (i.e. the obsolescence and destruction of traditional civilizational structures by the Modern World). The implications of this idea is that Radical Self works through  Modernity and consequently Postmodernity to destroy linear time, and thus release itself from entrenched ontological experiences.

But being beyond linear time has two sides, one positive, the other negative, represented by the contrasting concepts of the Radical Subject and the Post-Human. The Post-Human is a new concept of man as nothing more than a collection of urges, wants and thoughts: pure will to power. The Radical Subject is more akin to the Pre-Human, the Human that is most primal and most in touch with Dasein; the human whose Being is tied with nature and chaos. Thus, the death of Modernity opens up with the confrontation between these two types of ontology, both of which seeks to overcome “man” as it is understood by modern epistemology.  

Postmodernity may be destruction, but it is a necessary form of destruction since it destroys the outdated and confining (as far as Dugin is concerned) logocentric world view of the Western World. In this way, Postmodernity brings with it both danger, in the form of virtuality, as well as salvation, through the reassertion of Dasein and the Radical Subject.

“… the approaching Ereignis (the ‘Event’), which will embody the triumphant return of Being, at the exact moment when mankind forgets about it, once and for all, to the point that the last traces of it disappear,” (page 29, Chapter One: The Birth of The Concept)

When one considers the theory in this manner, Western Civilization’s role in bringing about the Modern and Postmodern worlds have an important significance in historical dialectics. This, of course, opens up the question of how we proceed from this, and for Dugin, the only solution is by accepting and embracing Dasein, and renouncing all concepts created by Modernity.

An inauthentic portrait of Martin Heidegger.

Dasein and Post-Modernity

For those who are having a difficult time reconciling Dugin’s use of Heidegger’s Dasein with the struggle against global homogenization, I suggest reading Dasein in the context of premodern philosophy, particularly Neoplatonism, which posited an inner unity to the universe’s multiplicity – Nous, the divine Oneness, which manifests multiplicity as a necessity of its very nature. Premodern philosophy posits that man is a microcosm of the universe, just as all objects are microcosms of a larger macrocosm (the Universe), and therefore bears no separation with the rest of existence. These points are essential, because Dasein implies that each man, and each event is unique by simply being in a particular period, time or place. This uniqueness, however, does not mean separation from the higher macrocosm, but instead enforces it, and, in fact, derives its authenticity from it. Only by being connected with, and in relation to, the universe can a thing be unique.

In contrast, virtuality offers no differentiation. It is seriality, which can then be mass produced ad infinitum. By trying to separate the microcosm (i.e. man) from the macrocosm, man becomes inauthentic, plastic and ultimately pseudo-human, which is what Postmodernity is for Dugin. This is consistent with Evola’s own criticisms of Liberalism, which equates it with radical individualism. By severing man from higher principles, from the macrocosm, Liberalism has paved the way for the creation of the pseudo-human, the creature that is pure virtuality.  

However, one cannot actually be severed from higher principles. We can only create conditions which make it seem like we are cut off from the macrocosm. This is particularly true in relation to existential criticisms of Heidegger’s philosophy which denies the Being of Man, but rather simply states that Man exists and is nothing more.

In contrast, to embrace Dasein is to Be. It is self-awareness of where and what you are, but at the same time, to be aware of your connection with the higher self, including one’s heritage and future. In Evolian terms, this is Tradition with a capital T. So in a sense, what Dugin is saying is that Postmodernity opens up the possibility of the return of Being and Tradition by overcoming Modernity, but this possibility can only be carried out in the context of struggle and the confrontation with our Being, which is also a confrontation with Dasein. Dugin’s book is an invitation to prepare the way for this event, this confrontation, as a prelude to the Ereignis, which in turn, will herald the Palingenesis.

The Radical Subject

In Chapter Ten, “The Ontology of the Future,” Dugin deals with Modern Eschatology, which is to say the Endless End of History, PostModernity. For Dugin, however, the postmodern world and the liberal regime are more than just the agents of Democracy and Human Rights. They are also the unknowing tools of something much more profound, and, once again, this is the Radical Subject. Dugin describes the Radical Subject in this manner:

“The same experience that makes the transcendental subjectivity manifest itself and deploy its content, thus creating time with its intrinsic music, is regarded by the Radical Subject as an invitation to reveal itself in another manner – on the other side of time…For the Radical Subject, it is not only virtuality and electronic prisons which are the prison, but reality itself has become so: a concentration camp, an agony, and a torture. The slumber of history is something contrary to the condition where the Radical Subject could exist, complete itself and become.” (page168) Chapter Ten, The Ontology of the Future

Moreover, Dugin hints that Modernity and Postmodernity, along with all their symptoms, are in fact the creations of the Radical Subject, and an expression of humanity’s collective unconscious desire to reveal the concealed aspect and to awaken from the “Slumber of History.” He writes:

“If we accept the hypothesis of the Radical Subject, we immediately confront an instance that explains who has made the decision in favor of globalisation, the suicide of humanity, and the end of history: who has conceived this plan and made it reality. It can only therefore only be the drastic gesture of the Radical Subject, looking for liberation from time through the construction of non-temporal (impossible) reality. The Radical Subject is incompatible with all kinds of time. It vehemently demands anti-time, based on the exalted fire of eternity transfigured in the radical light.” (page168) Chapter Ten, The Ontology of the Future

Aside from Chaos Logos, this is the idea that I find most inspiring in Dugin’s work. What Dugin is trying to say here is that the Radical Subject, the transcendental aspect of humanity, the part that is beyond what we normally describe as being human in conventional terms, is trying to reveal itself. Admittedly, this idea has elements of religion, but the comparison is irrelevant, for what matters is that Dugin is trying to articulate an unmodern Weltanschauung, one which transcends the epistimological assumptions of the Modern world and its rationalist system.

This almost seems like a reworking of Plotinus’ “the Flight of the Alone to the Alone,” except for Dugin time is an attempt of the “Alone to Flee from the Alone.” Thus, the postmodern World is the moment where humanity catches up with itself, and must confront the nature of its existence as well as the possibilities contained within. This confrontation, Dugin says, will result in the discovery of the Radical Self, which is human consciousness which transcends the logocentric epistemology of several centuries.

So, in a way, Post-Modernity’s negation of Being is still part of Being; still part of Dasein, because even illusion and virtuality have Being, and even Postmodernity still possesses Dasein. Therefore, Dasein cannot be eliminated even in the moment where its very existence is said to have disappeared.

This begs a metaphysical question: If all things exist then what of nothingness? In order for ‘everything’ to be valid then it must include nothingness, and thus nothingness/ virtuality/ self-negation/ the modern and post-modern world/ the Kali Yuga must transpire as a matter of cosmic necessity. It is built into existence and Dugin tackles this question as a historical process which has lead to a kind of existential crisis, wherein man overcomes the past and the inconsistencies raised by the past, thereby opening up the possibility for spiritual and civilizational Palingenesis. 

Indeed, Dugin poses this very possibility at the very end of Chapter Ten, The Ontology of the Future, where he theorizes that Postmodernity may be a necessary form of ontological madness. Thus, self-negation (Modernity as well as Postmodernity) must exist in order to validate the teleological aspect of existence, thus allowing for reemergence of the Radical Subject. Inauthenticity must exist for there to be authenticity. It is an attempt for Dasein to authenticate itself. As such, Dugin’s use of Dasein is an attempt to call for authenticity in an age of inauthenticity. The battle against modernity is more than just about materialism and Unipolarity. It is also a battle against nihilism, self-negation and spiritual decay.

Of all of Dugin’s thoughts, these are the ones which I enjoyed most of all, for they resonate with my own instincts. Like Dugin, I believe that the world – not just the West – must enter into a period of nihilism, expressed in different ways, but rooted in the same problems. This period of nihilism will characterize a transition of necessity, where the civilizations and nations of the world are forced to confront new possibilities which extend beyond what we hold to be real in the waning days of the modern world. It is this confrontation that leads us to confront Dasein once more.

Chaos Logos

The final parts of the book are perhaps the most important parts. In his concepts of Ontology of the Future, New Political Anthropology, and Chaos Logos, Dugin’s analysis is brilliant if a little too abstract (and possibly a little too paranoid) for the average reader. However, I consider Dugin’s ideas with regards to the Ontology of the Future, the nature of Modern and Postmodern Eschatology, the Pseudo Political Soldier and the Post-Human as nothing short of brilliant.

The gist of these chapters is an old theme of Dugin’s, and it concerns how the logocentric ontology of Western civilization has, basically, come to an end. (I would also argue that logocentric thought exists in other civilizations as well.) After having watched several interviews of Dugin as well as read some of his articles, I was already aware of this analysis, but this is the first time that I’ve encountered this thesis articulated in an exhaustive manner.

Keeping this thesis in mind is one of the best ways to understand the 4th Political Theory. Dugin believes that the modern world – which is an extension of the Logocentric Weltanschauung – has exhausted all its possibilities, and that the postmodern world is a type of postmortem existence. In this way, Dugin is channeling Nietzsche, but instead of just saying that God is dead, he takes it to a whole new level by stating that Logos, along with all its various forms and manifestations, including the Western conception of God, is dead.

When Western man worshipped Christ, it was not so much the Jewish teacher that he was worshipping, but the Logocentric Anthropos, which formed the Western experience from Plato all the way to down to the present. In this way, Dugin affirms what Nietzsche predicted several generations ago with the death God, but also elaborates upon it by replacing Christ with Logos. So, in a strange way, Dugin is affirming Fukuyama’s End of History in the sense that History, as it is currently formulated in the modern (logocentric) world, offers no other possibilities, and that human existence has become a sort of prison. From the linearity of Modernity, we are now in the spiral of Postmodernity and only the confrontation with the Radical Subject, Ereignis, can get us out.

‘Logo’-centric modernity?

However, this confrontation with the Radical Subject requires the return to Chaos, which is the realm of eternity, where there are no dualities or fixed cosmic laws (and I suspect that this includes Tradition with Capital T), but only infinite possibilities. Chaos is defined as something which exists beyond logocentric modernity, as something which transcends existing human experiences and as the fount of all culture and ideas.

