Putin facing multi-million pound legal action over alleged role in MH17 crash

British lawyers have flown to Ukraine to prepare a class action against the Russian president on behalf of bereaved families
Robert Mendick, Ben Farmer and Tim Ross
Telegraph | 26 Jul 2014

Vladimir Putin is facing a multi-million-pound legal action for his alleged role in the shooting down of a Malaysia Airlines passenger jet over eastern Ukraine, The Sunday Telegraph can disclose.

British lawyers are preparing a class action against the Russian president through the American courts. Senior Russian military commanders and politicians close to Mr Putin are also likely to become embroiled in the legal claim.

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A Dutch police officer in Donetsk on Sunday. Fighting in the area prevented a visit by international experts on Sunday (AFP/Getty)

The case would further damage relations between Mr Putin and the West, but politicians would be powerless to prevent it.

Last week, lawyers from McCue & Partners, the London law firm, flew to Ukraine for discussions about how to bring the case and where it should be filed. Victims’ families will be invited to join the action. The case will inevitably highlight the role allegedly played by Russia in stoking conflict in eastern Ukraine.

The announcement of a potential lawsuit against the Russian government came as:

Þ Australian and Dutch officials held talks on the deployment of an international force of police and soldiers to secure the crash site. Four Australians and four Dutch investigators are already in the rebel-held city of Donetsk, but there are growing calls for a larger multinational force from a “coalition of the grieving” to take control of the area where Flight MH17 came down;

Þ An exclusive ICM/Sunday Telegraph poll found wide support for stepping up the West’s trade war with Russia, with 45 per cent backing tougher European Union sanctions, including a full arms embargo;

Þ EU politicians prepared to draw up a further list of Mr Putin’s “cronies” who will face sanctions. Negotiations over the individuals to be included in the latest ban will start tomorrow, ahead of wider economic sanctions due to be discussed in the weeks ahead;

Þ It emerged that Malaysia Airlines, which also suffered the disappearance of Flight MH370 in March, is drawing up plans to change its name and carry out a radical restructuring of its business. Writing in The Sunday Telegraph today, the airline’s commercial director, Hugh Dunleavy, says the business will eventually “emerge stronger”, despite the “tragic” deaths;

Þ Labour called on football’s world governing body, Fifa, to draw up contingency plans to allow Russia to be stripped of the 2018 World Cup.

There is overwhelming, but largely circumstantial, evidence that Russian-backed rebels mistakenly brought down the Boeing 777, killing all 298 people on board, having mistaken it for a Ukrainian military aircraft.

It is almost certain the aircraft was brought down by a Russian-made SA-11 missile fired from a Buk mobile launcher that appeared to have crossed into Ukraine from Russia.

A spokesman for McCue & Partners said in a statement: “There has been talk of civil suits against Malaysia Airlines, but those immediately responsible are not only the separatists who are alleged to have fired the rocket at Flight MH17, causing the death of hundreds of innocent victims, but those, be they states, individuals or other entities, who provided them with financial and material support and the means to do so.

“Our team is presently liaising and working with partners in Ukraine and the US on whether, apart from civil suits against the airline, legal action can be brought against the perpetrators on the victims’ behalf.”

The official investigation into the atrocity, led by the Dutch, who suffered the greatest loss of life, is being hampered by armed rebels who have control of the crash site.

A civil legal case brought by the victims could embarrass Mr Putin in a way that the official inquiry may be unable to do. Simon Smith, the British ambassador to Ukraine, told The Sunday Telegraph of his grave concern that the crash site had been “compromised” and that families of victims might have to wait years for proper answers to what happened, including who ordered the attack and who supplied the weaponry and training on the missile system.

Mr Smith said: “There’s a fair amount of evidence building up that a lot of evidence has been compromised. It’s been moved, it’s not where it lay immediately after the crash happened, and that’s very regrettable.” He said that while it might only take “a surprisingly short time” to determine what missile knocked the airliner out of the sky, he warned that “there may be some lines of inquiry that take an immensely long time to work through”.

He said air crash investigators were being pragmatic. “We will work with what evidence we find,” he said, adding: “The fact that a piece of evidence has been moved does not mean it has lost all its value.”

Hopes of finally securing the crash site, protecting it from looters and militia trying to cover up their involvement, have been dealt a blow by the turmoil engulfing the Ukrainian parliament.

Ukraine was locked in political limbo on Friday night after parliament adjourned for a fortnight following the shock resignation of Arseniy Yatsenyuk, the prime minister. That may delay ratification of an international agreement giving Holland powers to secure the site.

Nine days after the crash, in which 10 Britons died, investigators have still not been able to begin collecting forensic evidence. Experts have told The Sunday Telegraph that the inquiry, hampered on the ground, could now take years to complete and for the truth to be reached.

Reed Foster, the head of the armed forces capabilities team at the intelligence and security analysts IHS Jane’s Defence, said: “It will be almost impossible to say who pushed the button. The evidence at the crash site will not tell you if it was a Ukraine or Russian operator of the Buk launcher.

“It is very easy for the Russians to maintain plausible deniability.”

Chris Yates, an independent aviation analyst who has worked as a consultant on a number of air crashes, said: “I am afraid this is going to go on for years for the simple reason the crash site is now substantially contaminated. People have been trampling all over it; debris has been shifted, cut up and removed.”

A legal source close to the planned class action said the burden of proof in a civil case was lower than in a criminal investigation, meaning that senior Kremlin politicians, including Mr Putin, could be held to account through the civil courts, even if they escape criticism in the official inquiry.

The case against Mr Putin could be worth hundreds of millions of pounds, possibly more, in potential damages. The action is likely to be brought through the US courts and could – if held liable – eventually see assets of Mr Putin and those closest to him frozen if any resulting compensation is not paid.

McCue and Partners have previously brought claims in the US courts against the former Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi for sponsoring IRA terrorism in Northern Ireland and on the British mainland.

On Friday night, the European Union announced a further 15 individuals, including Russia’s two most senior intelligence chiefs, would be added to its list of figures hit by sanctions.

Douglas Alexander, the shadow foreign secretary, will say today that Europe faces “a moment of reckoning” in how it responds to Russia.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10993470/Putin-facing-multi-million-pound-legal-action-over-alleged-role-in-MH17-crash.html

Putin’s choice: ‘Confronting the extremes’

Richard Walker
Deutsche Welle | 24.07.2014

After the downing of flight MH17, Russian President Vladimir Putin is under intense domestic and international pressure. Which way will he turn? William Pomeranz of the Wilson Center in Washington told DW what he thinks.

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DW: What are the choices Vladimir Putin will be considering right now? Some analysts point to two extremes: deescalating and trying to portray himself as a peacemaker, or going for broke and sending troops into eastern Ukraine. Do you see it that way?

William Pomeranz: Those are the extremes. And Putin has put himself in a position where he has to confront those two very difficult extremes.

A choice of deescalating, which runs the risk of having political repercussions at home – because he’ll be seen as abandoning the Russian speakers who, a few months ago, he said he would defend at all costs. Or alternatively he can double down, and theoretically even intervene directly – although that’s something I don’t think he’s looking to do. If he were to intervene directly, then obviously the level of sanctions would increase significantly and quickly, and that would really cause economic pain for Russia.

Looking first at the deescalation option, how could he minimize the political repercussions?

If he does it slowly, sending out messages about the security of Russia. Yesterday Putin told the Russian Security Council that Russia’s borders were secure, that there were no threats to its territorial integrity. If he can portray it somehow that Russia has emerged strengthened, or at least as a fully respected and engaged international player, then he might be able to deescalate.

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Putin could emphasize border security as a deescalation strategy

Looking at the other extreme of sending Russian troops into eastern Ukraine – you say that’s unlikely. But who in Putin’s circle might be arguing for that?

I think it’s possible that the security services would insist that he can’t abandon the pro-Russian separatists, and that he can’t be perceived as losing Ukraine. If it’s perceived that the final result of this whole crisis is that Russia gains Crimea but "loses" all of Ukraine, then I think the perception in Russia would be that this whole series of events did not live up to expectations. Putin doesn’t want to be perceived as the Russian leader that "lost Ukraine."

Crimea is going to be very expensive. For those who see Crimea as a major source of expenditure, I don’t think it will be enough to compensate for "losing Ukraine."

Having talked about the extremes, do you see a middle path that Putin could take?

The middle path has been there almost the entire crisis. First, Ukraine does not become a member of NATO. No one in NATO as far as I can see really wants Ukraine, especially in its current situation; I don’t anticipate Ukraine ever becoming a member.

So if Russia were to get a sort of guarantee that Ukraine would be a non-NATO country, and second, Russia was willing to accept that Ukraine will introduce constitutional reforms that will devolve power to the regions. Here there’s a crucial caveat that Ukraine decides how that power devolves, and it’s not dictated by Russia. That would allow certain powers to be transmitted to Donetsk and Luhansk without destroying the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

What is the best move for the US – what’s the best diplomatic posture that would encourage Putin to deescalate?

While the US has raised the level of sanctions, it has done so intermittently in the hope that Russia would come and negotiate. The US has sent out strong signals that it will not tolerate Russia’s interference – but there is an "off-ramp" available through negotiation.

Looking at the broader picture, Dmitri Trenin of the Carnegie Endowment in Moscow wrote this week that an "unalloyed competitive posture" may now set in for US-Russian relations. Do you agree?

I think we’ve reached a real low point in US-Russian relations. I think President Obama is not that interested in investing whatever political capital he has left in changing that dynamic. And President Putin, I think, is secure in knowing that he can wait until the next president to see what his next moves have to be. So I don’t see any major shifts in US-Russian relations unless other events intervene.

William E. Pomeranz is Deputy Director of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies of the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington.

http://www.dw.de/putins-choice-confronting-the-extremes/a-17804473

The Real Lesson of MH17

Consider the possible worst outcomes if you choose to dabble in destabilization
Gary Hart
The National Interest | July 23, 2014

Crossing Murphy’s Law with the law of unintended consequences produces this: If the worst possible thing can happen it will, and it will probably happen to you. When the Soviet Union was occupying Afghanistan, we armed the Taliban on the always-dubious theory that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. In the great sweep of human history, it did not take long for the enemy of our enemy to become our enemy. This seems to offer yet another law: Never replace an occupier whom you are trying to get rid of.

The circumstances are much different, but twenty-first century Ukraine could well turn out to prove as troublesome to Putin’s Russia as Afghanistan was to both Russia and the United States. By arming the insurgent rebels in eastern Ukraine, quite possibly with long-range surface-to-air missiles that brought down Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 with a catastrophic loss of civilian lives, the Russian strategy, such as it was, has come home to roost with a terrible jolt.

The Putin government took a gamble on controlling the pro-Russian Ukrainian insurgents and lost. We may or may not ever know the exact circumstances that produced this tragedy. But there is a better than even chance that a Russian-manufactured SA-11 (Buk) battery inserted into rebel-held territory in eastern Ukraine fell into the hands of operators, drunk or sober, who convinced themselves they had the authority to launch against any blip on the radar screen. An even greater nightmare for the Russian government is the possible involvement of one or more Russian military operators controlling the missile battery.

In a more civilized world, leaders who acknowledge that war is hell would take that truth seriously and not play around the edges. Clearly, we have moved beyond if not below the conventional nation-state wars of the eighteenth through the twentieth century into an area of conflict not charted since the rise of the Assassins in the eleventh century. Stateless nations, or so-called nonstate actors, play by their own rules which are no rules at all. In an age of high technology, automated weapons systems, long-range radars, and so forth in the hands of modern-day assassins, if the worst possible thing can happen—it will.

Present day insurgents, rebels, terrorists, ISIS, renegade drug lords, arms-trading mafias and freelance pirates are children with hammers in fine-glass factories. You don’t have to wear a uniform anymore to be in danger in this age of random warfare. This fact requires a greater degree of responsibility and accountability on the part of nation-state leaders to resist the temptation to stir up ethnic nationalists, separatists and radical fundamentalists for the simple purpose of achieving hegemony over contiguous states.

Even if the Ukrainian-Russian separatists appealed to Moscow for support, it should now be clear to the Putin government that things can get badly out of hand. But there is a lesson here for all, including for the United States. Our clandestine services could arm anticommunist insurgents in various venues around the globe during the Cold War. But we risked blowback, things getting out of hand and the possibility that insurgent success could produce a repressive government labeled “made in the USA” every bit as repugnant as the uncooperative government it replaced. There are plenty of instances where exactly this happened.

Post-MH17, the new watchword must be: Consider the possible worst outcomes if you choose to dabble in destabilization. There are consequences beyond your control and they will be under the international magnifying glass of instant media. At this writing, it seems incontrovertible that blame for MH17 is landing right on the Kremlin’s doorstep. Blame will be heaped upon Vladimir Putin at length and at leisure and it will take some doing for his government to work its way back into a position of respect at the tables of international diplomacy.