Chaos is also defined as the source of Logos, and that to survive and create new possibilities, Logocentric thought must return to Chaos in order to rejuvenate itself, resulting in what Dugin calls Chaos Logos. The coming of Chaos Logos as well as the Radical Subject are, in some ways, related to Nietzsche’s eternal return, where the passage of time is an instrument of self-affirmation and self-knowledge by, paradoxically, overcoming temporality.

Chaos Logos, Dugin says, is inclusive, which really means openness to new possibilities, whereas pure Logos was exclusive, linear and closed off to the unknown. In other words, and to put things crudely, Chaos is all about embracing what is beyond the zeitgeist. It is to think the unthinkable and confront new definitions of what it means to be human beyond modernity. This admittedly is a difficult thing to do, but Dugin has laid the metapolitical groundwork for this transition.

This transition and the language used to express it is still being created. In this sense, the 4th Political Theory remains an invitation to all who wish to chart new courses in postmodernity. It’s also an instrument of self-knowledge and authenticity vis-a-vis the veneer of modernity. In this sense, the 4th Political Theory can also be considered an overarching framework for things  to come. Understandably, this makes the work very difficult at times, but it remains the best tool for understanding Dugin’s ideas.

At a time when we are trying to cope with the rapid changes of the 21st century, the 4th Political Theory invites those who reject the values represented by the modern and postmodern worlds to create a world that is both better and more promising than the coming global shopping mall/rave party.


Alexander Dugin’s 4 Political Theory is for the Russian Empire, not for European Ethno-Nationalists
Domitius Corbulo
The Occidental Observer | May 18, 2014

Only a rare few in the alternative right knew Alexander Dugin before the publication and translation of his book, The Fourth Political Theory, in 2012. Suddenly, the contents of this book became the subject of lively discussion and he was hailed as “arguably the most prominent New Right thinker in the world.”  With the exception of Michael O’Meara at Counter Currents, most of the reviews were very positive or at least sympathetic.  After reading reviews, interviews, blogs, articles, and listening to some video lectures by Dugin, I decided to read The Fourth Political Theory (FPT).

Through the first pages, I was fairly impressed by Dugin’s laconic treatment of the way liberalism had created the normative conditions for a humanity predisposed toward a world government in its “glorification of total freedom and the independence of the individual from any kind of limits, including reason, identity (social, ethnic, or even gender), discipline, and so on” (18). With the “liberation” of man from any necessary, pre-ordained membership in any community or identity, and the universal morality of human rights widely accepted, few obstacles now stood in the way of a totalitarian global market.

Dugin is a patriot and I agree that Russia must act as a counter-hegemonic power against the spread of American Hollywood values and the continuing expansion of the EU inside former Soviet territories.

But it soon became apparent that Dugin’s FPT was more than a critique of American hegemony and Atlanticism; it was an unrelenting attack on the very essence of Western civilization. The following reasoning runs through his book: Liberalism = America’s current military and foreign policy = Western civilization = European history since ancient times = Evil. For Dugin, the idea that America is the first universal nation is “in essence…an updated version and continuation of a Western universalism that has been passed from the Roman Empire, Medieval Christianity, modernity in terms of the Enlightenment, and colonization, up to the present-day” (74). Europeans have always been, or, at least since Roman times, the intrinsic enemy of ethnic identity, tradition, and truthfulness.

In order to adequately understand the essence of liberalism, we must recognize that it is not accidental, that its appearance in the political and economic ideologies is based on fundamental processes, proceeding in all Western civilization. Liberalism is not only a part of that history, but its purest and most refined expression, its result (140).

The reviewer Siryako Akda says that “Dugin criticizes the Western world from the point of view of tradition and authenticity.” My reading is that Dugin defends the Russian people and empire from the perspective of tradition while criticizing the West from the perspective of postmodernism and cultural Marxism.   It has escaped the attention of commentators in the alternative right that Dugin relies almost entirely on cultural Marxists in his assessment of liberalism.  I don’t think we should take it lightly that he celebrates Karl Marx’s ideas as “tremendously useful and applicable” (50), calls Franz Boas “the greatest American cultural anthropologist” (63), and believes that Levi-Strauss “convincingly showed” that primitive cultures in Africa were as complex and rich as European cultures (109). Without hesitation and appreciation of the way the West rose to become the foremost civilization in the world, the most creative in the arts and sciences, he states that the “very ideology of [Western] progress is racist in its structure.” He is oblivious to the fact that without Peter the Great’s assimilation of European knowhow in industry, the Russian empire Dugin so admires, and aberrantly identifies with tradition per se, would have disintegrated in the modern era.

Some of the other thinkers Dugin draws on are Baudrillard, Foucault, and Deleuze.  He accepts Foucault’s condemnation of the Enlightenment as a carrier of “all the signs of intellectual racism, apartheid, and other totalitarian prejudices” (133). With statements like this Dugin would easily fit into a Western university environment.  His depiction of all that is Western as racist and evil combined with his identification of non-Western traditional cultures as authentic, natural, and truthful are no different from the multiculturalist template enforced in academia. We are supposed to believe that the Chinese with their suppressed minorities and official discourse of racial hierarchies, the Russians with their history of breaking national heritages, and the Indians with their filthy caste system are not racist but possessors of healthy empires that should be supported by White nationalists in opposition to American hegemony.

For the record, as valuable as postmodernists may be against Western liberal illusions about possessing a universal model of life, they are anti-White in their very essence. Baudrillard criticizes the model of immigrant integration in France and Europe for obviating the cultural autonomy and veracity of non-Western ways of life. Writing in 1997 about the attractions of Jean-Marie Le Pen, Baudrillard condemns the inherent inability of the established parties in realizing that immigrants don’t want to integrate into European culture, and for this reason feel unjustly discriminated against, all the while calling Le Pen’s efforts to protect the identities of the native French “evil” and “savage”.

What else can one say about Foucault? He is for women’s liberation, immigrants’ rights, and queer studies in the West, at the same time that he is for Islamic fundamentalism in the Muslim world. A recent Foucauldian approach to the US/Mexico border, concluded that the way to achieve liberation in this border is for US authorities to avoid the use of any “sovereign exclusion and disciplinary institutionalization” against migrants and instead create migrant support networks “through universal inclusion, equality of participation, and a solidarity across borders.”

Reviewers might have underestimated Dugin’s reliance and strong sympathies for the postmodernist critique of the West due to his often-repeated view that the “primary target” of FTP is “Western postmodernism.” Western postmodernism may be the primary target of Russian traditionalism, but Dugin welcomes postmodernism and envisages its proponents as allies, not enemies, of a common front against Western modernity and liberalism. Postmodernists and cultural Marxists (“New Leftists”) are positively portrayed for their complex attack on the West “from all directions, from the political (the events of 1968), to the cultural, philosophical, artistic, the very presentation of man, reason, science, and reality” (132). This ism has been the most effective weapon forged in the West against the West. They are seen as allies in a common front against the West in the name of Tradition in the East and the South. Dugin understands well the preference of postmodernism for authentic, stable, and natural cultures in the Rest and for transsexuality and hybridity inside the West.

Matt Parrot, among other reviewers, welcomes Dugin’s “positive attitude toward the ethnos” (Dugin’s words) even as he is ambivalent about his rejection of all forms of racism. Dugin has said that “white nationalists” are “allies when they refuse modernity, the global hierarchy and liberal —capitalism … everything that is killing all ethnic cultures”.

But this is a rather incongruous and misleading position. Dugin welcomes the current decomposition of Western cultures, mass immigration, and the destruction of viable and cohesive European ethnic nations. He rejects categorically the concept of nations with ethnic boundaries as a modern idea that works against traditionalism and empires. He envisages a role for White nationalists only within the context of a Europe thoroughly watered down by mass immigration and postmodern diversity where proud European ethnics will somehow find a niche alongside Africans, Asians, and Muslims against American universalism.

Dugin expressly endorses Deleuze’s anticipation of new forms of human beings with multiple identities, including White identitarians, within a multiplex Western world of many genders and racial combinations. His positive evaluation of the book Empire (2000), by Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, widely feted as “a new Communist Manifesto,” reveals exactly what Dugin anticipates and welcomes as the final phase in the fall of the West. As global capitalism creates “a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers,” Negri and Hardt visualize a situation in which national authorities will be unable to halter the planetary flow of immigrants seeking jobs and a better life in rich countries.  Multitudes of immigrants from everywhere will pour into the center of this global empire, the West, demanding cosmopolitan freedom and eventually dissolving the difference between the wealthy center and the peripheries. Negri and Hardt see in the immigrant multitudes a new agent of revolution against the West.  This multitude will have one cardinal demand that will break forever the Western imperial core: global citizenship. “The general right to control its own movement is the multitude’s ultimate demand for global citizenship” (400).  The main demand will not be economic, the right to a guaranteed basic income, but cultural, the abolition of all immigration controls: papiers pour tous!

Dugin salutes the political possibilities engendered by this globalism inside the West. Mass immigration will create a network of sabotage inside the West, fueling the anti-globalization movement both outside and inside the West, led in the West by gay pride parades, Occupy Wall Street movements, immigrant riots in the suburbs of European cities, and a whole array of groups and protests by an emerging “post-humanity” (mutants, cyborgs, and clones), internet blogs, Black flash mobs, and ecologists. White crackers are welcomed to find a role in this multitude, fight for their identity just like everyone else.  Meanwhile, these post-human trannies will be opposed by the anti-global movements in Russia and other non-Western geopolitical blocs standing for God and Tradition and old-fashion Empires. These two poles — traditionalists and cultural Marxists — will have a common enemy: Western liberalism and its main representative, “the rational, rich, adult White male” (185).

The Fourth Political Theory is a theory for Russian geopolitical strategists, not for European ethno nationalists’

Russian Nationalism and Eurasianism: The Ideology of Russian Regional Power and the Rejection of Western Values

Dr. Matthew Raphael Johnson
Center For Syncretic Studies | August 2, 2014


The recent flurry of writing on Russian politics, nationalism and Alexander Dugin shows the contemptible inability of western savants to apprehend any idea beyond the cliche’s of stagnant neo-liberalism.  Worse, “Russia specialists” in academia are now tripping over themselves trying to “analyze” Dugin and the Eurasianist idea.  Bereft of the vocabulary to understand the concept, they merely apply fashionable labels from western political thought onto Russia in a pathetic and pretentious attempt to show how “dangerous” such ideas are to “European values.” 