But, lest we gloat there is a lesson here for all. Consider all ramifications, including long-term ones before succumbing to the temptation to engage covertly in civil conflicts, let alone back-alley brawls, even if it seems expedient to do so at the time. Think long term. Consider all consequences—including improbable ones like rogue missile batteries that bring down civilian airliners. It is not totally out of the question that, under similar circumstances, this could have been a U.S. missile launcher in the hands of renegade warriors who acquired it thirdhand in the massive international arms market.

Enough for today are the evils thereof. The Russians will have to live with the consequences of their heavy-handed manipulation of their neighbor. There are few, if any, secrets anymore (even before Edward Snowden). It is tempting to guess that there is a good deal of finger pointing and chairs kicked over in Kremlin offices these days. Someone’s head will roll. But unlike in the past, dating to Ivan the Terrible, the head will still be attached to the unlucky body.

Gary Hart was a member of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee from 1975 to 1987.

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-real-lesson-mh17-10933

TAKING CRIMEA… AGAIN

CITINO, ROBERT M
Military History. Sep2014, Vol. 31 Issue 3, p40-49. 10p

ARMIES FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT DAY HAVE WRANGLED OVER THIS PATCH OF GROUND IN THE BLACK SEA — BUT WHY?

The three key principles of the real estate business, the saying goes, are "location, location, location." The style of a home, its square footage, the backyard pool — all factor in, but none is as important as the location. Some places are more desirable than others, and homes built in those coveted locales are often the subject of bidding wars.

The principle carries over into military history. Some locations attract more attention, draw more invaders and generate more wars. Take Crimea. A diamond-shaped peninsula dominating the Black Sea, it has long enticed would-be overlords of every stripe. While it is a natural naval base, its tenuous link with the mainland via the Isthmus of Perekop is also just wide enough to lure land armies. And lure them it has, one after the other: Tauri and Scythians; Greeks and Romans; Byzantines and Kievan Rus’; Mongols, Ottoman Turks and Russians; Soviet commissars and German field marshals. All felt the pull of Crimea’s beauty and its temperate climate, to be sure, but what really drew them was the location. The ruler of the peninsula has 360-degree power projection at his fingertips: north into Ukraine, east into the Caucasus, south into Asia Minor or west into the Balkans.

Take Crimea? Many have tried.

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SIEGE OF SEVASTOPOL, 1854-55 The key to control of the Crimean Peninsula, Sevastopol became the object of an allied siege soon after British and French forces arrived in the region. By taking the city, the Europeans hoped to punish the Russians for the attack at Sinop while demonstrating their support for the hard-pressed Ottomans.

The 1853-56 Crimean War provided a case example of the peninsula’s lure. In 1852 a diplomatic clash arose between Russia and France over the status of a handful of Christian shrines and churches in the Holy Land, then under Ottoman Turkish rule. Both powers claimed to be the protector of Christians living in the Ottoman empire, with Russia speaking on behalf of Orthodox believers and France for the Roman Catholic population. To show he meant business, French Emperor Napoléon III (Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte) sent the 80-gun ship of the line Charlemagne into the Black Sea, and Ottoman Sultan Abdülmecid I was sufficiently impressed to rule in France’s favor.

Russian protests against the sultan’s decision fell on deaf ears in Istanbul, and in July 1853 Czar Nicholas I ordered Russian troops over the border into the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia (present-day Moldova and Romania), territories then under nominal Turkish control. And after Ottoman protests fell on equally deaf ears in St. Petersburg, the empire declared war on Russia in October.

It is perhaps easy to make light of the obscure monkish quarrel that sparked the conflict, but big issues were at stake. The long-term cause was the "Eastern question," the upheaval in the Near East caused by the long-term decline of the Ottoman empire. As Turkish strength waned, the Great Powers sought to protect their strategic interests in the region. From the point of view of London or Paris, a bipartite war between Russia and the Ottomans would certainly result in a decisive Russian victory, and Russian dominance of the Near East was an unthinkable proposition. And so British and French naval units entered the Black Sea in a show of support for the Turks.

Tensions boiled over on November 30, when a Russian naval squadron operating out of Sevastopol — the great naval base in Crimea — used its newfangled explosive shells to destroy a Turkish squadron of a dozen ships off Sinop, inflicting more than 3,000 casualties. Now under heavy pressure from public opinion inflamed by this "massacre of Sinop," Britain and France declared war on Russia in March 1854.

Their purpose was to prop up the teetering Ottoman empire, but it hardly seemed necessary. After declaring war, Turkish forces brought the fight to the Russians, invading Wallachia and fortifying a number of positions along the Danube River. The Russian drive south faltered, and in April 1854 they began a desultory siege of the fortress town of Silistra. The Ottomans were holding out, but unfortunately an allied expeditionary force was already en route. It landed at Varna on the Black Sea in May, where poor sanitation promptly sparked a cholera epidemic that killed thousands. At the same time, recognizing they would never take Silistra, the Russians abandoned their siege in June. The following month, after an ultimatum from neutral Austria, they evacuated Wallachia and Moldavia altogether.

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DOCUMENTING THE WAR The Crimean War was quite unpopular with segments of the British public, so in an effort to boost support, the government hired an official civilian photographer, Roger Fenton, to provide positive images of the conflict. As photography was still in its infancy, he could not capture action, yet his posed portraits of soldiers, camps and equipment gave Britons their first true look at life on the front lines.

The conflict might well have ended then, but the allies were in the theater, and simply turning around and going home would have been a public relations fiasco. They had to attack Russia somewhere. It had to be a valuable and high-prestige target, it had to be nearby, and it had to be a spot vulnerable to allied naval power. Based on geography and the strategic realities of the region, there could be only one location: Crimea. The allies would seize Sevastopol, punish the Russians for Sinop and reduce the threat level to both the Ottoman empire and the broader region.

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SIEGE OF SEVASTOPOL, 1941-42 Proving that time rarely alters strategic realities, in World War II Russian forces again struggled to defend Crimea.

A force of nine divisions — four British, four French and one Turkish — dutifully sailed for Crimea, landing at Eupatoria in September. None of the contending armies had fought a serious war since 1815, and it was evident. The allies came ashore without transport and little equipment beyond rifles, drove straight down the main road toward Sevastopol and met the Russians coming straight up to block them. There was no preliminary jousting, no attempt to find a flank, no real reconnaissance. On September 20 the adversaries met on the Alma River.