Reading A. Toynbee, especially Volumes IV-VI of his Study of History, lead one to question both the “civilizational” fundament and, later, his “higher religion.”  The problems are not that, at such a level of analysis, he is inaccurate.  Such an epic level of perspective cannot be held to the sharp standards of accuracy that a study of, say, the state of New Hampshire might be subject.  The very nature of such a sweeping history means that, in the main, he might be seen as “more or less” on the right track.  That is as far as one can go. However, that begs the question, since the very concept of such an epic orientation is open to doubt.

In the case of this present author, the concern has been to refuse such grand historical panoramas and focus instead on a single nation, or elements within a nation that lend themselves to detailed study.  There, the actual living conditions of real people can be analyzed.  The sweep of Toynbee, Hegel or Marx is interesting, but if the result is to then force all societies to follow that general model, then they should be left unread.  Few deny the ability of Eric Voegelin, but again, outside of specialized studies on Plato or Marx, Voegelin’s sweep is such as to make it interesting, but a fatal temptation to the study of actual historical life.Equally sweeping is the general criticism of P. Sorokin and others, namely, that such a view of history is problematic because it isolates a few variables from the rest, making them extremely important.  This means that others are minimized.  This criticism gains force to the extent that one sees the knowledge required for any epic vista of history to work at all.  One cannot know that much about global history to come to such conclusions. Those specializing in an element of a civilization (such as Hellenistic aesthetics) will easily annihilate sweeping generalizations.  Hegel’s desire to label entire epochs of history with one word means that such an approach cannot be true; unless one is willing to reduce epochs of civilization to slogans about them.

This preface is needed because the Eurasians fall into the same problem.  They too, deal in civilizational norms, though their interest is very specific: defining the Atlantian civilization as against the Russian one. At the level of elite society, this is useful.  Western elites, generally speaking, are of one mind in their commitment to science, secularism, individualism (in theory), capitalism, positivism and empire.  There is nothing strange about this.  Toynbee, in areas in which he is well schooled (such as Greek antiquity), becomes extremely important.  When he generalizes this experience to medieval Hindustan, however, he becomes less tenable.

Identity and foreign policy go hand in hand.  Domestic and foreign policies are closely linked.  In Russia’s case, her sense of corporate selfhood has changed radically


since the fall of the Marxist empire in the early 1990s.  Russia’s foreign policy has changed as her global status has changed, and the debate among the different factions of Russian life has dominated her foreign policy.  The purpose in this paper is to define, in specific terms, the nature of a Russian, Eurasianist foreign policy.  Eurasianism is a popular foreign policy idea in elite Russian circles and therefore, must be taken very seriously by scholars (Shlapentokh, 2007).

Russia is a state and nation.  It is also a broader based civilization taking in many ethnic groups to herself.  This means that its values and virtues are far more than the result of specific historical conditions, but are, in some sense, eternal virtues that give life meaning.  There are “civilizational” values that take what is crucial in those nations the civilization encompasses.  These are not ethnic groups (which are much smaller) but refer to “imperial” ideologies that can rule many different groups and are formulated precisely to justify the rule of a large and diverse policy.  Examples of such civilizations might be Chinese, Indian or African.  These go beyond historical experience and are supposed to contain greater truths.

The concept of a “Russian civilization” undergirds the vision of the Russian Eurasianists. This is both a political theory and a source of foreign policy decisions. The “imperial mission” of a society is not about local values, but cosmic ideas. In politics, these “imperial ideologies” serve as the foundation of global rule.

Eurasianism as foreign policy refers to Russian geopolitical space.  Russia is a “cosmos,” it takes smaller “solar systems” under its wing to create a loose federation of allied nations and states.  In some instances, it rejects the very notion of “nation-statism” in that a true civilization can be only a federation, not a state.

Ideological History of Eurasianism

Prior to the well known Alexander Dugin, Eurasianism has a rich ideological heritage unknown to those who cannot read Russian.  PM Bitsilli (1953) took a broad look at global history.  “Rhythm” is specific to a people.  It is dialectical both in that it is becoming (rather than being) and takes the familiar trinity as undifferentiated unity – fragmentation – reflective unity.  This also was essential to the metaphysics of Karsavin.  Rhythms differ radically, but they still partake of the same formula.

Finally, inertia is the third element. Dialectic, rhythm and inertia govern the historical process.  Tribal life is unreflective, yet, historical forces and local conditions force a chaotic mixing of tribes that are more or less compatible.  Finally, in the construction of the ethnos, a reflective unity is created as conditions now exist for reason, thought and the development of the historical person.

In his “Tragedy of Russian Culture,” Bitsilli takes the common Eurasian position that “progress” and “history” are both loaded and ideological terms which contrast all existence with that of the west.  That is to say, the lineal development of mechanized and commercial capitalism is the standard of global development.  For Bitsilli, culture is the “self-disclosure” of the personality en masse.  It is an overcoming of history in the sense that this self persists through time.


PN Savitsky (1968) focused his research on the primordial argument for national, that is, ethnic development.  Tribes mix together to form ethnicities.  This mixing is not arbitrary, but can only take place among groups who share significant elements in common.  This mixing, further, is also not arbitrary due to its context.  As is common in this doctrine, climate, topography and local resources are extremely significant in the development of a decentralized tribal life into early forms of ethnic groups.  Organizations of peoples, as they come out of their tribal background, take from local conditions. Thus, territory is significant and becomes a part of the development of the national unit.

The soil literally is incorporated into the flesh of the people.  Local resources, soil conditions and the general environment become a part of the physical makeup of ethnicities.  Soil conditions are aspects of topography in that they are dependent on it.  The ethnic group then becomes like its surroundings: an organic whole.

Ethnicities developing near the shoreline, all other things equal, develop into mercantile states. They think globally in terms of markets and resources.  Russia, on the other hand, is a land and forest based community and does not, as a result, develop the trading ethic to the extent that the Greeks or Phoenician have.  This is not to argue that these conditions determine outcomes.  They only provide dispositions.


Savitsky stresses that the Mongol occupation was not destructive for Russia, but quite the opposite.  The Horde was a culturally advanced people who protected Russia from the inroads of western religious ideology.  All occupied lands, so Savitsky and Most Eurasians would argue, did well under Mongol administration.

In terms of politics, Savitsky argues that linear progress is a myth.  Social organisms run in cycles, repeating some basic institutions but adding and subtracting others.  The state, in the sense of its Cultural Constitution, requires a unity of religion and basic moral foundations in order to carry out even minimal tasks.  The cultural and religious unity obviates the need for a strong state, administratively speaking.

Most importantly, Savitsky argued as early as 1928 that the future belongs to Asia. After World War I and storm clouds brewing over Europe, this was not a ludicrous idea. It is even more significant now.  The simple idea that can be drawn from the prophetic words of Savitsky is that Europe destroyed itself in two world wars, went broke during the “Cold War” and, as of 2014, has little to offer the east.  To reject “Europe” is to make a realistic judgment about the state of their finances, elites and economic foundations.

Of course, the most significant Eurasianist, and the most verbose, is Alexander Dugin. His work is generally more esoteric than the rest, arguing that the ancient symbolism of east and west points to two sorts of civilization: the sea based and the land based. What makes Dugin attractive to those who can read the language is his use of Plato to ground a new vision of the nation and its context, the civilization.

What the west lacks is the concept of higher meanings.  Nominalism and positivism, the two official ideologies of western thought (in general) see objects per se.  Nominalism argues that there are no necessary connections among things in society or nature, there are merely individual acts, people or institutions. Dugin, using Plato, argues that the “object” is merely phenomenal, not real.  “Realism” is the view, assumed by positivism and nominalism, that there are two entities only: the observer and the observed.  This is naive because there can be no way to prove the existence of actual objects solely based on perception.

The nominal has no purpose. They are random individual things that might form a system for “mutual advantage.” Its social applications are obvious. However, to oversimplify, objects and particulars exist only in a context, and that context soon becomes the All, or the single set of relations that make up the cosmos. Each is dependent on all. Dugin’s critique of the west, given this simplistic model, is that western man has been trained to see objects as “facts,” brute givens that are only provided with meaning by man, and that usually refers to a political or scientific elite. All is reduced to the “practical,” and as a result, all meaning is lost.

The west replaced natural law with markets. Markets took science and make it an appendage of commercial dominance. The concept of pure mechanism, the product of the Renaissance, was to create a world, one imposed upon the real one, that reduced matter to a machine that can be taken apart and put back together in the form of man-made technology. This is the essence of capitalism (and has no relation to the market model). Capitalism is based on egocentricity, the denial of private property except for the few, and, perhaps most important, that morals and culture have no place in “rational” economics.

Socialism is quite similar.  It is obsessed with technology, science and production as ends in themselves.  Power may be reached by different means, but it all comes down to economics. Capitalism and socialism depend, not on intelligence, but on deviousness.  The Marxist critique of capital is correct as far as it goes. Economics is inherently historical, egocentrism can never create stability and capital functions by using labor as a tool.

These are not the only options. Eurasianism, as economics, is based on the concept that economics is not a field in itself.  It may not make its own rules, but is subordinated to the common good of the community.  Competition always has a place, but so does cooperation. Production is culturally specific in nearly every way, only that globalization has gone very far in standardizing its methods.


Nations exist. They create states. However, with the possible exception of great states such as Russia and China, autarky is not rational. Regionalism is the response. For Dugin, several civilizational spaces exist: Eurasia, Africa, the Far East and Europe.  These are now the actors in history.  Nations retain their autonomy within their civilizational space, but the regionalism of Dugin seeks to retain the gains made by globalization while retaining local and regional sovereignty.  The result is a multipolar world.

Globalization is western ideology and scientific culture masquerading as “reason” itself; as science per se. It is the rebirth of Atlantis, the necropolis, the world of Twilight, or unreality.  Both Dostoevsky and Gogol used these metaphors to describe St. Petersburg. Atlantis lives on, deriving from the Phoenicians, and leading to the ruse of Venice in the High Middle Ages, then concluding with the English and institutionalized as a “global ideology” under the US.

Basic Concepts of Eurasianism and the West

The discussion above does not even scratch the surface of the richness of Eurasian thought. It is a summary of some of the Russian-language literature. In a more understandable way, much of the Eurasian idea can be summarized in these points:

  1. Communitarianism against nominalism. Identities are necessarily collective.
  2. Non-alignment in global affairs.
  3. Eurasianism holds that while nations exist, they are not self-contained. The political unit is the civilization, which is a federation of complimentary nations.
  4. Culture is the essential tie among people in a nation or civilization. The quantifiable aspects of rule are highly limited and secondary.
  5. Russians are not Europeans, or at least not entirely European. Russians are mixtures of Slav, Mongol and Turkish blood that help inform their genetics. This means that Russians are genetically related to the Caucasian and some Central Asian peoples. In addition, this “third world” blood makes the Russians an ideal intermediary between Asia and Europe, or even Europe and the third world. (cf. Shlapentokh, 2007 for greater detail)
  6. The state (in its true sense as the cultural collective) should put its stamp on the economy. In general, public-private ownership mixes are essential for larger and strategic industry, while private ownership remains for small business.

The Eurasian idea is one that both defines those within it as well as excludes those without. In this case, the “other” is the “West.” In the broadest of terms, the cardinal ideas of the West are these:

  1. Egocentrism manifest as abstract rights rather than function, station or vocation. Rights are more rhetorical and strategic than real.
  2. Democracy as necessarily proceeding from nominalism. This is not merely a “procedure” but a state of affairs. Democracy exists when liberalism does.
  3. Materialism and secularism in public and economic life. In general, since rights have no discernible origin, utilitarianism becomes the official ideology by default.
  4. Liberal Messianism is crucial: liberalism needs to be imposed by force.
  5. The west defines “state” as that which is bureaucratic and administrative.
  6. Liberal rhetoric sounds merely procedural. This is to mask the ideological core of liberalism which is essentially totalitarianism.
  7. Politicians serve as window dressing for economic elites. When the economy fails, the politicians, who control nothing, are said to be at fault.
  8. Evolution is part of the west’s official ideology. It serves to a) secularize society, but more importantly, b) justify colonialism, industrial capitalism and “competition.”
  9. “Rationality” is defined in purely economic terms.
  10. “Science” and the “scientific establishment” are treated as identical. Science is defined as that which deals with formal and quantitative properties. This, in turn, is identical with the concept of “intelligibility.”
  11. Liberalism rejects the “nation” as fiction, yet, holds formal quantity, the “international community,” and the isolated ego as palpable realities.


These two views of the world are antithetical. The west views itself as the apex of human liberty while seeing the east as in need of western assistance.  Evolution is leading the world to the western idea, which was the purpose of the Darwinian system from the beginning. It is no accident that this view of the world arose from the height of English colonial rule and industrial development. Capitalism sees the world merely as a series of markets or resource bases to control. Peoples are treated in purely quantitative terms.

Representative government, which is radically distinct from “democracy,”is an important factor in Eurasianist thought. The Eurasianist movement evaluates the “democracy” ethic as being a mask for economic power. Elections are competitive races among economic factions speaking for “the people,” a collective abstraction that does not exist.  A strong Russian executive can help filter the demands of the moneyed class and seek the common good. Putin’s approach has mirrored this demand (Shlapentokh, 2007).

“Russian pluralism” is a vision that motivates Russian domestic policy (Tolz, 1998). Eurasianism as a political theory revolves around the concept of civilization over ethnos. A pluralist society would imitate the look of a federation, using the most significant elements of nationalism without its tribal negatives.  A Russian Eurasianism stresses the fundamental autonomy of these ethnic groups within a broader state, and these different groups would maintain a large degree of independence.

Russia under Vladimir Putin has been a strong supporter of the non-aligned movement. This movement seeks to improve the condition of the third world and build a global society based on the independence of nation states. This idea is a direct attack on Westernism. At the same time, larger states that are in various stages of development have taken the lead from one time to another, including Indonesia, Russia and India. This just means that these countries on the periphery of development have the size and potency to wring concessions from the central states such as England or Japan (Shulman, 2005). in Russian Eurasianism, the main foreign element is the “multipolar” world shared by the non-aligned movement and its dedication to alter global capitalism and westernism.

This “non-aligned” idea is central to Eurasianism in that the west, given their “New World Order” and “End of history” rhetoric, is implying that it and it alone has the right to shape the rules of the political game. It is not so much that these rules have been deduced from democratic elections and hence enforced, they are the rules that govern elections. Eurasianists make quite a bit of fuss about this distinction. Democracy is just as much a set of results as a set of processes (Nikitin, 2005). Russian Eurasianism and the non-aligned movement are closely related.

Russia cannot be considered as a “developed” or “developing” country since those terms imply an absolute standard.  The Soviet use of domestic force to rapidly develop heavy industry (that may or may not have been appropriate for the time) makes her a developed country, though one that did not develop according to the typical pattern of European states. In fact, Russia’s industrialization drive in the 1960’s and 1970’s might (with some adjustments) be a model for the third would that wants to see a great state presence in the economy rather than just profit-seeking businessmen.  Since Russia can be seen as the “periphery” of the European Union, she shares some elements in common with the third world.

Nursultan Nazarbayev

In the (2010) work of Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, the above concepts are restated in a way more congenial to the development of Central Asia. His essential political theory can be summarized in five points:

  1. A strong, independent state is required for both development and sovereignty over resources. “Self-regulated” development is part of the concept of independence, since anything else would give development priorities to others. The public good should always take precedence over private profit.
  2. Within any Eurasian Union, a specific Central Asian bloc needs to be formed to focus on issues concerning this region. This is a part of Nazarbayev’s emphasis on Eurasianism being practical and loose rather than federative (see below).
  3. Free trade should focus on regions and culturally similar peoples. Central Asia is a good example. Free trade should be pursued with common policies on substantial economic issues. Its purpose is to keep foreign forces out of the area. In areas where Central Asia is impacted the most, even other members of the union, such as Russia, should stand aside.
  4. Any decision made by the Central Asian Union, as well as, presumably, any Eurasian Union including Russia, will require a 4/5 vote.
  5. Slowly, regional groupings will consolidate basic laws on development policy.


Nazarbayev’s main concern is a practical one: the modernization of the Central Asian states with no reciprocal duties in any specific direction. His view is guarded and cautious due to his concern for Kazakh independence as well as its stress on modernization. In fact, convergence is not an issue here except as a matter of fiscal law, and he goes out of his way to stress that there is no single ideology nor any sense of unitarism. While this is consistent with Eurasianism, Nazarbayev’s emphasis on practical economic programs aimed at modernization is not.

Even more, he stresses that, in terms of basic policy, each state within the union should retain the option to remove itself from any law it deems problematic. At best, The Kazakh program is based on a loose structure. Since there is no “doctrine” of Eurasianism on these matters, it remains an open question. In general, Eurasianists remain national in their focus.

The problem which Nazarbayev points out is that the states to be a part of this Union are far from homogenous, and remain at different levels of development.  Hindrances to any union he sees as primarily based on a lack of strategy. There is no method of dispute resolution, nor does there seem to be any connection among ministers dealing with these issues and their own governments.

Relative to currency, the President argues that it needs to be based explicitly on production and the development needs of the societies involved. While it should be kept out of the hands of private bankers, no specific state should control it either. He advocates that all branches of government be involved in currency decisions, since these are so essential to economics and development. Keeping the currency out of the hands of speculators seems to imply that he wants the regional currency non-convertible.

Concepts in Eurasian Foreign Policy

In the work of Professor Vera Tolz, there are three basic concepts of Russian Eurasianism that can serve as the basis of foreign policy. In all cases, the idea of the USSR lies at the root. The USSR was an empire promising basic independence for each of its republics. In other words, the official position was that all ethnic organizations under the Soviet system were to be permitted autonomy within the broader society. This approach, thought honored only in the breach, is very close to Eurasianism. These views Tolz calls “revisionist” in that they seek to challenge the west and its increasing hegemony in various ways:

  1. The USSR was a noble enterprise that went awry. This was because the Bolsheviks thought they could run the country from a central source. This was incorrect and led to tremendous distortions in the economy. The USSR needs to be reborn, but on a far more decentralized and humanitarian basis.
  2. Russian civilization can develop along the lines of a limited federation of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.
  3. The third concept is traditional ethno-nationalism, where the state develops to incorporate all Russian speakers contiguous to her borders.

Dugin, in his essay on Nikolai Trubetskoy, argues that both the tsarist and liberal approaches to the USSR are incorrect. He argues that Bolshevism derives directly from the revolutionary state pioneered by Peter I, and the Petrograd bureaucracy that failed to connect with the broader population. They accepted Bolshevism because it was a “vague, unconscious, blind and desperate desire to return to Old Russia, prior to the ‘Romano-German yoke.” At the same time, the Eurasian idea rejects this movement as secular and anti-traditionalist. It was the westernization of the Russian elite, rather than any alien imposition on society, that served as the model for the revolution. In other words, the alien regime existed from the early 18th century onwards.

Trubetskoy saw the USSR as a basically positive phenomenon because it unified the Eurasian plain and maintained a multinational state dedicated to a unified economic end.  In addition, in doing battle with western imperialism, it served to weaken the west’s stranglehold over most of the planet. Finally, in protecting Russians against the west, the USSR, despite itself, preserved much of Old Russia.

While often not mentioned in English, the Eurasian idea derives from the Old Belief. As this writer has also written, the Old Rite is representative of pre-Petrine Russia, and this state, given its limited resources, made war on the church no less systematically than the Bolsheviks. After Nikon, the close association of the church with the bureaucracy made the love of Orthodoxy dependent on the love of the state.

While exaggerated, this is essentially true; the deposition of Nikon left Alexis in charge, only very soon after to permit Peter and the Germanic ruling class later to purge all national elements of the church. The followers of Alexis saw the Old Rite as ignorant fanatics and themselves, increasingly, as Enlightened westerners. The fact that the atheist and materialist Theophan Prokopovytch was placed in charge of reorganizing the Russian church under Peter shows just how far this process went.