It was the greatest battle since Waterloo, with some 60,000 British, French and Turks facing off against 36,000 Russians, but no one covered himself with glory at the Alma. The British and French kicked things off with an unimaginative frontal assault. The Russians defended their redoubts south of the river bravely at first, but superior allied fire-power — courtesy of the new Minié rifle — soon forced them to retreat. The battle started out orderly enough, but as the Russians’ shaky command and control broke down, it degenerated into a confused rout. Fighting a long way from home with meager cavalry, the allies failed to launch a pursuit, and their victory ended on a disappointing note. Still, the casualty statistics told the tale: The British had done the heavy lifting in the assault, suffering 362 killed and 1,640 wounded. The French, delayed to the action by obstructing cliffs in their battle sector, suffered 60 killed and 500 wounded. The Russians, fighting in dense columns with smoothbore muskets, suffered more than 5,000 casualties of all types.

The Russian rout did not end until it reached Sevastopol. The arriving force was a beaten rabble more than a cohesive army, and the allies might well have taken the city by brisk direct assault. This was a cautious war, however, and the allied command decided instead to execute a long flank march around the city. This maneuver let them seize new supply ports — Kamiesh for the French and Balaklava for the British — and abandon their original base at Eupatoria, which Cossack attacks had rendered untenable anyway. But it wasted precious time. The allies did not bombard Sevastopol until October 17, by which time any hope for a speedy victory was gone. Instead, there was a siege — always a slow, difficult and costly business. It began for the allies with another outbreak of disease, this time a combination of dysentery and cholera, and in late November a bitter winter storm wrecked their supply fleet. While such things happen in every war, the telegraph — a new factor in the Crimea — allowed correspondents like W.H. Russell of the London Times to file daily accounts of every gory detail to shocked readers back home.

The Russians launched three inept relief attempts of Sevastopol — at Balaklava (site of the ill-fated charge of Britain’s Light Brigade) in October, Inkerman in November and the Chernaya River in August 1855. The allies beat back each attack with heavy losses, and the issue was no longer in doubt. Successive allied bombardments of the fortress met increasingly feeble resistance, and a French assault in September smashed the linchpin defensive position, the Malakoff redoubt. Recognizing defeat, the Russians torched their arsenals and abandoned the city.

By now all sides were exhausted, and the subsequent 1856 Treaty of Paris reflected it. The accord not only returned Sevastopol to the Russians (as a long-term allied occupation was neither politically nor militarily feasible) but also demilitarized the Black Sea, barring the Russians from stationing fleets or forces in the theater. That was about it, however, and even those meager clauses would have a very short half-life. With Europe distracted by the Franco-Prussian War in 1870-71, the Russians would renounce the entire treaty.

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RUSHING TO VICTORY Despite tenacious Russian resistance, German General Erich von Manstein’s 11th Army took Sevastopol on June 30, 1942.

Largely forgotten today, the Crimean War was a signal moment in history for many reasons. The art of war took a quantum leap forward, with railroads, rifles and the telegraph taking center stage. Russia’s complete ineptitude — unable even to defend a fortress on its home soil — came as a shock to the country. It led to long overdue social reforms, such as the abolition of serfdom, and also fostered the rise of radical revolutionary groups that would eventually bring down the empire altogether. But more than anything, the war showed the importance of Crimea itself, then as always a key piece of strategic real estate. The lure of the peninsula had summoned forth the soldiers of four great empires and killed more than a half-million of them.

We saw the same dynamic at work in World War II. The clash between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union was the greatest land conflict in history, involving tens of millions of men and ranging from the Arctic Circle to the Caucasus Mountains. Yet, at times it seemed as if Crimea was the focal point of the entire titanic struggle.

Again, it was a matter of location. The simple fact was neither side could advance beyond a certain point in the Ukraine were Crimea in hostile hands. The Germans first felt the pull. With Army Group South driving on Rostov at lightning speed in the summer of 1941, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt had to halt and divert the entire 11th Army to overrun Crimea. When its commander. General Eugen von Schobert, had the misfortune to land his Fieseler Fi 156 Storch aircraft in a freshly laid Russian minefield. General Erich von Manstein took command of the 11th. Blasting into Crimea through deeply echeloned Soviet defenses in the Perekop Isthmus, he kept his eyes on the great prize, Sevastopol.

Before he could get there, however, trouble intervened all over the map. Crimea’s central location is a double-edged sword, as events transpiring in different sectors can dramatically affect any operation. A Soviet counteroffensive on the northern shores of the Sea of Azov forced Manstein to detach a corps to contain it; the fall of Odessa to the west brought another evacuated Soviet division into Sevastopol. Although German intelligence reported three Soviet divisions in the peninsula, by now there were at least seven.

As a result the Germans had a tough time clearing Crimea and were not ready to storm Sevastopol until mid-December. The attackers had to blast through three concentric rings of Soviet fortifications including strongpoints, machine-gun nests, medium and heavy batteries in armored cupolas, and positions built into the caves and rocky hillsides. The Germans came within a stone’s throw, but just as they were making their breakthrough, Soviet reinforcements arrived in the form of the 79th Naval Infantry Brigade. Transported into Severnaya Bay on a small flotilla, its men hustled ashore, rushed to the threatened sector and held back the onrushing Germans. The Soviet crisis at Sevastopol was past.

Then it was the Germans who were in trouble. As Manstein pondered his failure, the Soviets landed a blow on the eastern side of Crimea, a series of amphibious landings on the Kerch Peninsula. Three complete armies — the 44th, 47th and 51st — came ashore, and Soviet Lt. Gen. Dmitri Kozlov hurled them at the German defenses in the Parpach bottleneck. Four times he sent the armies forward; four times they came reeling back with massive casualties. The final try, in April 1942, was especially horrible, with tanks, guns and trucks stuck in glutinous mud, and the men having to muscle shells forward by hand.

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REVERSAL OF FORTUNE Having taken Sevastopol, the Germans were unable to hold it. Russian forces retook the city and all of Crimea in 1944.

Kozlov had failed, and once again it was Manstein’s advantage. His response was Operation Trappenjagd ("Bustard Hunt," named for the flightless bird that inhabits Crimea). The Soviet offensives had petered out with slight gains on the northern sector, an outward bulge toward the German lines. Smelling blood, Manstein launched an assault on May 8. Deploying XXXXII Corps in the north to pin Soviet forces in place, he sent in a beefed-up XXX Corps to make the main effort in the south, breaking through the Soviet front and opening a path for the 22nd Panzer Division. Once through the tanks wheeled sharply left, heading north and driving to the coast across the rear of the Soviet 51st and 47th armies in the bulge, cutting them off and encircling them. Throughout the offensive the German Luftwaffe was supreme in the air, with virtually all of Luftflotte 4 deployed in Crimea. Usually tasked to support an entire army group, it flew thousands of sorties per day over this tightly constricted battlefield. Soon the encirclement became a seething cauldron of fire and destruction. Kerch itself fell on May 15, the operation’s eighth day. After a few more days of mop-up fighting Trappenjagd was over. Soviet losses were colossal, some 170,000 men in all, more than 1,100 guns and 250 tanks; the Germans, by contrast, suffered just 7,500 casualties.

Still Sevastopol held out. Russian skill at siege and field fortification was proverbial, and the defenders of the fortress (the First Independent Coastal Army) had been busy in the preceding few months. New strongpoints, bunkers and tank traps sprouted around the perimeter, and crucial sectors, like the northern shore of Severnaya Bay, presented some of the most heavily fortified concrete blockhouses on earth. Chief among the guardians were the monstrous twin batteries Maxim Gorky I and II, each comprising two heavily armored turrets housing twin 305mm guns. Superlatives are always difficult to prove, but Sevastopol may well have been the strongest fortress in the world in 1942.

Manstein had an answer, though — a blast of "annihilation fire." By early June he had readied his entire complement of airpower, and guns of every type were unlimbering at the front. They included the monsters of the German arsenal, pieces so large they fascinate even today: two 600mm Karl mortars dubbed "Thor" and "Odin," along with the 800mm "Schwerer Gustav" railway gun, the world’s largest artillery piece, firing a 7.7-ton projectile from a 106-foot-8-inch barrel. It was definitely a "crew-served weapon" — a crew of 250.

The bombardment opened on June 2, with 600 ground-support aircraft and 611 guns crammed into a 21-mile front. It turned Sevastopol into a "sea of flames," as the German air commander described it, and it stayed that way for a month. A single shell from "Schwerer Gustav," for example, destroyed a Soviet ammunition dump encased beneath 90 feet of rock on the north shore of Severnaya Bay. Under such firepower the subterranean tunnels that linked these positions together and housed the civilian population during the fighting offered scant protection.

Backed by this enormous weight of metal the Germans ground through the Soviet defenses, with LIV Corps pushing in the north and XXX Corps to the southeast. Between them the disciplined troops of the Romanian Mountain Corps carried out a holding operation. Soviet resistance was tenacious, and losses were heavy on all sides, but by June 13 the Germans had gained the north shore of Severnaya Bay. Again spotting an opportunity — his operational gift — Manstein now devised an elegant maneuver to unhinge Soviet defenses. On the night of June 28-29 elements of his 50th Infantry Division carried out a daring amphibious crossing of Severnaya Bay on 100 assault boats, seizing the steep southern bank in their initial rush. Over the course of the day they overran Inkerman and the old Malakoff redoubt, positions so crucial to the city’s defense in 1855.

Manstein’s masterstroke fatally compromised Sevastopol’s innermost defensive ring and sealed the fate of the fortress. With the German 11th Army outside the gates, and air and artillery continuing to chew up the rubble, Soviet commanders in Sevastopol received evacuation orders late on June 30 — too late, as it turned out, and many Soviet soldiers fell needlessly into captivity. The Germans entered the city the following day, and the fighting ended on July 4.

The Crimean campaign was far from over, however. Soviet partisans continued to inhabit the Yaila Mountains, as they would for the rest of the war, and the Germans relied on their usual monstrous tactics — reprisals, hostages, mass shootings — in a futile attempt to crush the holdouts. After the German debacle at Kursk in the summer of 1943, massive Soviet counterstrokes carried the Red Army up to and over the Dnieper River. In the course of their great advance they sealed off Crimea once again, bottling up the German 17th Army in the peninsula. A great Soviet offensive into Crimea in April 1944 saw the former lineup reversed. This time it was the Germans defending Perekop and holed up inside Sevastopol, with the Soviets’ 4th Ukrainian Front, under the able command of General Fyodor Tolbukhin, trying to break them. The Soviets forced their way though Perekop in two weeks of fighting, overran the peninsula in a third week and by late April stood outside Sevastopol. The Germans hadn’t rebuilt the fortress, however, and a final Soviet assault made short work of them. In a final ironic coda the German attempt to evacuate the doomed fortress was no more skillful than the Soviet one in 1942. Losses among the 17th Army and Romanians alike were steep, though the Soviets lost nearly as many men in retaking the peninsula.

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MOSCOW ON THE MARCH Crimea’s strategic significance has not diminished since World War II. In early 2014 Russian forces invaded the area, which had been Ukrainian since the breakup of the Soviet Union.

What emerges from the military story of Crimea is more than a mere battle narrative. It is how crucial this little acre has been to so many contenders. It will never be easy to compute the number of soldiers on all sides — German, Romanian and Soviet — who perished there in the course of World War II, not to mention those who died in the Crimean War or the innumerable battles for dominance of the peninsula dating back to ancient times.

One thing is certain, however. While the number is out of all proportion to the size of the peninsula, it is not out of proportion to its location or its strategic significance. Every one of the generals who fought there would agree on that. And so, we may surmise, does Vladimir Putin.

For further reading on the Crimean War, Rob Citino recommends The Crimean War: A History, by Orlando Figes, and The War in Crimea, by Lt. Gen. Sir Edward Hamley. And for more on Crimea in World War II, Citino suggests Lost Victories, by Erich von Manstein, and Sevastopol 1942: Von Manstein’s Triumph, by Robert Forczyk.

CRIMEA: BATTLEGROUND OF EMPIRES

One could say Crimea is "on the way" — on the way to Europe if attacking west, on the way to Russia if attacking east, obtrusively on the way if conducting any operations in the Black Sea. Regardless of its target, an army on the march or navy under way must deal with Crimea, for to bypass it would leave an enemy stronghold on one’s flank or at one’s rear.

Though the eponymous Crimean War may first pop to mind in any discussion of regional conflict, the military history of the peninsula stretches far back into antiquity. The Greeks wrested it from the Tauri, the Romans from the Greeks. In turn came the Goths, Huns, Bulgars, Rus’ and other rivals before a second wave of imperial invasions by the Byzantines, Mongols, Ottoman Turks and Russians.

Despite its name, the 1853-56 Crimean War was a far broader conflict with global implications. When the Ottomans buckled and Russia sought to expand its influence, the peninsula became the main stage in an allied effort to check the czar’s power grab. Ironically, after a prolonged and costly albeit successful siege, they returned Crimea to Russian control with the coming peace.

The bitterest fighting to date came during the seesaw German-Soviet offensives of World War II, when hundreds of thousands on either side perished for the status quo.

SIEGES OF SEVASTOPOL: 1854-55 AND 1941-42

The first siege was something of a punitive action. The Russians and Turks had deadlocked on multiple fronts, and it seemed the budding Crimean War would die on the vine. But an allied fleet had already set sail. Its face-saving siege lasted a year and cost 300,000 allied lives.