These three visions are about recreating Russia as a powerful civilization on the ruins on both the USSR and the democratic capitalism of Yeltsin. These three concepts are different ways of making it legitimate. All three of these are anti-western in that they reject the liberal cosmopolitanism that serves to justify western expansion. None of these three are specifically economic, but use culture and political to situate economic development. Economics for the Eurasianist is but an aspect of the broader political idea (Tolz, 1998).

In a recent review of Empire (2000), by A. Negri and M. Hardt, Alexander Dugin remarks:

The essence of empire is corruption. Corruption, as destruction, is the antithesis of construction; it is a usurper. Empire is the perennial contagion in world history; it destroys life, but it does so through a highly complex and subtle system of control based on man’s base desires, individuality and freedom. As intellectual work is today crucial, the nature of production has changed. If the mind is the main means of production, then the machine and the brain slowly merge. On the other hand, new technologies such as the computerization of technique, have become an indispensable aspect of the human body, and soon, these two will also merge. . . Empires are not imposed from without, but they slowly create mental dependencies that tie man into their networks. These gradually serve as our sources of information that integrate ourselves economically, legally and psychologically. This implies a total loss of identity.

The connection between the physical world and the its mental analogue is common enough in western criticism, most famously in the early 20th century work of Bernard Bosanquet. Contrary to a naive realism, structures of social life and the means of their justification soon become organizing principles in the mind. This is the problem with recent work on Dugin and Eurasianism, these structures cannot manage the nature of the Eurasian critique of the western world.

Eurasianism and Domestic Policy

Building a new Russian nation with its own specific interests in the world requires a strong civil society. This concept, which has become cliche over time, primarily deals with the institutions necessary for the functioning of a state, any state. Even a state that uses the most strict criterion of ethnicity must maintain a civil society that undergirds that idea. All states and governments must, in some way, provide the population with institutions that give regularity and law to social forces regardless of their origin.

The great issue in building the new Russia is membership. In Ukraine, for example, the proverbial distinction between east and west Ukraine has almost torn the country apart. Western Ukraine is seen as pro-western,. Eastern Ukraine seen as pro-Russian. In Russia’s case, the Eurasianists do not normally use an ethnic criterion of membership, but would rebuild Russia as a federation of ethnic groups that can serve to check and balance each other (Sengupta, 2009).

Even if Russian foreign policy were to center around gathering all Russian speaking areas under Moscow, this would not free the state from the rule of law or basic representative institutions. There is no clear connection between liberalism and representation, that is, there is no reason to believe that a democratic government is necessarily a representative government. The Russian nationalist movement  in general, and Eurasianists in particular, normally holds that liberalism is about ideology and the interests of capital, not the protection of rights. A state can be highly representative without being a democracy, and a democracy can enshrine an oligarchy rather than “the people.” The Eurasianists are fairly cynical about western claims to tolerance and “universal values.”

Representation, at its root, is the “matching” of a constitution to domestic ideas of justice. A constitution is more than a scrap of paper. It is a living mode of thought that is meant to bind a community together in a world of shared ideas. Laws cannot come from mere self-interest or utility, but must be representative of the popular will. Popular wills are not necessarily manifest in elections, but show the broader contours of social life over time. The General Will is the public good, and its differs, as in the work of Rousseau, from the mere counting of votes and might even be opposed to it.

Even more, a strong, new Russia requires an educational system that creates a firm foundation to the constitutional order. Education in the Eurasianist case should be tilted towards that which is useful for the society as a whole, rather than the liberal arts as a broad category of “classics.” The idea is that education brings students into the constitutional order and both, taken together, form a strong sense of national identity; a linguistic and cultural bond that brings people together in shared responsibility rather than abstract rights.

This concept of constitution is central to foreign policy because when “Russia” acts on the world stage, there must be some important and significant entity that is called “Russia.” The Eurasianist looks askance at the United States acting on the world stage for democracy and human rights. These are abstractions. For the Russian Eurasianist in 2012, the U.S. acts for the interest of the corporate bodies who control her (Sengupta, 2009).

Dugin, in his article on National Bolshevism, reduces the Eurasian-socialist idea to three:

  1. For development according to Russian tradition, socialism, ethnic roots and a adhesion to the constants in Russian history. These include the mir, sobornost’, a rejection of utility, universalism and the imperial idea.
  2. Towards the restoration of the values of Old Russia, traditional spiritual culture and the doctrine of “The Third Rome.”
  3. To build a society without classes, toward brotherhood, equality, solidarity and justice. It is a combination of the social ideals of the populists, communists, socialists, and the national anarchist revolutionary tradition (Dugin, 2004).

Regionalism and Democracy

Regionalism is significant for Russia given her immense geographic distinctions. Eurasianism usually supports a strong sense of regional identity to balance centralized institutions. Regionalism for Russia has been an important problem since the Yeltsin administration because these were considered the more corrupt parts of the Russian polity. Regional governments were (and are) seen as the weak spots on the Russian body politic because of the older, clan-based models of both patronage and rent-seeking.

In the work of professors Phyllis Dininio and Robert Ortung, regional corruption has been the Achilles heel of Russia as a polity. In their 2005 article on the subject, there are two overpowering variables dealing with the regional idea: first, the size of the government and, second, the level of economic development. If Eurasianism is to enshrine regionalism as an essential part of its doctrine, then the problems of regional corruption need to be faced. While Putin has long promises to deal strongly with corruption, regional elites have been dug in through control over patronage and raw materials. In fact, the Dininio and Ortung thesis is that rent seeking increases in areas of great raw material production.

Corruption provides a great incentive to develop central institutions. The typical Eurasianist view is that internal moral virtues are just as important as external institutions. The “spiritual bonds” that the Eurasianist movement harps on continually is about the ability of local institutions to form virtuous citizens. A virtuous public would do well under even the worst form of government. In Russia’s case, internal virtue is needed to rebuild institutions since the decay of the state in the early 1990s.

Corrupt regions in Russia can be traced to large bureaucracies, tightly centralized, that can serve as rent protection for raw materials. The basic corrupt practice is that the bureaucrats use their access to the halls of power to charge a premium for those wishing to exploit or profit from it. This, in turn, strengthens the forces of disintegration and weakens the forces of the national will. While regionalism is important to the Eurasianist movement, it can never be the “cover” for an elite seeking to profit at the expense of the broader economy (Dininio and Ortung, 2005).

Regional corruption is an ideological issue for both the Eurasianists and the Putin government because both share the sense of a strong central authority that represents a well integrated regional identity. Regional identity and proper central representation are not opposites, but rather require each other to function. Putin’s 2005 attempt to appoint certain regional leaders was seen as a way to correct this imbalance, yet, for the most part, American media treatment of the move was negative (Robertson, 2009)

Another reason why the regional idea is important is because it connects Russia to its “near abroad.” In a real sense, these can be called “regions” since—at least—they contain a certain proportion of Russian speakers. Ukraine is a powerful case in point. Ukraine was the center of the older Imperial state because her fertility fed the rest of Russia. To destabilize Ukraine and force it away from Russia is to wound Moscow tremendously. Ukraine is a region in the eyes of the Eurasianist, a region with legitimate cultural aspirations. Yet, there is no reason why she should remove herself from the Russian embrace and become the main agricultural supplier to the EU as a regional dependency (Shulman, 2005 and Bukkvoll, 1997).

Ukraine and other “regions” of the Russian near abroad show the significance of regionalism for Russian foreign policy. Eurasianism—and to a great extent the Putin presidency—wants to see a different sort of sovereignty. The Ukrainian national idea saw the world in black and while: either independence or empire. The Eurasianist sees it differently.  As there is a “third way” in economics, there is also a third way in sovereignty, one that does not posit independence and empire as opposites, but rather as counterparts. In this case, a federative Russia sees Ukraine and Belarus retain basic control over internal cultural policy while serving a loose confederation of independent powers. Basic legislation is in the hands of regional elites, while foreign policy is maintained in Moscow.  These federative concepts are a crucial element of Eurasian foreign policy, especially since both Ukraine and Russia have an active role in the Caucuses mountains. In both cases, the Slavic and Turkic connection is clear – the Slavs will be dealing with Asians as equal partners within a single “civilizational space” (Sangupta, 2009)

Ukrainian foreign policy as compared with the Russia shows many areas of overlap that display the significance of Eurasianism even for Kiev. Ukraine sees Russia the way the Eurasianists do – as a powerful empire and civilization more than a nation state. On the other hand, Kiev sees itself as a “central European” state using and manifesting certain parts of Russian Slavdom for its own purposes. Ukrainian foreign policy centers around making sense out of the competing demands of Moscow and the western powers, whether in Washington or Brussels. The seemingly unending recession and depression since 2007 is making the western option that much less appealing. The Eurasianist—naturally—sees southern and eastern Asia to be the future. If Ukraine is to “turn to the west,” she might be turning to a moribund body too indebted to help her development.  Eurasianists can easily point to the apparently terminal stage of western capitalism and seek compensation in Asia (MacFarlane, 2006).

Ukraine and Russia both need to deal with regions. In Ukraine, the far Eastern coal and steel areas remain staunch Russian supporters and, to a great extent, neo-communists. These do not want a recreation of the Russian empire, but seek an independent Ukraine in fraternal union with Belarus and Russia, creating a Slavic colossus and trading empire the west must respect on the world stage.

Ukraine and Belarus, in the Eurasian idea, are integral parts of a broader Russian federation. Such a federation is based on spiritual bonds and cultural history rather than economic self interest. Abstractions like rights and fraternity make no sense unless the spiritual bonds of the whole can be found in them. The concept of “home and hearth” is far more than a mere slogan of the bankrupt, but is crucial for any functional policy. Political debate implies a great level of commitment and consensus.  Foundational issues must be settled before there can be any common ground to debate.


The Eurasian idea is central to Russian politics. While still only partially digested by western writers, Russians have been concerned with rebuilding. From the dust and ashes of an old empire a new identity is being forged, and, judging by the popularity of Vladimir Putin, the basic elements of Eurasianism seem to be significant (Kullberg and Zimmerman, 1999). The slavish imitation of the west is not an option, nor is going back to some kind of central control. The non-aligned movement, regionalism and the battles against corruption are but three pillars in a basic domestic and foreign policy that is to institutionalized many Eurasianist concepts.