The second siege was equally long and bloody. In 1941 the invading Germans dispatched an entire army to neutralize the Soviet threat in Crimea. It took nine months and sapped the greater Invasion force. When the Russians returned in 1943, the slaughter resumed.

SEVASTOPOL: THE LINCHPIN

Since its founding as a Greek colony in the 6th century BC Sevastopol has been Crimea’s primary port, central trading hub and largest city. Its navigable, protected harbor has made it a key strategic naval base and thus the target of repeated sieges. Control it and Crimea follows.

PEREKOP: THE CHOKEPOINT

Scarcely 4 miles across at its widest point, the Perekop Isthmus is the neck of land connecting Crimea and the Ukrainian mainland. As the Germans learned in 1941, an army must first bull its way through this fortified chokepoint to have any shot at controlling the peninsula. Victory comes at a terrible toll.

THE ALLURE OF CRIMEA

From antiquity to the present day Crimea has drawn vying powers wise to the advantages of a warm-water port and military projection from this pivot point amid Europe, Asia Minor and the Eurasian steppe. Whoever possessed it could strike across the sea with warships in virtually any direction and yet defend against attack by land from two narrow chokepoints. Over the centuries it has served as a buffer zone, merchant hub, slave-trading center and, in recent years, an important regional source of natural gas. Add to that its rich agriculture and livestock trade, vineyards, sandy beaches and developed infrastructure, and it’s easy to grasp the draw of this contested peninsula.

KERCH: KILLING GROUND

Site of a namesake harbor second only to Sevastopol in strategic Importance, the Kerch Peninsula has also seen its share of fighting through the centuries. None was bloodier than the slugfest of 1941-42, when the Germans stopped the Soviets cold at the Parpach narrows, claiming some 170,000 Russians.

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The Return of Geopolitics

Mead, Walter Russell
Foreign Affairs. May2014, Vol. 93 Issue 3, p69-79. 11p

The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers

So far, the year 2014 has been a tumultuous one, as geopolitical rivalries have stormed back to center stage. Whether it is Russian forces seizing Crimea, China making aggressive claims in its coastal waters, Japan responding with an increasingly assertive strategy of its own, or Iran trying to use its alliances with Syria and Hezbollah to dominate the Middle East, old-fashioned power plays are back in international relations.

The United States and the EU, at least, find such trends disturbing. Both would rather move past geopolitical questions of territory and military power and focus instead on ones of world order and global governance: trade liberalization, nuclear nonproliferation, human rights, the rule of law, climate change, and so on. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, the most important objective of U.S. and EU foreign policy has been to shift international relations away from zero-sum issues toward win-win ones. To be dragged back into old-school contests such as that in Ukraine doesn’t just divert time and energy away from those important questions; it also changes the character of international politics. As the atmosphere turns dark, the task of promoting and maintaining world order grows more daunting.

But Westerners should never have expected old-fashioned geopolitics to go away. They did so only because they fundamentally misread what the collapse of the Soviet Union meant: the ideological triumph of liberal capitalist democracy over communism, not the obsolescence of hard power. China, Iran, and Russia never bought into the geopolitical settlement that followed the Cold War, and they are making increasingly forceful attempts to overturn it. That process will not be peaceful, and whether or not the revisionists succeed, their efforts have already shaken the balance of power and changed the dynamics of international politics.

A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY

When the Cold War ended, many Americans and Europeans seemed to think that the most vexing geopolitical questions had largely been settled. With the exception of a handful of relatively minor problems, such as the woes of the former Yugoslavia and the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, the biggest issues in world politics, they assumed, would no longer concern boundaries, military bases, national self-determination, or spheres of influence.

One can’t blame people for hoping. The West’s approach to the realities of the post-Cold War world has made a great deal of sense, and it is hard to see how world peace can ever be achieved without replacing geopolitical competition with the construction of a liberal world order. Still, Westerners often forget that this project rests on the particular geopolitical foundations laid in the early 1990s.

In Europe, the post-Cold War settlement involved the unification of Germany, the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, and the integration of the former Warsaw Pact states and the Baltic republics into NATO and the EU. In the Middle East, it entailed the dominance of Sunni powers that were allied with the United States (Saudi Arabia, its Gulf allies, Egypt, and Turkey) and the double containment of Iran and Iraq. In Asia, it meant the uncontested dominance of the United States, embedded in a series of security relationships with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Indonesia, and other allies.

This settlement reflected the power realities of the day, and it was only as stable as the relationships that held it up. Unfortunately, many observers conflated the temporary geopolitical conditions of the post-Cold War world with the presumably more final outcome of the ideological struggle between liberal democracy and Soviet communism. The political scientist Francis Fukuyama’s famous formulation that the end of the Cold War meant "the end of history" was a statement about ideology. But for many people, the collapse of the Soviet Union didn’t just mean that humanity’s ideological struggle was over for good; they thought geopolitics itself had also come to a permanent end.

At first glance, this conclusion looks like an extrapolation of Fukuyama’s argument rather than a distortion of it. After all, the idea of the end of history has rested on the geopolitical consequences of ideological struggles ever since the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel first expressed it at the beginning of the nineteenth century. For Hegel, it was the Battle of Jena, in 1806, that rang the curtain down on the war of ideas. In Hegel’s eyes, Napoleon Bonaparte’s utter destruction of the Prussian army in that brief campaign represented the triumph of the French Revolution over the best army that prerevolutionary Europe could produce. This spelled an end to history, Hegel argued, because in the future, only states that adopted the principles and techniques of revolutionary France would be able to compete and survive.

Adapted to the post-Cold War world, this argument was taken to mean that in the future, states would have to adopt the principles of liberal capitalism to keep up. Closed, communist societies, such as the Soviet Union, had shown themselves to be too uncreative and unproductive to compete economically and militarily with liberal states. Their political regimes were also shaky, since no social form other than liberal democracy provided enough freedom and dignity for a contemporary society to remain stable.

To fight the West successfully, you would have to become like the West, and if that happened, you would become the kind of wishy-washy, pacifistic milquetoast society that didn’t want to fight about anything at all. The only remaining dangers to world peace would come from rogue states such as North Korea, and although such countries might have the will to challenge the West, they would be too crippled by their obsolete political and social structures to rise above the nuisance level (unless they developed nuclear weapons, of course). And thus former communist states, such as Russia, faced a choice. They could jump on the modernization bandwagon and become liberal, open, and pacifistic, or they could cling bitterly to their guns and their culture as the world passed them by.

At first, it all seemed to work. With history over, the focus shifted from geopolitics to development economics and nonproliferation, and the bulk of foreign policy came to center on questions such as climate change and trade. The conflation of the end of geopolitics and the end of history offered an especially enticing prospect to the United States: the idea that the country could start putting less into the international system and taking out more. It could shrink its defense spending, cut the State Department’s appropriations, lower its profile in foreign hotspots — and the world would just go on becoming more prosperous and more free.

This vision appealed to both liberals and conservatives in the United States. The administration of President Bill Clinton, for example, cut both the Defense Department’s and the State Department’s budgets and was barely able to persuade Congress to keep paying U.S. dues to the UN. At the same time, policymakers assumed that the international system would become stronger and wider-reaching while continuing to be conducive to U.S. interests. Republican neo-isolationists, such as former Representative Ron Paul of Texas, argued that given the absence of serious geopolitical challenges, the United States could dramatically cut both military spending and foreign aid while continuing to benefit from the global economic system.

After 9/11, President George W. Bush based his foreign policy on the belief that Middle Eastern terrorists constituted a uniquely dangerous opponent, and he launched what he said would be a long war against them. In some respects, it appeared that the world was back in the realm of history. But the Bush administration’s belief that democracy could be implanted quickly in the Arab Middle East, starting with Iraq, testified to a deep conviction that the overall tide of events was running in America’s favor.

President Barack Obama built his foreign policy on the conviction that the "war on terror" was overblown, that history really was over, and that, as in the Clinton years, the United States’ most important priorities involved promoting the liberal world order, not playing classical geopolitics. The administration articulated an extremely ambitious agenda in support of that order: blocking Iran’s drive for nuclear weapons, solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, negotiating a global climate change treaty, striking Pacific and Atlantic trade deals, signing arms control treaties with Russia, repairing U.S. relations with the Muslim world, promoting gay rights, restoring trust with European allies, and ending the war in Afghanistan. At the same time, however, Obama planned to cut defense spending dramatically and reduced U.S. engagement in key world theaters, such as Europe and the Middle East.

AN AXIS OF WEEVILS?

All these happy convictions are about to be tested. Twenty-five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, whether one focuses on the rivalry between the EU and Russia over Ukraine, which led Moscow to seize Crimea; the intensifying competition between China and Japan in East Asia; or the subsuming of sectarian conflict into international rivalries and civil wars in the Middle East, the world is looking less post-historical by the day. In very different ways, with very different objectives, China, Iran, and Russia are all pushing back against the political settlement of the Cold War.

The relationships among those three revisionist powers are complex. In the long run, Russia fears the rise of China. Tehran’s worldview has little in common with that of either Beijing or Moscow. Iran and Russia are oil-exporting countries and like the price of oil to be high; China is a net consumer and wants prices low. Political instability in the Middle East can work to Iran’s and Russia’s advantage but poses large risks for China. One should not speak of a strategic alliance among them, and over time, particularly if they succeed in undermining U.S. influence in Eurasia, the tensions among them are more likely to grow than shrink.

What binds these powers together, however, is their agreement that the status quo must be revised. Russia wants to reassemble as much of the Soviet Union as it can. China has no intention of contenting itself with a secondary role in global affairs, nor will it accept the current degree of U.S. influence in Asia and the territorial status quo there. Iran wishes to replace the current order in the Middle East — led by Saudi Arabia and dominated by Sunni Arab states — with one centered on Tehran.

Leaders in all three countries also agree that U.S. power is the chief obstacle to achieving their revisionist goals. Their hostility toward Washington and its order is both offensive and defensive: not only do they hope that the decline of U.S. power will make it easier to reorder their regions, but they also worry that Washington might try to overthrow them should discord within their countries grow. Yet the revisionists want to avoid direct confrontations with the United States, except in rare circumstances when the odds are strongly in their favor (as in Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and its occupation and annexation of Crimea this year). Rather than challenge the status quo head on, they seek to chip away at the norms and relationships that sustain it.

Since Obama has been president, each of these powers has pursued a distinct strategy in light of its own strengths and weaknesses. China, which has the greatest capabilities of the three, has paradoxically been the most frustrated. Its efforts to assert itself in its region have only tightened the links between the United States and its Asian allies and intensified nationalism in Japan. As Beijing’s capabilities grow, so will its sense of frustration. China’s surge in power will be matched by a surge in Japan’s resolve, and tensions in Asia will be more likely to spill over into global economics and politics.

Iran, by many measures the weakest of the three states, has had the most successful record. The combination of the United States’ invasion of Iraq and then its premature withdrawal has enabled Tehran to cement deep and enduring ties with significant power centers across the Iraqi border, a development that has changed both the sectarian and the political balance of power in the region. In Syria, Iran, with the help of its longtime ally Hezbollah, has been able to reverse the military tide and prop up the government of Bashar al-Assad in the face of strong opposition from the U.S. government. This triumph of realpolitik has added considerably to Iran’s power and prestige. Across the region, the Arab Spring has weakened Sunni regimes, further tilting the balance in Iran’s favor. So has the growing split among Sunni governments over what to do about the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots and adherents.

Russia, meanwhile, has emerged as the middling revisionist: more powerful than Iran but weaker than China, more successful than China at geopolitics but less successful than Iran. Russia has been moderately effective at driving wedges between Germany and the United States, but Russian President Vladimir Putin’s preoccupation with rebuilding the Soviet Union has been hobbled by the sharp limits of his country’s economic power. To build a real Eurasian bloc, as Putin dreams of doing, Russia would have to underwrite the bills of the former Soviet republics — something it cannot afford to do.

Nevertheless, Putin, despite his weak hand, has been remarkably successful at frustrating Western projects on former Soviet territory. He has stopped NATO expansion dead in its tracks. He has dismembered Georgia, brought Armenia into his orbit, tightened his hold on Crimea, and, with his Ukrainian adventure, dealt the West an unpleasant and humiliating surprise. From the Western point of view, Putin appears to be condemning his country to an ever-darker future of poverty and marginalization. But Putin doesn’t believe that history has ended, and from his perspective, he has solidified his power at home and reminded hostile foreign powers that the Russian bear still has sharp claws.

THE POWERS THAT BE

The revisionist powers have such varied agendas and capabilities that none can provide the kind of systematic and global opposition that the Soviet Union did. As a result, Americans have been slow to realize that these states have undermined the Eurasian geopolitical order in ways that complicate U.S. and European efforts to construct a post-historical, win-win world.