In conclusion, we can see several things developing:

  1. Russia will not copy the west. The Yeltsin administration saw a huge proportion of the Russian economy shipped to foreign bank accounts and be taken over by those who had no hand in creating it. Democracy can be a dirty word in Russia since it is the system partially imposed by Boris Yeltsin. It just meant that the well connected were able to take advantage of the vacuum in both political and economic power.
  2. Eurasianism is a popular and coherent option. Russia increasingly sees the west to be bankrupt, both literally and figuratively. The rebuilding process itself—similar to the 1960s decolonization movement in Africa—requires both a strong state and a significant sense of membership.
  3. The state will continue to be an important part of the national economy. This is especially the case in areas such as oil and natural gas. The state will continue to own enterprises and can compete with cooperative and private ownership. Simple economic self-interest can never be the foundation of a national economy. The common good (represented y the state, albeit imperfectly) is equally as important as efficiency.
  4. The west is in trouble, and is likely to continue in trouble. Her debt is massive, and her dependence on foreign oil equally so. Increasingly large trade deficits with China are the price she has paid for her retail prosperity. To think that the “western option” is an obvious or automatic one for Russia is absurd. The Eurasianists have a point when they stress the significance of the east in terms of economic potential.

The shocking ignorance of American intellectuals trying to grapple with Eurasian concepts they do not understand underscores Dugin’s main concerns. The US does not have the conceptual apparatus to properly understand the sweeping ontology of Eurasianiam. Western and westernized writers, such as Gene Veith, A. Motyl,  Doug Sanders, Anton Barbashin, Hannah Thoburn, Anton Shekhovtsov and Marc Lippman display a disgraceful ignorance born of two things: first, their utter lack of intellectual preparation for the ontology and metaphysics of Dugin or anyone else outside of the western mainstream, and just as importantly, the fact that few of their readers know any better. This latter problem is everywhere, and gives the above a license to write as they please. This both frees them from actual understanding and insulates them from serious criticism.

Since Eurasianism does not proceed from familiar journalistic cliches and pseudo-academic pretension, they do not have a framework to understand – let alone criticize – any of the views laid out. It shows the total collapse of serious thought in the pursuit of recognition as an “intellectual.” These are the residue of mass society and the collapse of intellectual honesty.


About Dr. Johnson:  Matthew Raphael Johnson is a scholar of Russian Orthodox history and philosophy. His research interests focus on Russian political theory and religious ideas, concentrating on the central role of nationalism, Eurasianism and the Orthodox tradition as forms of rebellion against globalism and liberalism.

He completed his doctorate at the University of Nebraska in 1999 as a recipient of the Sennen Fellowship, focusing on anti-modernist social philosophy. His dissertation surveyed Michael Oakeshott’s critique of positivism.

Having taught at the University of Nebraska and Mount St. Mary’s University in Maryland, he continues to translate, write and lecture, regularly drawing disapproval from left and right alike. An agrarian, royalist and Slavophile, his writing relegates him to the periphery of American life, a place he finds quite congenial.

Dr. Johnson is the author of several books, including Sobornosti: Essays on the Old Faith; Heavenly Serbia and the Medieval Idea; Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality: Lectures on Medieval Russia; The Ancient Orthodox Tradition in Russian Literature; The Third Rome: Holy Russia, Tsarism and Orthodoxy; and Russian Populist: The Political Theory of Vladimir Putin.


Eurasian Youth Union and the Novorossiya Enterprise

The Eurasian Youth Union
Representatives of an Important, Largely Unknown Political Philosophy
Translation by Jordan Estes
Introduction by Josh Wilson, Assistant Director,

The short political program of The Eurasian Youth Union, presented below, perhaps belies the depth and breadth of Eurasianism’s body of philosophy.

The Eurasianists are most often grouped with Russian nationalists and considered as a fringe group of Russian politics. However, as Robert Legvold, a professor emeritus at Columbia University and former director of the Harriman Institute has said, Eurasianism is "a subject crucial to understanding today’s Russia but never given proper due." Arguments based on the philosophy’s principles are increasingly used by Russian politicians and intellectuals to form and support Russian foreign and domestic policies. Eurasianism is also increasingly popular with college-aged Russians and has supporters throughout the former Soviet space and elsewhere, notably in Turkey.

Eurasianism has roots stretching back to the Slavophiles who argued that Russia was inherently not a western or eastern civilization and that Russia should be developed based on Russian – and particularly on non-Western – principles. Eurasianism began as movement, however, in the early 20th century with Russian émigrés who believed that the new Bolshevik government would fail, making way for a new, strong state based on Russian and particularly on Russian Orthodox values.

Modern Eurasianism, sometimes referred to as Neo-Eurasianism, is a product of many post-Soviet thinkers, as can be seen in the many, highly-active and often multilingual websites devoted to it. These include those run by the Eurasian Youth Union, The International Eurasian Movement, The Eurasian Portal for Information and Analysis, and an exceptionally large YouTube presence.

The most influential of Russia’s Eurasianist activists and thinkers, however, is undoubtedly Alexander Dugin. Dugin, is a former member of the nationalist group Pamyat, which bills itself as a "People’s National Patriotic Orthodox Christian Movement" that sought to preserve Russian culture from a perceived Masonic/Zionist/Western threat. Dugin was also, however, one of the authors of the original political platform of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation when that party was formed as a successor to the banned Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Dugin’s major body of work centers on what he calls "The Fourth Political Theory." This work-in-progress postulates that world governments have heretofore been formulated around three political theories: liberal democracy, communism, and fascism. Dugin argues that, in the contemporary world, liberal democracy, as championed by "Atlanticist" forces has become dangerously dominant. Dugin argues that this threatens to homogenize the world, stamping out minority cultures and philosophies in favor of those seen as objectively moral under Atlanticist thought. This, however, the argument continues, will cause minority cultures to rebel against western forces of globalization and make way for a new, Fourth Political Theory, which will draw from the "ruins" of the first three.

The Eursianists’ profile has grown under the political protests of 2011/2012, as they have actively counter-protested against them. The Eurasianists see these protests as being predominantly driven by an untenable union of two groups they oppose most: fascists and western-oriented liberals.

Thus, the political program of the Eurasianist Youth Union, presented below in a new translation by The School of Russian and Asian Studies, can be seen as a short, radical, and fiery expression of Dugin’s thought. The young Eurasianists would establish a new Eurasian empire wherein all cultures would be given the powers of local government to maintain their own laws and enforce their own values. To achieve this, they must fight against primarily the US, against liberals in Russia, and against a host of other enemies including "incompetent bureaucrats" and the "debased media."

As the Russian political scene continues to evolve, and particularly as Eurasianist thought finds expression in Russian policy goals such as Vladimir Putin’s proposed Eurasian Union, understanding Eurasianism will become increasingly important to understanding Russia and in formulating effective policies towards it.

Программа Евразийского Союза Молодежи

Eurasian Youth Union Party Program

Американский враг

The American Enemy

Американцы строят свою мировую империю, где нам нет места. В ней нет места ни Великой Европе, ни Свободной Азии. Нет места русским, немцам, французам, тюркам, китайцам. Это империя Нового Карфагена, где царствует убийца Молох – процентное рабство, плутократия, всевластие спекулятивных капиталов, догматы упадка и разложения, гадкая мораль наживы и вырождения.

The Americans are building a world empire within which we don’t belong. Neither mighty Europe nor free Asia will have a place within this empire; it does not welcome the Russian, German, French, Turkish, or Chinese peoples. America itself is the empire of New Carthage, bowing to the murderous Moloch,[1] with its foundations in slavery, plutocracy, the omnipotence of speculative capital, the dogmas of decadence and corruption, moral degeneration, and unfettered greed.

У нас отнимают прошлое, лишают будущего. Мы согнуты как пружина, и нас хотят вырвать с корнем из нашей родной земли.

They are consuming our past and robbing us of the future. We are being twisted and crushed. They wish to uproot us from our native land.

Надеяться не на кого. Власть растеряна и слаба. Враг силен и коварен.

We must trust no one in our task. Our government is confused and weak. The enemy is strong and cunning.

Сегодня разлагается под мягкими стратегиями глобализма не только Евразия, но мировой дух.

Today not only Eurasia but the whole world is rotting away under the influence of globalism’s soft strategies.

Так не пойдет, мы призваны стать последним бастионом. Если не мы, то никто.

This cannot be allowed. We have been called to act as the final bastion against this trend. If not us, then no one will stand against it.

Молодежь Евразии – финальная надежда

The Eurasian Youth are the last hope.

Мы, молодежь Евразии, – финальная надежда страны, континента. Всеобщая мобилизация объявлена, на кону — свобода Отечества, само существование Великой России. Враг подступает к границам вплотную. Он вовне, он внутри.

We, the youth of Eurasia, are the last hope not only of the country, but of the entire continent. A general mobilization has been declared. At stake are the freedom of the Fatherland and the very existence of Great Russia. The enemy approaches the edges of our borders; he is outside, and he is already inside.

Чтобы дать отпор внешнему врагу, надо разделаться с внутренним. Внутренний враг – сторонники США, глобалисты, ворье, идиоты-чиновники, опустившиеся телевизионщики, спящие обыватели, конформисты всех мастей. Это резидентура внешнего врага, и именно она не дает стране собраться с духом и дать последний бой.

In order to repel the external enemy, we must first deal with the internal one. Our internal enemies are the followers of the USA, globalists, dirty thieves, idiotic bureaucrats, debased media workers, the sleeping masses, and conformists of all kinds. The enemy’s residence within our borders prevents us from gathering our strength for the final battle.

Великая Чистка

The Great Cleansing

Мы пришли, чтобы провозгласить эпоху Великой Чистки. Наша цель создать новую армию – армию Евразии. Мы готовы творить Евразийскую Революцию.

We have come to announce the age of the Great Cleansing. Our objective is to establish a new army – the Eurasian Army. We are ready to orchestrate the Eurasian Revolution.

Мы носители воли и молнии, дети древних народов материка – славян, арийцев, тюрок, финнов, угров, монголов, палеоазиатов, кавказцев. Нас всех приговорили архитекторы «всемирного Макдонольдса», наши священные земли и рощи, храмы и города уже скуплены и заложены. У нас нет будущего – нам светит рабство у новых хозяев мира – в мягком концлагере «золотого миллиарда».

We have inherited the fire and will of our forefathers, the ancient peoples of our continent – the Slavs, Aryans, Turks, Finns, Ugric, Mongol, Paleo-Asiatic, and Caucasian peoples. Our enemy sentenced us to be the architects of a “Global McDonald’s,” our sacred lands and groves, temples and cities have already been bought up and incorporated. There is no future for us in slavery to the new masters of the world, in the soft concentration camps of the “golden billion.”[2]

Мы поднимаемся, чтобы взять власть над своей судьбой в свои руки.

We rise up to take our future into our own hands.

Мертвые и Революция

The Revolution and the Dead

В крови нашей растворены наши мертвые, созидавшие древние империи Евразии, крушившие врагов миллионами, не щадившие ни себя, ни других во имя великой цели. Сегодня нам говорят, что эти океаны красной крови были пущены напрасно, что жить, пресмыкаясь на животе, уютнее и разумнее. Это выбор рептилий. Наш выбор — вертикальная походка господина, носителя великой воли.

In our veins flows the blood of our ancestors; the ones who built Eurasia’s ancient empires, crushed enemies by the millions, and spared neither themselves nor others for the sake of their great purpose. Today we are told that this blood was spilled in vain, and that it is more comfortable and reasonable for us to live passively, merely groveling on our stomachs like lowly reptiles. We choose to walk tall, as the masters of our own great destiny.

Наш выбор – Евразийская Революция. Наш удел – багряный восход. Наша судьба – праздник одухотворенной плоти, брачный союз ума и воли.

We choose the Eurasian Revolution. A crimson sunrise is our destiny. And our fate is a celebration of the spiritual flesh, a marriage of the mind and will.

Только пробужденный от сна свободный и могучий воин способен сегодня народить новых детей для Отечества. Только здоровая сильная уверенная в себе и своем народе женщина вскормит настоящее поколение – многочисленное, сытое и буйное, способное восстановить нашу планетарную мощь.

Only a free and mighty warrior who has been awakened from his slumber is capable of bringing new children into the Fatherland. Only a strong, healthy, self-assured and patriotic woman can nurture our present generation to be numerous, well-fed, and revolutionary. Such a generation will be able to reestablish us as a world power.

Наша цель – Империя

Empire is our objective

Наша цель – Евразийская Империя. В ней найдется место всем народам и культурам. Но править в ней будут мудрейшие и сильнейшие, и отбор будет безжалостным.

Our objective is a Eurasian Empire. Within this empire, all nations and cultures will find their place. Selection among leaders will be ruthless, only the strongest and wisest will lead the Empire.

Наша этика – смерть лучше позора. Не можешь быть сильным, лучше не будь вообще.

Our belief is that death is better than living in shame. If one cannot be strong, it is better to not exist at all.

Наш стиль – верность корням и бросок в будущее – по ту сторону запретов. Дерзко, но с опорой на сокровище предков.

Our lives are lived true to our roots and thrust into the future, away from what has been prohibited. We live bold lives based on the most precious values of our ancestors.

Мы предадим героев древности, великих имперостроителей Евразии, если не создадим еще нечто более великое, чем они. И лишь когда мы распластаем границы от океана до океана, глаза наших мертвых окрасятся тихим прозрачным светом: они – наши потомки — сделали это! Иначе мертвые нас в покое не оставят.

It would be a betrayal of the heroes of antiquity, those great empire-builders of Eurasia, if we did not surpass their legacy. And only when we have spread our boundaries from ocean to ocean, will the eyes of our dead ancestors glow with a soft, transparent light – we, their ancestors, will have fulfilled their legacy! Our ancestors will not let us rest until we accomplish our goal.

Лучшая доля

The Greatest Fate

У вас есть иная доля и иная дорога – юный путь в Евразийскую Революцию. Евразийская Революция даст вам смысл, сделает вас ценными. В ней вы получите мандат на бытие, содержательность, перспективу, достоинство и брак. Подобное тянятся к подобному, и в евразийских зонах мы сосредоточим лучшее и самое необходимое: мы научим вас истине, сделаем умными, сильными и красивыми, покажем место в ряду избранников рода, обеспечим путь наверх.

You have a different fate and a different road – the youthful path to the Eurasian Revolution. The Eurasian Revolution will give you purpose and make you valued. You will find a reason for being, a more substantial life, a new perspective, dignity and family. Like minds are drawn together naturally, and we will bring together the best and most needed of those in the Eurasian zones: We will teach you the truth; you will become intelligent, strong, and beautiful; you will be shown your place among the chosen ones; and we will provide you with a path on which to rise.

Стране нужны новые люди, новые кадры, новые дети, новые силы. Веселые и беспощадные.

Our country needs new people, new workers, new children, and new power. It needs people who are joyous and merciless.

Это эскадроны Евразийской Революции. Для них мы объявляем евразийский набор – в «Евразийский Союз Молодежи».

These are the warriors of the Eurasian Revolution. We invite them to a Eurasian collective – the Eurasian Youth Union.

[1] Child sacrifice has historically been associated with the worship of the pagan god Moloch in ancient Carthage. In literature, Moloch often signifies a costly sacrifice, especially when the sacrifice is made blindly, without questioning the power demanding it.

[2] The “golden billion” is a term employed in the Russian-speaking world in reference to the relatively wealthy inhabitants of the industrially developed world, or, stated otherwise, the West.

Jordan Estes is an economics major at Georgetown University. He spent a semester abroad with SRAS’s Central Asian Studies program in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, followed by a summer in Moscow, Russia with SRAS’s Russian as a Second Language program. He hopes to continue his studies of Russia and eventually find work in Moscow related to economics or international relations.


(Pro-)Russian extremists in 2006 and 2014: the Dugin Connection
Anton Shekhovtsov’s blog | 21 August 2014

In August 2006, Russian fascist Aleksandr Dugin and his Eurasian Youth Union (Евразийский союз молодежи, ESM) organised a summer camp where ultranationalist activists were further indoctrinated and trained to fight against democratic movements in neighbouring independent states. Looking at the pictures from that camp, I have identified at least five people who, in 2014, were engaged in the terrorist activities of (pro-)Russian extremists in Eastern Ukraine.

Andrey Purgin in the ESM camp, 2006

Andrey Purgin, 2014

Andrey Purgin, first "Prime Minister" of the "Donetsk People’s Republic". In 2006, he was a leader of the organisation "Donetsk Republic".

Oleg Frolov in the ESM camp, 2006

Oleg Frolov, 2014

Oleg Frolov, a member of the "parliament of the Donetsk People’s Republic". Like Purgin, he was a leader of the "Donetsk Republic" in 2006.

Konstantin Knyrik in the ESM camp, 2006

Konstantin Knyrik, 2014

Konstantin Knyrik, head of the information centre "South-Eastern Front". In 2006, he was a leader of the Crimean branch of the Eurasian Youth Union.

Oksana Shkoda in the ESM camp, 2006

Oksana Shkoda, 2014

Oksana Shkoda, representative of the general headquarters of the "Donetsk People’s Republic".

Aleksandr Proselkov in the ESM camp, 2006

Aleksandr Proselkov next to Pavel Gubarev, "people’s governor" of the "Donetsk People’s Republic", 2014

Aleksandr Proselkov, "deputy foreign minister" of the "Donetsk People’s Republic". Eliminated.

The Eurasian Youth Union was established in 2005 with the money from the Presidential Administration of Russia on the initiative of Aleksandr Dugin and Vladislav Surkov, then deputy head of the Presidential Administration. These pictures are only a small amount of evidence that Russia’s war on Ukraine has been planned a long time ago.

Eurasian Youth Union
Wikipedia | 8 July 2014

Eurasian Youth Union (Russian: Евразийский союз молодёжи; ESM) is a Russian anti-European political organization, the youth wing of the Eurasia Party headed by Aleksandr Dugin. The organization has branches in several countries. The Government of Ukraine has branded the ESM as an extremist, anti-Ukrainian organization, convicted of a string of vandalism offenses and banned it in Ukraine.[1]


According to some observers the Eurasian Youth Union was created as a reaction to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the role the younger generation played in it. It is suggested that ESM represents an opposition to a Ukrainian youth organization PORA.[2]

The early-20th century Eurasianism ideology of a part of the Russian emigration and modern Neo-Eurasianism developed by Aleksandr Dugin has been declared the main ideology of the organization. Its ideology also features prominently Russian nationalism and imperialism, calls for the creation of a new Eurasian empire centered around Russia. On its website the movement declared the West and in particular the United States as its main opponent and termed it as the "main evil".

Our Union has one absolute enemy. It is the USA. This is the beginning and the end of our hatred.[3]

In its internal policy the ESM supports the current government of Russia and in particular its President, Vladimir Putin. Some also claim, that the movement receives taciturn support from the Russian Government eager to see a movement opposed to a possibility of an Orange Revolution happening in Russia.[4]


In Russia the Eurasian Youth Union has allied itself with Russian extremist organizations like the National Bolshevik Front, the DPNI and other groups of that type. It organizes and takes part in the annual Russian Marches in Russia and other countries of Eastern Europe. Very often these marches are accompanied by violence, especially in Ukraine.[5]

The ESM took an uncompromising approach to changes that happened in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution in 2004. In particular it set up branches in several Ukrainian cities, voiced its sharp criticism of the pro-Western Ukrainian government. The ESM has been behind a string of attacks on property and organizations they deemed pro-Western. It organised attacks on several Ukrainian Security Service branches, monuments to UPA veterans and hacker attacks on the website of the President of Ukraine. The most prominent of these attacks, that received nation-wide attention was the desecration of Ukrainian state symbols on Mount Hoverla in October 2007.[6] The other attack on Ukrainian targets was in Moscow, where several of ESM members trashed an exhibition devoted to the Holodomor, a term referring to the Ukrainian portion of the Soviet famine of 1932-1933, which is believed in Ukraine to have been a Stalinist genocide targeting Ukrainians.[7] Due to the relatively high profile of these attacks the Ukrainian police asked for assistance from Russia in finding people responsible for them, but no suspects have been apprehended yet.