Still, one can see the effects of this revisionist activity in many places. In East Asia, China’s increasingly assertive stance has yet to yield much concrete geopolitical progress, but it has fundamentally altered the political dynamic in the region with the fastest-growing economies on earth. Asian politics today revolve around national rivalries, conflicting territorial claims, naval buildups, and similar historical issues. The nationalist revival in Japan, a direct response to China’s agenda, has set up a process in which rising nationalism in one country feeds off the same in the other. China and Japan are escalating their rhetoric, increasing their military budgets, starting bilateral crises with greater frequency, and fixating more and more on zero-sum competition.

Although the EU remains in a post-historical moment, the non-EU republics of the former Soviet Union are living in a very different age. In the last few years, hopes of transforming the former Soviet Union into a post-historical region have faded. The Russian occupation of Ukraine is only the latest in a series of steps that have turned eastern Europe into a zone of sharp geopolitical conflict and made stable and effective democratic governance impossible outside the Baltic states and Poland.

In the Middle East, the situation is even more acute. Dreams that the Arab world was approaching a democratic tipping point — dreams that informed U.S. policy under both the Bush and the Obama administrations — have faded. Rather than building a liberal order in the region, U.S. policymakers are grappling with the unraveling of the state system that dates back to the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement, which divided up the Middle Eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire, as governance erodes in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. Obama has done his best to separate the geopolitical issue of Iran’s surging power across the region from the question of its compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but Israeli and Saudi fears about Iran’s regional ambitions are making that harder to do. Another obstacle to striking agreements with Iran is Russia, which has used its seat on the UN Security Council and support for Assad to set back U.S. goals in Syria.

Russia sees its influence in the Middle East as an important asset in its competition with the United States. This does not mean that Moscow will reflexively oppose U.S. goals on every occasion, but it does mean that the win-win outcomes that Americans so eagerly seek will sometimes be held hostage to Russian geopolitical interests. In deciding how hard to press Russia over Ukraine, for example, the White House cannot avoid calculating the impact on Russia’s stance on the Syrian war or Iran’s nuclear program. Russia cannot make itself a richer country or a much larger one, but it has made itself a more important factor in U.S. strategic thinking, and it can use that leverage to extract concessions that matter to it.

If these revisionist powers have gained ground, the status quo powers have been undermined. The deterioration is sharpest in Europe, where the unmitigated disaster of the common currency has divided public opinion and turned the EU’S attention in on itself. The EU may have avoided the worst possible consequences of the euro crisis, but both its will and its capacity for effective action beyond its frontiers have been significantly impaired.

The United States has not suffered anything like the economic pain much of Europe has gone through, but with the country facing the foreign policy hangover induced by the Bush-era wars, an increasingly intrusive surveillance state, a slow economic recovery, and an unpopular health-care law, the public mood has soured. On both the left and the right, Americans are questioning the benefits of the current world order and the competence of its architects. Additionally, the public shares the elite consensus that in a post-Cold War world, the United States ought to be able to pay less into the system and get more out. When that doesn’t happen, people blame their leaders. In any case, there is little public appetite for large new initiatives at home or abroad, and a cynical public is turning away from a polarized Washington with a mix of boredom and disdain.

Obama came into office planning to cut military spending and reduce the importance of foreign policy in American politics while strengthening the liberal world order. A little more than halfway through his presidency, he finds himself increasingly bogged down in exactly the kinds of geopolitical rivalries he had hoped to transcend. Chinese, Iranian, and Russian revanchism haven’t overturned the post-Cold War settlement in Eurasia yet, and may never do so, but they have converted an uncontested status quo into a contested one. U.S. presidents no longer have a free hand as they seek to deepen the liberal system; they are increasingly concerned with shoring up its geopolitical foundations.

THE TWILIGHT OF HISTORY

It was 22 years ago that Fukuyama published The End of History and the Last Man, and it is tempting to see the return of geopolitics as a definitive refutation of his thesis. The reality is more complicated. The end of history, as Fukuyama reminded readers, was Hegel’s idea, and even though the revolutionary state had triumphed over the old type of regimes for good, Hegel argued, competition and conflict would continue. He predicted that there would be disturbances in the provinces, even as the heartlands of European civilization moved into a post-historical time. Given that Hegel’s provinces included China, India, Japan, and Russia, it should hardly be surprising that more than two centuries later, the disturbances haven’t ceased. We are living in the twilight of history rather than at its actual end.

A Hegelian view of the historical process today would hold that substantively little has changed since the beginning of the nineteenth century. To be powerful, states must develop the ideas and institutions that allow them to harness the titanic forces of industrial and informational capitalism. There is no alternative; societies unable or unwilling to embrace this route will end up the subjects of history rather than the makers of it.

But the road to postmodernity remains rocky. In order to increase its power, China, for example, will clearly have to go through a process of economic and political development that will require the country to master the problems that modern Western societies have confronted. There is no assurance, however, that China’s path to stable liberal modernity will be any less tumultuous than, say, the one that Germany trod. The twilight of history is not a quiet time.

The second part of Fukuyama’s book has received less attention, perhaps because it is less flattering to the West. As Fukuyama investigated what a post-historical society would look like, he made a disturbing discovery. In a world where the great questions have been solved and geopolitics has been subordinated to economics, humanity will look a lot like the nihilistic "last man" described by the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche: a narcissistic consumer with no greater aspirations beyond the next trip to the mall.

In other words, these people would closely resemble today’s European bureaucrats and Washington lobbyists. They are competent enough at managing their affairs among post-historical people, but understanding the motives and countering the strategies of old-fashioned power politicians is hard for them. Unlike their less productive and less stable rivals, post-historical people are unwilling to make sacrifices, focused on the short term, easily distracted, and lacking in courage.

The realities of personal and political life in post-historical societies are very different from those in such countries as China, Iran, and Russia, where the sun of history still shines. It is not just that those different societies bring different personalities and values to the fore; it is also that their institutions work differently and their publics are shaped by different ideas.

Societies filled with Nietzsche’s last men (and women) characteristically misunderstand and underestimate their supposedly primitive opponents in supposedly backward societies — a blind spot that could, at least temporarily, offset their countries’ other advantages. The tide of history may be flowing inexorably in the direction of liberal capitalist democracy, and the sun of history may indeed be sinking behind the hills. But even as the shadows lengthen and the first of the stars appears, such figures as Putin still stride the world stage. They will not go gentle into that good night, and they will rage, rage against the dying of the light.

PHOTO (COLOR): Boots on the ground: armed Russians in Perevalnoe, Crimea, Ukraine, March 2014

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WALTER RUSSELL MEAD is James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College and Editor-at-Large of The American Interest.