The organization’s vandalism and sharp anti-governmental stance received wide condemnation among Ukrainian media and provoked the response from different Ukrainian organizations of the opposite orientation; several threats were made against the organization and its members and an arson attack has been reciprocated on the ESM’s offices in Moscow.

By the decision of the courts the Eurasian Youth Organization has been banned in Ukraine, its leaders Dugin and Zarifullin declared personae non grata.[8][9]


    1. Annual report on antisemetism and racism. The Tel-Aviv university. Retrieved July 4, 2008
    2. Okara, Andrey (12–18 March 2005). "The new Ukrainian Oprichnina, or what’s common between «Pora», Neoeurasians, Ivan the Terrible and Yulia Tymoshenko?". Zerkalo Nedeli 9 (537). in Russian, in Ukrainian.
    3. "Program of the Eurasian Youth Movement Our Enemy" (in Russian).
    4. Umland, Andreas (16–22 December 2006). "The Neo-Eurasianism. Question of Russian fascism and Russian political discourse". Zerkalo Nedeli 48 (627). in Russian, in Ukrainian.
    5. Gorsky, Yuri (30 October 2007). "Russian Right-Wing March – 2005. The way it was" (in Russian). Party for Protection of Russian Constitution "RUS". Archived from the original on May 1, 2008.
    6. "ESM destroyed Ukrainian symbols on Hoverla" (in Ukrainian). Novynar. 18 October 2007.
    7. "After Hoverla ESM destroyed a Holodomor exhibition" (in Ukrainian). Ukrainska Pravda. November 17, 2007.
    8. "SBU singled out people responsible for Hoveral attack" (in Ukrainian). Novynar. 20 October 2007.
    9. "NEO-Eurasianist Alexander Dugin on the Russia-Georgia Conflict" . Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst. 3 September 2008.


“We Live In The Era Of The End” A Interview with Dari Dougina
Open Revolt! | January 23, 2013

Open Revolt is very happy to present a conversation between the Eurasian Youth Union’s Dari Dougina and our own James Porrazzo.

Dari, the daugher of Alexander Dugin, in addition to her work in the Eurasian Youth Union is also the director of the project Alternative Europe for the Global Revolutionary Alliance.

Dari you are a second generation Eurasianist, daughter of our most important thinker and leader Alexander Dugin. Do you care to share with us your thoughts on being a young militant this deep into the Kali Yuga?

We live in the era of the end – that’s the end of culture, philosophy, politics, ideology. That’s the time without real movement; the Fukuyama’s gloomy prophecy of the ”end of history” turns to be a kind of reality. That’s the essence of Modernity, of Kali Yuga. We are living in the momentum of Finis Mundi. The arrival of Antichrist is in the agenda. This deep and exhausting night is the reign of quantity, masked by the tempting concepts such as Rhizome of Gilles Deleuze: the pieces of the modern Subject changes into the ”chair-woman” from the “Tokyo Gore Police” (post-modern Japanese film) – the individual of the modern paradigm turns into the pieces of dividuum. ”God is dead” and his place is occupied by the fragments of individual. But if we make a political analysis we will find out that this new state of the world is the project of liberalism. The extravagant ideas of Foucault seemingly revolutionary in their pathos after more scruple analyze show their conformist and (secretly) liberal bottom, that goes against the traditional hierarchy of values, establishing pervert “new order” where the summit is occupied by the self-adoring individual, atomistic decay. That’s hard to fight against the modernity, but sure – it’s unbearable to live in it – to agree with this state of the things – where all the systems are changed and the traditional values became a parody – being purged and mocked in all spheres of controls of modern paradigms. That’s the reign of the cultural hegemony. And this state of the world bothers us. We fight against it – for the divine order – for the ideal hierarchy. The cast-system in modern world is completely forgotten and transformed into a parody. But it has a fundamental point. In Plato’s republic – there is very interesting and important thought: casts and vertical hierarchy in politics are nothing but the reflection of the world of ideas and higher good. This model in politics manifests the basic metaphysical principles of the normal (spiritual) world. Destroying the primordial cast system it in the society – we negate the dignity of the divine being and his Order. Resigning from the casts system and traditional order, brilliantly described by Dumezil, we damage the hierarchy of our soul. Our soul is nothing but the system of casts with a wide harmony of justice which unites 3 parts of the soul (the philosophical – the intellect, the guardian – the will, and the merchants – the lust). Fighting for the tradition we are fighting for our deep nature as the human creature. Man is not something granted – it s the aim. And we are fighting for the truth of human nature (to be human is to strive to the superhumanity). That can be called a holly war.

What does the Fourth Political Theory mean to you?

That’s the light of the truth, of something rarely authentic in the post-modern times. That’s the right accent on the degrees of existence – the natural chords of the world laws. That’s something which grows up on the ruins of the human experience. There is no success without the first attempts – all of the past ideologies contained in them something what caused their failure.

The Fourth Political Theory – that’s the project of the best sides of divine order that can be manifested in our world – from liberalism we take the idea of the democracy (but not in it’s modern meaning) and  liberty in the Evolian sense; from communism we accept the idea of solidarity, anti-capitalism, anti-individualism and the idea of collectivism; from fascism we take the concept of vertical hierarchy and the will to power – the heroic codex of the Indo-European warrior.

All these past ideologies suffered from grave shortcomings – democracy with the addition of liberalism became  tyranny (the worst state-regime by Plato), communism defended the technocentric world with no traditions and origins, fascism followed the wrong geopolitical orientation, its racism was Western, Modern, liberal and anti-traditional.

The Fourth Political Theory is the global transgression of this defects – the final design of the future (open) history. It’s the only way to defend the truth.

For us – truth is the multipolar world, the blossoming variety of different cultures and traditions.

We are against racism, against the cultural and strategic racism of the USA’s Western modern civilization, which is perfectly described by professor John M. Hobson in ”The Europocentric conception of world politics”. The structural (open or subliminal) racism destroys charming complexity of the human societies – primitive or complex.

Do you find any special challenges as both a young woman and a activist in this age?

This spiritual war against (post)Modern world gives me the force to live.

I know, that I’m fighting against the hegemony of evil for the truth of the eternal Tradition. It is obscured now, not completely lost. Without it nothing could exist.

I think that any gender and age has its forms to access  the Tradition and its ways to challenge  Modernity.

My existential practice is to abdicate most values of the globalist youth. I think we need to be different from this thrash. I don’t believe in anything modern. Modernity is always wrong.

I consider love to be a form of initiation and spiritual realization. And the family should be the union of  spiritually similar persons.

Beyond your father, obviously, who else would you suggest young militants wishing to learn our ideas study?

I recommend to make acquaintance with the books of Rene Guenon, Julius Evola, Jean Parvulesco, Henri Corbin, Claudio Mutti, Sheikh Imran Nazar Hosein (traditionalism); Plato, Proclus, Schelling, Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, E. Cioran (philosophy); Carl Schmitt, Alain de Benoist, Alain Soral (politics); John M. Hobson, Fabio Petito (IR); Gilbert Durand, G. Dumezil (sociology). The base kit of reading for our intellectual and political revolution.

You’ve now spent some time living in Western Europe. How would you compare the state of the West to the East, after first hand experience?

In fact, before my arrival to Europe I thought that this civilization is absolutely dead and no revolt could be possible there. I was comparing the modern liberal Europe to bog, with no possibility to protest against the hegemony of  liberalism.

Reading the foreign European press, seeing the articles with titles as ”Putin – the satan of Russia” / ” the luxury life of poor president Putin” / ” pussy riot – the great martyrs of the rotten Russia” – this idea was almost confirmed. But after a while I’ve found some political anti-globalist groups and movements of France – like Egalite&Reconcilation,  Engarda, Fils de France etc – and everything changed.

The swamps of Europe have transformed into something else – with the hidden possibility of revolt. I’ve found the ”other Europe”, the ”alternative” hidden empire, the secret geopolitical pole.

The real secret Europe should be awakened to fight and destroy its liberal double.

Now I’m absolutely sure, that there are 2 Europes; absolutely different – liberal decadent Atlanticist Europe and alternative Europe ( anti-globalist, anti-liberal, Eurasia-orientated).

Guenon wrote in the ”Crisis of the modern world” that we must divide the state of being anti-modern and anti-Western. To be against the modernity – is to help Occident in its fight against  Modernity, which is constructed on liberal codes. Europe has it’s own fundamental culture (I recommend the book of Alain de Benoist – “The traditions of Europe”). So I found this alternative, secret, powerful, Traditionalist other Europe and I put my hopes on its secret guardians.

We’ve organized with Egalite&Reconcilation a conference in Bordeaux in October with Alexander Dugin and Christian Bouchet in a huge hall but there was no place for all the volunteers who wanted to see this conference.

It shows that something begins to move…

Concerning my views on Russia – I’ve remarked that the bigger part of European people don’t trust the media information – and the interest to Russia grows up – it’s seen in the mode of learning Russian, of watching soviet films and many European people understand that the media of Europe are totally influenced by the hegemonic Leviathan, liberal globalist machine of lies. 

So the seeds of protest are in the soil, with  time they’ll grow up, destroying the ”society of spectacle”.

Your whole family is a great inspiration to us here at Open Revolt and New Resistance. Do you have a message for your friends and comrades in North America?

I really can’t help admiring your intensive revolutionary work! The way you are working – in the media – is the way of killing the enemy ”with it’s own poison”, using the network warfare strategy. Evola spoke about that in his excellent book ”Ride the tiger”.

Uomo differenzziato is someone who stays in the center of modern civilization but don’t accept it in his inner empire of his heroic soul. He can use the means and arms of modernity to cause a mortal wound to the reign of quantity and its golems.

I can understand that the situation in USA now is difficult to stand. It’s the center of hell, but Holderlin wrote that the hero must throw himself into abyss, into the heart of the night and thus conquer the darkness.

Any closing thoughts you’d like to share?

Studying in the faculty of philosophy and working on Plato and neo-platonism, I can remark, that politics is nothing but the manifestation of the basic metaphysical principles which lays in the fundament of being.

Making political war for the Fourth Political Theory we are also establishing the metaphysical order – manifesting it in the material world.

Our struggle is not only for the ideal human state – it is also the holy war for reestablishing the right ontology.